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Abstract
In this thesis, an H∞-constrained incentive Stackelberg games for stochastic
systems with deterministic external disturbances are investigated. As part of
the preliminary study, some results of the deterministic system are also pre-
sented. Although we focus on continuous-time, we have studied dynamic
games for both discrete- and continuous-time systems. In the case of discrete-
time, both deterministic and stochastic systems are investigated. One leader
and multiple followers are considered for both ﬁnite- and inﬁnite-time cases.
We also studied multiple leaders and multiple followers for a continuous-time
stochastic system. To simplify the calculation, only the inﬁnite-time horizon
of continuous-time is emphasized.
In the incentive Stackelberg game, players are divided into two categories; the
leader group and the follower group. For a single leader game, incentive Stack-
elberg strategy is an extensive idea in which the leader can achieve his team-
optimal solution in a Stackelberg game. Multiple leaders and multiple follow-
ers have made the game more complex and challenging. In the leaders’ group
and followers’ group, players are supposed to be non-cooperativ; subsequently,
Nash equilibrium is investigated. Several theorems and lemmas are designed
to study the incentive Stackelberg game problems. For multiple leader games,
an incentive structure is developed in such a way that leaders achieve Nash
equilibrium by attenuating the disturbance under H∞-constrained. Simultane-
ously, followers achieve their Nash equilibrium ensuring the incentive Stack-
elberg strategies of the leaders while the worst-case disturbance is considered.
The deterministic disturbances and their attenuation to stochastic systems un-
der the H∞-constrained is one of the main attractions of this thesis. Problems
involving deterministic disturbance must be attenuated at a given target called
disturbance attenuation level γ > 0. Surprisingly, the concept of solving the
disturbance reduction problem under the H∞-constrained seems like a Nash
equilibrium between the disturbance input and the control input.
In this research, a very general and simple linear stochastic system governed
by Itoˆ differential equation has been studied. This thesis studies the most com-
mon linear quadratic (LQ) optimal control in the game problems. In order to
solve the LQ problem, stochastic dynamic programming (SDP) and stochastic
maximum principle [Peng (1990)] are used. Cooperative game problems and
non-cooperative game problems are solved based on the concepts of Pareto
optimality and Nash equilibrium solutions, respectively. Several basic prob-
lems are completely solved and useful for current research. The main task to
solve the LQ problem is to ﬁnd a matrix solution of algebraic Riccati equa-
tions (AREs). Newton’s method and Lyapunov iterative method are used to
solve such AREs.
However, the main objective of this research is to investigate the incentives
Stackelberg strategy, preliminary research and synthesis of LPV systems for
multiple decision makers. We aim to better understand to implement our cur-
rent idea for LPV system in the future. H∞-constrained Pareto optimal strategy
for stochastic linear parameter varying (LPV) systems with multiple decision
makers is investigated. The modiﬁed stochastic bounded real lemma and lin-
ear quadratic control (LQC) for the stochastic LPV systems are reformulated
by means of linear matrix inequalities (LMIs). In order to decide the strategy-
set of multiple decision makers, Pareto optimal strategy is considered for each
player and the H∞-constrained is imposed. The solvability conditions of the
problem are established from cross-coupled matrix inequalities (CCMIs). Sev-
eral academic and real-life numerical examples have also been resolved to
demonstrate the usefulness of our proposed schemes.
This thesis consists of seven chapters. In Chapter 1, the research background,
motivation, research survey, objectives and outlines of the thesis are described.
Some basic deﬁnitions and preliminary results are also introduced in this chap-
ter. Chapter 2 of the thesis summarizes some of the preliminary mathemat-
ical problems based on discrete-time and continuous-time stochastic optimal
control. The exogenous disturbance problem and its attenuation of the H∞-
constrained are presented. In Chapter 3, the incentive Stackelberg game for
a discrete-time deterministic system is considered. It explains two levels of
hierarchy with one leader and multiple followers. Followers are supposed
to act non-cooperatively. Exogenous disturbance also exists in the system
and is attenuated under the H∞-constrained. Chapter 4 investigates the in-
centive Stackelberg game for discrete-time stochastic systems. The structure
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of the game is very similar to Chapter 3. It is a single leader and multiple
non-cooperative followers with exogenous disturbance which is attenuated un-
der the H∞-constrained in the 2-level hierarchy. Therefore, Chapter 4 can be
viewed as the stochastic version of the deterministic game described in Chapter
3. In Chapter 5, the continuous-time incentive Stackelberg games for multiple
leader and multiple followers are investigated. The external disturbance is in-
cluded with the system, as usual. The information pattern of the game is more
complex than before. Each leader must achieve Nash equilibrium and use the
H∞-constrained to reduce the external disturbance. Each leader separately an-
nounces the declares incentive Stackelberg strategies for each follower. Each
follower employs a leader incentive mechanism that follows the Nash equilib-
rium in a follower group. Leaders and followers do not cooperate with their
group. Chapter 6 discusses the Pareto optimal strategy for stochastic LPV sys-
tem with multiple decision makers. In the dynamic game of uncertain stochas-
tic systems, multiple participants can be used for more realistic plants. The
system includes disturbances that are attenuated under the H∞-constrained. Fi-
nally, in Chapter 7, the thesis is concluded with some motivating guidelines for
future research.
In this thesis, two appendices are included. The Appendix A discusses how
to solve convex optimization problems using linear matrix inequalities (LMIs)
and special cases to solve systems and control theory problems. Some pre-
liminary results on static output feedback optimal control are given in Ap-
pendix B. Here we consider the linear quadratic optimal cost control prob-
lem for stochastic Itoˆ differential equations. Several deﬁnitions, theorems, and
lemmas are studied for future research. To solve the output feedback control
problem, Newton’s algorithm and corresponding MATLAB codes are already
developed. Numerical examples of a very basic problem have been solved.
The problem is already formulated for future investigation.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Game theory is a mathematical model for studies of conﬂict and cooperation among in-
telligent rational decision makers. Game theory is mainly applied to economics, politics,
psychology, logic, and computer science. Initially, it involved a zero-sum game in which
one’s earnings led to the loss of other. Nowadays game theory applies to a wide range of
behavioral relationships. It is a general term for the logical decision science of humans,
animals, and computers. Game theory is related to strategic interactions among multiple
decision makers and named players. Every player has a nontrivial strategy chosen based on
the payoff, i.e., each player has an objective function to maximize, called proﬁt function, or
to minimize, called cost function. In a multi-player game, each player’s objective function
consists of at least one other player’s choices called decision variables. The decision vari-
able is the amount managed by the decision maker. A decision variable that determines the
value that generates the optimum value of the objective function. The cooperative game
investigates the relative amount of power each player holds in these alliance games, or how
the alliance allocates their returns. This applies to what happens in political science or
international relations and the concept of power. On the other hand, if cooperation is not
allowed between players, we call the game non-cooperative game. The non-cooperative
game concerns the analysis of strategic choices. In this case, two or more players cannot
move together from the solution point. The solution point where players can take bene-
ﬁt from unilateral movements is called Nash Equilibrium, and is named after John Nash.
A non-cooperative game is called zero-sum if the sum of the players’ objective functions
equals zero. The zero-sum game is a mathematical representation in which each player’s
utility gain or loss is completely balanced with the loss or gain of other player’s utility. If
the players’ total returns add up and subtract the total loss, they will total zero. Similarly,
we can deﬁne nonzero-sum and constant sum game. If the player’s behavior uniquely deter-
mines the result captured by the objective function, the game is considered deterministic.
In deterministic games, player action solutions produce completely predictable results. On
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the other hand, if at least one player’s objective function is a known probability distribution
of an additional variable (state), then, it becomes stochastic game. The stochastic game
is a dynamic game with a stochastic transition to be played by one or more players. If no
player can get any information about the behavior of any other player, it is called a dynamic
game. On the other hand, if players can only access the information shared by all, we say
the game is static. If the evolution of the decision-making process (controlled by the player
over time) occurs in a continuous period of time and usually involves a differential equa-
tion, the dynamic game is considered a differential game. If it occurs on a discrete-time
horizon case, a dynamic game is called a discrete time game.
1.1 Research background and motivation
CP
Leader’s Control Follower’s Control
Fig. 1.1: Packet switch in a loop architecture.
The engineering application of the incentive Stackelberg strategy is a scheduling
problem of packet switches working in the loop structure (Figure 1.1) introduced by
[Saksena and Cruz (1985)]. Communication in high-speed networks can be switched opti-
cally or electronically. Although optical switches are advantageous for circuit switching, it
is generally considered difﬁcult to combine them with packet switching. In packet switch-
ing and scheduling, the switch provides lossless communications for sessions with certain
smoothing attributes and allows the use of input ﬂow control to translate the session into a
smooth session. When switching between connections according to a scheduling strategy,
inbound packets on each connection are stored in a limited-capacity buffer and managed
by the central processor. Packets are rejected, when the buffer is full. When the central
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processor serves a particular connection, the buffering force of the connection is controlled
locally based on the state information of the buffer. The goal of the local controller is to
maximize the data transmission on the connection. On the other hand, the central processor
knows the state of all connection buffers and all local controllers’ control actions. The goal
of the central processor is to use scheduling policies to maximize the total data transmis-
sion from all connections. In this problem, the central processor is represented as a leader
and the local connection controller is represented as a follower. The problem information
structure allows the leader to access the follower’s decision value and observations at each
stage of the process. However, our motivation is that the incentive Stackelberg strategy
for the above problem comes from static games, our goal is to deal with more challenging
dynamic games. Furthermore, dynamic games using the stochastic system make the thesis
more informative.
1.2 Stochastic differential equations
Since the problem investigated in this thesis refers to a stochastic control system, we recall
some facts on the stochastic differential equations.
Deﬁnition 1.1. [Dragan et al. (2006)] A measurable space is an ordered pair (X , A ), in
which X is a set and A is a σ -algebra of subsets of X, that is, A is a family of subsets
A⊂ X such that
(i) X ∈A ;
(ii) If A ∈A , then X −A ∈A ;
(iii) If An ∈A , n≥ 1, then ∪∞n=1An ∈A .
Deﬁnition 1.2. [Dragan et al. (2006)] For a measurable space (X , A ), a function μ :
A → [0,∞] is called a measure if:
(i) μ( /0) = 0
(ii) if An ∈A , n≥ 1 and Ai∩Aj = /0 for i = j, then
μ(∪∞n=1An) =
∞
∑
n=1
μ(An).
A triplet (X , A , μ) is called a space with measure. If μ(X) = 1, then μ =P is a probability
on A and the triplet (X , A , P) is called a probability space.
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Deﬁnition 1.3. [Dragan et al. (2006)] An r-dimensional stochastic process x(t), t ∈ [0,∞)
is called a stochastic process with independent increments if for all 0= t0 < t1 < · · ·< tN =
t, the random vectors x(t0), x(t1)− x(t0), . . . ,x(tN)− x(tN−1) are independent.
Deﬁnition 1.4. [Dragan et al. (2006)] A stochastic process w = {w(t)}t∈[0,∞) in a proba-
bility space (X , A , P) is called a standard Brownian motion or a standard Wiener process
if:
(i) w(0) = 0;
(ii) with probability 1, the function t → w(t) is continuous in t;
(iii) w(t) is a stochastic process with independent increments and the increment w(t+ s)−
w(s) has the normal distribution N(0, t) with t, s ∈ [0, ∞);
(iv) E[w(t)] = 0, t ∈ [0, ∞), E[|w(t)−w(s)|2] = |t− s| with t, s ∈ [0, ∞).
1.2.1 Stochastic integrals
Through the one dimensional Wiener process w(t) ∈ R, let us deﬁne a continuous sample
path as a solution to the following stochastic differential equation:
dx(t) = f (t, x(t))dt+g(t, x(t))dw(t), x(0) = x0, (1.1)
for all t ∈ [0, ∞), x ∈ Rn. Basically, the stochastic differential equation (1.1) is the repre-
sentation of the following integral sign.
x(t) = x0+
∫ t
0
f (s, x(s))ds+
∫ t
0
g(s, x(s))dw(s). (1.2)
The last integral term on the right side of equation (1.2) is called a stochastic integral.
For a suitable function g [Higham (2001)], the integral
∫ T
0 g(t)dt can be approximated
by Riemann-Stieltjes integral with the sum
N−1
∑
k=0
g(tk)(tk+1− tk), (1.3)
where the discrete points tk = kδ t were already introduced. The Riemann sum in (1.3) is
based on left end-point. In fact, the integral is deﬁned by taking the limit δ t → 0 in (1.3).
Using a similar idea, we can consider the sum of the form
N−1
∑
k=0
g(tk)(w(tk+1)−w(tk)). (1.4)
By analogy with (1.3), it can be considered as an approximation of the stochastic integral∫ T
0 g(t)dw(t). This is known as the Itoˆ integral. Here, we integrate g with respect to the
Wiener process w(t).
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Remark 1.1. The trajectory of the Wiener process has an inﬁnite change in any interval
[0, T ], T > 0. In other words, for any δ > 0,
P
[
N−1
∑
k=0
|w(tk+1)−w(tk)|> δ
]
→ 1, (1.5)
holds as max(tk+l − tk) → 0, 0 = t0 < tl < .. . < tN = T . It should be noted that be-
cause of (1.5), the Itoˆ stochastic integral can fail to exist in the sense of Riemann-Stieltjes
[Afanasiev et al. (2013)].
An alternative approach to the Riemann sum (1.3) based on mid-point can be written as
N−1
∑
k=0
g
(
tk+ tk+1
2
)
(tk+1− tk). (1.6)
The corresponding alternative to (1.4) is
N−1
∑
k=0
g
(
tk+ tk+1
2
)
(w(tk+1)−w(tk)). (1.7)
The ‘mid-point’ sum (1.7) is known as Stratonovich integral.
1.2.2 Itoˆ’s formula
Let us deﬁne a scalar function V (t, x) for which the partial derivatives Vt , Vx and Vxx exist.
If the process x(t) possesses the following stochastic differential equation:
dx(t) = f (t)dt+σ(t)dw(t). (1.8)
then the process θ(t) = V (t,x(t)) also has a stochastic differential dθ(t), deﬁned by the
following formula:
dθ(t) =
[
Vt(t, x(t))+VTx (t, x(t)) f (t)
+
1
2
Tr[σ(t)σT (t)Vxx(t, x(t))]
]
dt+VTx (t, x(t))σ(t)dw(t), (1.9)
where Tr is the trace of a matrix; Vx ∈ Rn is the vector with components ∂V∂xi ; Vxx is the
square matrix with elements ∂
2V
∂xi∂x j
, (i, j = 1, . . . ,N) [Afanasiev et al. (2013)].
Proof. Let us consider two arbitrary moments τ1 and τ2 (τ1 < τ2). Let us divide the interval
[τ1, τ2] into some sub-intervals as follows:
τ1 = t0 < t1 < · · ·< tN = τ2.
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Therefore,
θ(τ2)−θ(τ1) =
N−1
∑
i=0
[V (ti+1, x(ti+1))−V (ti, x(ti))]. (1.10)
Applying Taylor’s formula on the term of right hand side, we obtain
V (ti+1, x(ti+1))−V (ti, x(ti))
=Vt(ti+αi(ti+1− ti), x(ti))(ti+1− ti)
+VTx (ti, x(ti))(x(ti+1)− x(ti))
+
1
2
Tr
[
Vxx (ti, x(ti)+λi(x(ti+1)− x(ti)))
× (x(ti+1)− x(ti))(x(ti+1)− x(ti))
]
,
where, αi and λi are some numbers form the interval [0, 1]. The increment of the process
x(t) of the equation (1.8) can be represented by
x(ti+1)− x(ti) = f (ti)(ti+1− ti)+σ(t j)(w(ti+1)−w(ti)), (1.11)
with max[ti+1− ti]→ 0. Therefore,
V (ti+1, x(ti+1))−V (ti, x(ti))
= [Vt(ti, x(ti))+VTx (ti, x(ti)) f (t j)](ti+1− ti)
+VTx (ti, x(ti))σ(t j)](w(ti+1)−w(ti))
+
1
2
Tr[Vxx(ti, x(ti))σ(ti)σT (ti)(ti+1− ti)].
Finally, from (1.10) we can obtain,
θ(t2)−θ(t1) =
N−1
∑
i=0
[[
Vt(ti, x(ti))+VTx (ti, x(ti)) f (ti)
+
1
2
Tr[Vxx(ti, x(ti))σ(ti)σT (ti)]
]
(ti+1− ti)
+VTx (ti, x(ti))σ(t j)](w(ti+1)−w(ti))
]
.
By observing the limits of all sums in this expression, it becomes as follows:
dθ(t) =
[
Vt(t, x(t))+VTx (t, x(t)) f (t)
+
1
2
Tr[σ(t)σT (t)Vxx(t, x(t))]
]
dt+VTx (t, x(t))σ(t)dw(t), (1.12)
Hence, Itoˆ’s formula is proved.
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1.2.3 Stochastic differential games
Stochastic differential games are a type of decision-making problem in which the evolution
of states is described by stochastic differential equations and the players work throughout
a time interval [Bas¸ar and Olsder (1999)]. An N-person stochastic differential game within
a ﬁxed duration involves the following:
(i) An index set N = {1, . . . , N} is called players’ set.
(ii) The prior information about time, [0, T ] is called time domain.
(iii) An inﬁnite set S0 ∈ Rn with some topological structure containing elements {x(t) ∈
S0, 0≤ t ≤ T} is called the game’s trajectory space. Its elements {x(t), 0≤ t ≤ T}
constitutes the game’s allowable state trajectory. Furthermore, for each ﬁxed t ∈
[0, T ], x(t) ∈ S0.
(iv) An inﬁnite set Si ∈ Rmi with some topological structure, deﬁned for each i ∈ N
called the control (action) space of i-th player, Pi, whose elements {ui(t), 0≤ t ≤ T}
are the controls of Pi. Furthermore, for each ﬁxed t ∈ [0, T ], ui(t) ∈ Si.
(v) A stochastic differential equation
dx(t) = f (t, x(t), u1(t), ..., uN(t))dt+σ(t, x(t))dw(t), x(0) = x0, (1.13)
whose solution represents the state trajectory of the game. Here, σ(t, x(t)) is an
m×θ matrix and w(t) is a θ dimensional Wiener process.
(vi) A set of value functions ηi(·) deﬁned for each i ∈N
ηi(t) = {x(s), 0≤ s≤ ε it}, 0≤ ε it ≤ t, (1.14)
where ε it is non-decreasing in t, and ηi(t) determines the state information gained and
recalled by Pi at time t ∈ [0, T ]. Speciﬁcation of ηi(·) characterizes the information
structure/pattern of Pi.
(vii) A sigma-ﬁeld Nit , in S0, generated for each i ∈N by the set {x(s) ∈ B | 0≤ s≤ ε it},
where B⊂ S0 is a Borel set - is called the information ﬁeld of Pi.
(viii) A pre-speciﬁed class Γi of mappings
γi : [0, T ]×S0 → Si,
with the property that ui(t) = γi(t, x) is Nit -measurable (i.e. it is adapted to the
information ﬁeld Nit ). Γi is the strategy space of Pi and each of its elements γi is a
permissible strategy for Pi.
7
(ix) Two functions qi : S0 → R, gi : [0, T ]× S0 × S1 × ·· · × SN → R deﬁned for each
i ∈N , so that the composite functional
Ji(u1, ..., uN) = E
[∫ T
0
gi(t, x(t), u1(t), ..., uN(t))dt+qi(x(T ))
]
. (1.15)
is well deﬁned for every u j(t) = γ j(t, x), γ j ∈ Γ j( j ∈N ), and for each i∈N , Ji is the cost
functional of Pi in a ﬁxed duration stochastic differential game and E[·] is the expectation
operator.
1.2.4 Optimal control
The optimal control is a speciﬁc branch of modern control to provide an attractive analysis
design. The ﬁnal result of an optimal design is not considered to be stable, having a certain
bandwidth, or satisfying any kind of ideal constraints related to classical control. However,
it is considered to be the best type of a particular system – therefore, the term optimal.
Linear optimal control is a special kind of optimal control in which the controlled device
is assumed to be linear, and the controller, which generates the optimal control, is limited
to linear. A linear controller operating with a quadratic performance optimization index
is called a linear quadratic (LQ) method. We focus on linear quadratic control problems
where the cost functional is quadratic and the state equation is linear. The control theory of
deterministic systems strongly inﬂuences the research of stochastic optimal control prob-
lems, in which the state of the system is represented by a stochastic process. In the long
history of stochastic systems studies, the class associated with white noise perturbations at-
tracted a lot of attention to the control literature. The goal of optimization is very common
because it can be viewed in different ways depending on the method.
It is worth mentioning that this thesis only studies the convex optimization problem.
That is, the weighting matrix of all linear quadratic costs in this thesis is assumed to be
positive deﬁnite/positive semi-deﬁnite.
Consider the following stochastic LQ system
dx(t) = [Ax(t)+Bu(t)]dt+Apx(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0, (1.16a)
J(x0; u) = E
[∫ ∞
0
[xT (t)Qx(t)+uT (t)Ru(t) dx
]
, (1.16b)
with Q≥ 0 and R > 0.
According to [Rami and Zhou (2000)], let us deﬁne a subset I of Sn
I  {X ∈ Sn | det[R] = 0}. (1.17)
8
It should be noted that I = φ when R is nonsingular.
Let is deﬁne the following stochastic algebraic Riccati operator R : I → Sn by
R(X) ATX +XA+ATpXAp+Q−XBR−1BTX . (1.18)
Moreover, let us introduce the following subset P of Sn as
P  {P ∈ Sn | R(P)≥ 0, R > 0}. (1.19)
By applying Schur’s lemma, we can write (1.19) as the following LMI format:
P  {P ∈ Sn | M(P)≥ 0, R > 0}, (1.20)
where
M(X)
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
ATX +XA+ATpXAp+Q XB
BTX R
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ . (1.21)
P is then seen to be convex as M is afﬁne [Rami and Zhou (2000)].
1.2.5 Non-cooperative games
In order to express non-cooperative games, the following objects are necessary:
• the number of players,
• the actions that each player may take and the restrictions imposed on them,
• objective function for each player to optimize,
• if the player is allowed to perform multiple actions, the time sequence of the actions,
• the information pattern and at what point each player can use information based on
past actions of other players,
• whether the player’s behavior is the result of a ﬁxed (known) distribution of stochastic
events or not.
Accordingly, we consider an N-player game, with P1, ...,PN denoting the Players set. The
decision or action variable of Player i is denoted by xi ∈ Xi, where Xi is the action set of
Player i. The action set could be a ﬁnite set, for example, with N = 2, we could have
a coupled constraint set described by: 0 ≤ x1,x2 ≤ 1, x1 + x2 ≤ 1. If we consider the
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objective/cost function of Player i will be denoted by Ji(xi,x−i), where x−i stands for the
action variables of all players except the i-th one.
LetΩ∈X be the constraint set where the actions variables are feasible. Now, an N-tuple
of action variables x∗ ∈Ω constitutes a Nash equilibrium (or, non-cooperative equilibrium)
(NE) if, for all i ∈ N ,
Ji(x∗i ,x
∗
−i)≤ Ji(xi,x∗−i), ∀ xi ∈ Xi, such that (xi,x∗−i) ∈Ω. (1.22)
If N = 2, and J1 = −J2 = J, then we have a two-player zero-sum game (ZSG), with
Player 1 minimizing J and Player 2 maximizing the same quantity. In this case, the Nash
equilibrium becomes the saddle-point equilibrium(SPE)
J(x∗1,x2)≤ J(x∗1,x∗2)≤ J(x1,x∗2), ∀(x1,x2) ∈ X . (1.23)
This also implies that the order in which minimization and maximization are carried out is
inconsequential, that is
min
x1∈X1
max
x2∈X2
J(x1,x2) = max
x2∈X2
min
x1∈X1
J(x1,x2) = J(x∗1,x
∗
2) =: J
∗. (1.24)
We then say in this case that the zero-sum game does not have a saddle point in pure
strategies if
min
x1∈X1
max
x2∈X2
J(x1,x2)> max
x2∈X2
min
x1∈X1
J(x1,x2). (1.25)
This opens the door for looking for a mixed-strategy equilibrium.
With just replacing xi’s by pi’s, where pi ∈Pi is the set of all probability distributions
on Xi, a pair (p∗1, p
∗
2) constitutes a mixed-strategy saddle-point equilibrium (MSSPE), if
J(p∗1, p2)≤ J(p∗1, p∗2)≤ J(p1, p∗2), ∀(p1, p2) ∈P1×P2, (1.26)
where
J(p1, p2) = Ep1,p2 [J(x1,x2)].
Similarly, if there exists no Nash equilibrium for an N-player game, the n-tuple (p∗1, ..., p
∗
N)
is in mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE) if
Ji(p∗i , p
∗
−i)≤ Ji(pi, p∗−i), ∀pi ∈Pi. (1.27)
A precise deﬁnition of extensive form of a dynamic game now follows.
Deﬁnition 1.5. Extensive form of an N-person nonzero-sum ﬁnite game without chance
moves is a tree structure with
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(i) a speciﬁc vertex indicating the starting point of the game,
(ii) N cost functions, each one assigning a real number to each terminal vertex of the
tree, where the i-th cost function determines the loss to be incurred to Pi,
(iii) a partition of the nodes of the tree into N player sets,
(iv) a subpartition of each player set into information sets {η ij}, such that the same num-
ber branches emanate from every node belonging to the same information set and no
node follows another node in the same information set.
1.2.6 Cooperative games
In the cooperative game, the strategies of individual players are concentrated in the coali-
tion. If the players are able to reach a cooperation agreement so that the choice of action
or decision can be made collectively and with complete trust, the game is called a coop-
erative. One of the main problems in the cooperative game is how to fairly distribute the
big coalition rewards among players. If the solution can be found in vector form, it can
represent the task of each player. In this thesis, we propose the Pareto concept, which was
named after the economist Vilfredo Pareto, for the cooperative games. Let us consider the
following linear stochastic system with linear quadratic cost functions:
dx(t) = [Ax(t)+
N
∑
i=1
Biui(t)]dt+Apx(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0, (1.28a)
Ji (x0, u1, . . . ,uN) :=
1
2
E
[∫ ∞
0
[
xT (t)Qix(t)+
N
∑
j=1
uTj (t)Ri ju j(t)
]
dt
]
, (1.28b)
where Qi = QTi ≥ 0, Ri j = RTi j ≥ 0 for i = j and Rii = RTii > 0, i, j = 1, . . . ,N.
Deﬁnition 1.6. A strategy-set (u1, · · · ,uN) is said to be a Pareto optimal strategy if it
minimizes a sum of the cost of functional of all players denoted by
J(u1, · · · ,uN) =
N
∑
i=1
riJi(x0, u1, · · · ,uN), (1.29)
where ∑Ni=1 ri = 1 for some 0< ri < 1.
Theorem 1.1. For the stochastic optimal control problem (1.28), the optimal linear feed-
back strategy for the a Pareto game is given by
u∗(t) =−R−1BTPx(t). (1.30)
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where PT = P ≥ 0 is the solution of the following stochastic algebraic Riccati equation
(SARE):
PA+ATP+Q−PBR−1BTP+ATpPAp = 0 (1.31)
with
B :=
[
B1, . . . ,BN
]
,
u(t) :=
⎡
⎢⎣u1(t)...
uN(t)
⎤
⎥⎦ ,
Q :=
N
∑
i=1
riQi,
R := block diag
[
∑Ni=1 riRi1 . . . ∑
N
i=1 riRiN
]
.
Proof. If we centralized the system (1.28) base on the Deﬁnition 1.6, we can can rewrite it
as follows:
dx(t) = [Ax(t)+Bu(t)]dt+Apx(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0, (1.32a)
J(x0, u) :=
1
2
E
[∫ ∞
0
(
xT (t)Qx(t)+uT (t)Ru(t)
)
dt
]
, (1.32b)
where
B :=
[
B1, . . . ,BN
]
,
u(t) :=
⎡
⎢⎣u1(t)...
uN(t)
⎤
⎥⎦ ,
Q :=
N
∑
i=1
riQi,
R := block diag
[
∑Ni=1 riRi1 . . . ∑
N
i=1 riRiN
]
.
With the control (1.30) the system (1.32) becomes
dx(t) = [A−BR−1BTP]x(t)dt+Apx(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0, (1.33a)
J(x0, u∗) :=
1
2
E
[∫ ∞
0
(
xT (t)Qx(t)+ xT (t)PBR−1BTPx(t)
)
dt
]
,
=
1
2
E
[∫ ∞
0
xT (t)[Q+PBR−1BTP]x(t)dt
]
. (1.33b)
Let V (x(t)) = x(t)TPx(t) be the Lyapunov candidate for the system (1.32), where P is a
symmetric positive semi-deﬁnite matrix. Now applying Itoˆ’s formula, we obtain
dV (x(t)) =Vx[A−BR−1BTP]x(t)+ 12x
T (t)ApVxxApx(t)
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= xT (t)[[A−BR−1BTP]TP+P[A−BR−1BTP]+ATpPAp]x(t), (1.34)
which is stable if dV (x(t)) < 0. If (A, Ap | C) is exactly observable, we can form the
Lyapunov stabilizable equation. By integrating and taking expectoration operator (E[·]) in
(1.34) as follows:
E
[∫ ∞
0
xT (t)[[A−BR−1BTP]TP+P[A−BR−1BTP]+ATpPAp]x(t)dt
]
=−E
[∫ ∞
0
xT (t)[Q+PBR−1BTP]x(t)dt
]
, (1.35)
i.e.,
[A−BR−1BTP]TP+P[A−BR−1BTP]+ATpPAp+Q+PBR−1BTP = 0. (1.36)
After simpliﬁcation we can ﬁnd
PA+ATP+Q−PBR−1BTP+ATpPAp = 0. (1.37)
Hence, the ﬁrst part of Theorem 1.1 is proved.
1.2.7 Nash games
Deﬁnition 1.7. An N-tuple of strategies
u∗ := {u∗1,u∗2, . . . , u∗N},
with u∗i ∈Ui, i ∈N constitutes a Nash equilibria for an N-person nonzero-sum ﬁnite game,
if the following N inequalities are satisﬁed for all ui ∈Ui, i ∈ N:
J∗i := Ji(x
0, u∗1, ... ,u
∗
N)≤ Ji(x0, u∗1, ... , u∗i−1, ui, u∗i+1, ... ,u∗N). (1.38)
where The N-tuple of quantities {J∗1 , . . . ,J∗N} is known as a Nash equilibrium outcome of
the nonzerosum ﬁnite game.
Let us consider the following linear stochastic system with linear quadratic cost func-
tions,
dx(t) = [Ax(t)+
N
∑
i=1
Biui(t)]dt+Apx(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0, (1.39a)
Ji(x0, u1, ... ,uN) = E
[∫ ∞
0
[xT (t)Qix(t)+uTi (t)Riui(t)]dt
]
, (1.39b)
where with Qi = QTi ≥ 0 and Ri = RTi > 0, i = 1, . . . ,N.
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Theorem 1.2. The optimal linear feedback strategies for the Nash games are given by
u∗i (t) = Kix(t) =−R−1i BTi Pix(t). (1.40)
where PTi = Pi ≥ 0 is the solution of the following stochastic algebraic Riccati equation
(SARE):
Pi
(
A−
N
∑
j=1, j =i
B jR−1j B
T
j
)
+
(
A−
N
∑
j=1, j =i
B jR−1j B
T
j
)T
Pi
+Qi−PiBiR−1i BTi Pi+ATpPiAp = 0. (1.41)
Proof. The stochastic system (1.39a) can be rewritten for i-th player considering others
players optimal strategy as follows:
dx(t) =
[(
A−
N
∑
j=1, j =i
B jR−1j B
T
j
)
x(t)+Biui(t)
]
dt+Apx(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0,
= [Ax(t)+Biui(t)]dt+Apx(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0, (1.42)
where
A= A−
N
∑
j=1, j =i
B jR−1j B
T
j .
Let V (x(t)) = x(t)TPix(t) be the Lyapunov candidate for the system (1.39), where Pi is a
symmetric positive semi-deﬁnite matrix. Now applying Itoˆ’s formula, we obtain
dV (x(t)) =Vx[A−BiR−1i BTi P]x(t)+
1
2
xT (t)ApVxxApx(t)
= xT (t)[[A−BiR−1i BTi Pi]TPi+Pi[A−BiR−1i BTi Pi]+ATpPiAp]x(t), (1.43)
which is stable if dV (x(t)) < 0. If (A, Ap | C) is exactly observable, we can form the
Lyapunov stabilizable equation. By integrating and taking expectoration operator (E[·]) in
(1.43) as follows:
E
[∫ ∞
0
xT (t)[[A−BiR−1i BTi Pi]TPi+Pi[A−BiR−1i BTi Pi]+ATpPiAp]x(t)dt
]
=−E
[∫ ∞
0
xT (t)[Qi+PiBiR−1i B
T
i Pi]x(t)dt
]
, (1.44)
i.e.,
[A−BiR−1i BTi Pi]TPi+Pi[A−BiR−1i BTi Pi]+ATpPiAp+Qi+PiBiR−1i BTi Pi = 0. (1.45)
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After simpliﬁcation we can ﬁnd
PiA+ATPi+Qi−PiBiR−1i BTi Pi+ATpPiAp = 0, (1.46)
or,
Pi
(
A−
N
∑
j=1, j =i
B jR−1j B
T
j
)
+
(
A−
N
∑
j=1, j =i
B jR−1j B
T
j
)T
Pi
+Qi−PiBiR−1i BTi Pi+ATpPiAp = 0. (1.47)
Hence, the ﬁrst part of Theorem 1.2 is proved.
1.2.8 Stackelberg game
The concept of a Nash equilibrium solution is that there is no speciﬁc player controlling
the decision process. However, there are other types of non-cooperative decision problems
in which one participant has the ability to perform his/her strategy on other participants,
and for such decision problems, a hierarchical equilibrium solution concept must be intro-
duced. With regard to the work of H. von Stackelberg (1934), players who occupy a strong
position in such a decision-making problem are called leaders, and other players involved
in the decision-making of leaders are called followers. In two-player differential games,
the existence of a hierarchy in decision-making implies that one of the players is in a po-
sition to determine his/her strategy ahead of time, announce it, and enforce it on the other
players. Therefore, the Stackelberg solution is the only possible hierarchical equilibrium
solution applicable in such decision-making problems, called Stackelberg games. A hierar-
chical equilibrium solution in Stackelberg games is generally called a Stackelberg strategy.
Although there are many levels of hierarchy in the decision-making process, we limit the
discussion here to two levels.
Let us consider the following stochastic system with linear quadratic cost functionals
in the case of inﬁnite-horizon:
dx(t) = [Ax(t)+B0u0(t)+B1u1(t)]dt+Apx(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0, (1.48a)
J0(x0, u0, u1) :=
1
2
E
[∫ ∞
0
(
xT (t)Q0x(t)+uT0 (t)R00u0(t)+u
T
1 (t)R01u1(t)
)
dt
]
, (1.48b)
J1(x0, u0, u1) :=
1
2
E
[∫ ∞
0
(
xT (t)Q1x(t)+uT0 (t)R10u0(t)+u
T
1 (t)R11u1(t)
)
dt
]
= 0,
(1.48c)
where A, B0, B1, Ap, Qi = QTi ≥ 0, Rii = RTii > 0 and Ri j = RTi j ≥ 0, i = j, for i, j = 0,1
are the coefﬁcient matrices of suitable dimensions. Assume that the Stackelberg game
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consists of two players. The initial state x(0) = x0 is assumed to be a random variable
with a covariance matrix E[x(0)xT (0)] = In.The subscript i = 0 represents the leader and
i = 1 represents the follower. Assuming that both players adopt a closed loop strategy, the
following deﬁnitions can be introduced.
Deﬁnition 1.8. For any admissible strategy-set (u0, u1) ∈ U, the strategy-set (u0, u1) is
called a Stackelberg strategy if the following conditions hold.
J0(x0, u∗0, u
∗
1)≤ J0(x0, u0, u01(u0)), ∀u0 ∈ Rm0 , (1.49)
where
J1(x0, u0, u01(u0)) =minu1
J1(x0, u0, u1), (1.50)
and
u∗1 = u
0
1(u
∗
0). (1.51)
It is well-known that the closed-loop Stackelberg strategies for the linear quadratic
problems have the following form:
ui = Kix(t), i = 0, 1. (1.52)
Let us assume that (A, Bi, Ap), i = 0, 1 is stabilizable and (A, Ap), i = 0, 1 are exactly
observable, then the following theorem can be derived.
Theorem 1.3. [Mukaidani and Xu (2015a)] The strategy-set (1.52) constitutes the Stackel-
berg strategy only if the following cross-coupled stochsastic cross-coupled algebraic non-
linear matrix equations (ANMEs) have solutions P1 ≥ 0, M0 ≥ 0, N1 > 0, N0 > 0 and K.
ATKP1+P1AK + Qˆ1−P1B1R−111 BT1 P1+ATpP1Ap = 0, (1.53a)
ATKFP0+P0AKF + Qˆ0+A
T
pP0Ap = 0, (1.53b)
M1ATK +AKM1−M1P1B1R−111 BT1 −B1R−111 BT1 P1M1+ApM1ATp −B1R−111 BT1 P0M0
−M0P0B1R−111 BT1 +M0P1B1R−111 R01R−111 BT1 +B1R−111 R01R−111 BT1 P1M0 = 0, (1.53c)
AKFM0+M0ATKF +APM0A
T
p + In = 0, (1.53d)
BT0 (P1M1+P0M0)+R01KM1+R00KM0 = 0, (1.53e)
where
F :=−R−111 BT1 P1,
AK := A+B0K,
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AKF := A+B0K+B1F,
Qˆ1 := Q1+KTR10K,
Qˆ0 = Q0+FTR01F +KTR00K,
Then the strategy-set (u∗0(t), u
∗
1(t)) = (Kx(t), Fx(t)) is the Stackelberg strategy.
Proof. For an arbitrary leader’s strategy u0 = Kx(t), let us consider the follower’s LQ
closed-loop stochastic system as:
dx(t) = [(A+B0K)x(t)+B1u1(t)]dt+Apx(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0, (1.54a)
J1(x0, Kx, u1) :=
1
2
E
[∫ ∞
0
(
xT (t)(Q1+KTR10K)x(t)+uT1 (t)R11u1(t)
)
dt
]
. (1.54b)
Or, simply
dx(t) = [AKx(t)+B1u1(t)]dt+Apx(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0, (1.55a)
J1(x0, Kx, u1) :=
1
2
E
[∫ ∞
0
(
xT (t)Qˆ1x(t)+uT1 (t)R11u1(t)
)
dt
]
, (1.55b)
where
AK := A+B0K,
Qˆ1 := Q1+KTR10K.
In fact (1.55) seems to be a standard LQ optimal control problem. So, if there exists a matrix
PT1 = P1 ≥ 0 that solves the following stochastic algebraic Riccati equation (SARE):
F(P1, K) := ATKP1+P1AK + Qˆ1−P1B1R−111 BT1 P1+ATpP1Ap = 0, (1.56)
then the follower’s state feedback control problem admits a solution,
u01(u0) = Fx(t) = F(K)x(t) =−R−111 BT1 P1x(t). (1.57)
It is seen that the SARE (1.56) is same as the SARE (1.53a). On the other hand, Leader
cost J0 can be obtained as,
J0(x0, u0, u1(u0)) = J0(x0, Kx, Fx)
=
1
2
E
[∫ ∞
0
(
xT (t)(Q0+FTR01F +KTR00K)x(t)
)
dt
]
=
1
2
E
[∫ ∞
0
xT (t)Qˆ0x(t)dt
]
=Tr[P0], (1.58)
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with state equation
dx(t) = [A+B0K+B1F ]x(t)dt+Apx(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0, (1.59)
where P0 = PT0 ≥ 0 is the solution of the following SARE:
K(P1, P0, K) := ATKFP0+P0AKF + Qˆ0+A
T
pP0Ap = 0, (1.60)
with
AKF := A+B0K+B1F,
Qˆ0 := Q0+FTR01F +KTR00K.
Therefore, SARE (1.53b) holds. Let us consider the Lagrangian L as follows:
L (P1, P0, K) = Tr[P0]+Tr[M1F(P1, K)]+Tr[M0K(P1, P0, K)],
= Tr[P0+M1(ATKP1+P1AK + Qˆ1−P1B1R−111 BT1 P1+ATpP1Ap)
+M0(ATKFP0+P0AKF + Qˆ0+A
T
pP0Ap)]
= Tr[P0+M1ATKP1+M1P1AK +M1Qˆ1−M1P1B1R−111 BT1 P1+M1ATpP1Ap
+M0ATKFP0+M0P0AKF +M0Qˆ+M0A
T
pP0Ap)] (1.61)
where M1 and M0 are symmetric matrices of Lagrange multipliers. Using Lagrange mul-
tiplier technique for nonlinear matrix functions, the necessary conditions for minimizing
Tr[P0] are as follows:
∂L
∂P1
= M1ATK +AKM1−M1P1B1R−111 BT1 −B1R−111 BT1 P1M1+ApM1ATp −B1R−111 BT1 P0M0
−M0P0B1R−111 BT1 +M0P1B1R−111 R01R−111 BT1 +B1R−111 R01R−111 BT1 P1M0 = 0, (1.62a)
∂L
∂P0
= AKFM0+M0ATKF +APM0A
T
p + In = 0, (1.62b)
1
2
∂L
∂K
= BT0 (P1M1+P0M0)+R01KM1+R00KM0 = 0. (1.62c)
So, (1.53c)–(1.53e) are derived. Hence, Theorem 1.3 is proved.
1.2.9 Incentive Stackelberg game
The incentive Stackelberg strategy is used to induce non-cooperative followers’ virtual co-
operation to achieve the optimal solution of the leader [Saksena and Cruz (1985)]. An
incentive Stackelberg strategy is one where the leader achieves his/her team-optimal
solution to the hierarchical game by using an incentive mechanism. The following
two steps are the main elements of an incentive Stackelberg problem [Ho et al. (1982),
Basar and Olsder (1980)].
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(i) The leader determines a team-optimal strategy-set and announces it ahead of time.
(ii) Knowing the incentive, based on the leader’s announced team-optimal strategy, each
follower chooses a strategy so as to minimize his/her own cost.
It should be noted that no matter how the followers behave, the leader can achieve his/her
own team-optimal equilibrium by using the corresponding incentive strategy-set. Incen-
tive Stackelberg games apply to organizations with several players and with organizational
objective functions that may not be the same as the members’ objective functions. How-
ever, Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 will discuss the disturbance attenuation incentive
Stackelberg game in detail. Here we present only the basic formulation of the incentive
Stackelberg game problem for one leader and one follower.
Consider a linear stochastic system governed by the Itoˆ differential equation deﬁned by
dx(t) =
[
Ax(t)+B0u0(t)+B1u1(t)
]
dt+Apx(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0, (1.63)
where x(t) ∈ Rn represents the state vector; u0(t) ∈ Rm0 represents the leader’s control
input for the follower; u1(t) ∈ Rm1 represents the follower ’s control input; w(t) ∈ R rep-
resents a one-dimensional standard Wiener process deﬁned in the ﬁltered probability space
(Ω, F , P, Ft) with Ft = σ{w(s) : 0≤ s≤ t} [Chen and Zhang (2004)].
Cost functionals of the leader is given by
J0 (x0, u0, u1) :=
1
2
E
[∫ ∞
0
{
xT (t)Q0x(t)+uT0 (t)R00u0(t)+u
T
1 (t)R01cu1(t)
}
dt
]
, (1.64)
where Q0 = QT0 ≥ 0, R00 = RT00 > 0, R01 = RT01 ≥ 0.
Cost functionals of the follower is given by
J1 (x0, u0, u1) :=
1
2
E
[∫ ∞
0
{
xT (t)Q1x(t)+
[
uT1 (t)R10u1(t)+u
T
1 (t)R11u1(t)
]}
dt
]
, (1.65)
where Q1 = QT1 ≥ 0, R11 = RT11 > 0 and R10 = RT10 ≥ 0. For a two-level incentive Stack-
elberg game, leader announce the following incentive strategy to the follower in ahead of
time:
u0(t) =Λx(t)+Ξu1(t), (1.66)
where the parameters Λ and Ξ are to be determined associated with the optimal strategy
u1(t) of the follower.
First, the leadear’s team-optimal solution u∗c(t) is investigated. By composing the
stochastic system (1.63), the following centralized systems can be obtained.
dx(t) =[Ax(t)+Bcuc(t)]dt+Apx(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0, (1.67)
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where
Bc :=
[
B0 B1
]
,
uc := col
[
u0 u1
]
.
Furthermore, the cost functional (1.64) can be modiﬁed as
J0 (uc(t)) :=
1
2
E
[∫ ∞
0
{
xT (t)Q0x(t)+uTc (t)Rcuc(t)
}
dt
]
, (1.68)
where
Rc := block diag
[
R00 R01
]
.
Therefore, using standard LQ theory, suppose that the leader team-optimal state feedback
strategy is given by
u∗c(t) = Kcx(t) =−R−1c BTc Pcx(t), (1.69)
where
Kc =
[
Kc0
Kc1
]
=
[−R−100 BT0 Pc
−R−101 BT1 Pc
]
. (1.70)
Then there exists a matrix PTc = Pc ≥ 0 that solves the following SARE:
PcA+ATPc+Q0−PcBcR−1c BTc Pc+ATpPcAp = 0. (1.71)
It should be noted that the relation between Λ and Ξ can be derived from (1.66) as
−R−100 BT0 Pc =Λ−ΞR−101 BT1 Pc, (1.72)
or,
Λ=−R−100 BT0 Pc+ΞR−101 BT1 Pc. (1.73)
So, the leader’s incentive Stackelberg strategy can be determined by
u0(t) =[Kc0−ΞKc1]x(t)+Ξu1(t),
=Kc0x(t)+Ξ [u1−Kc1x(t)] . (1.74)
To determine Ξwhich satisfy (1.66), let us consider the following optimization problem
for the follower. To establish the follower’s according optimal strategy regarding leader’s
incentive Stackelberg strategy (1.66), we can change (1.63) as follows,
dx(t) =
[
Ax(t)+B0u0(t)+B1u1(t)
]
dt+Apx(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0,
=
[
Ax(t)+B0(Λx(t)+Ξu1(t))+B1u1(t)
]
dt+Apx(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0,
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=
[
Aˆx(t)+ Bˆu1(t)u1(t)
]
dt+Apx(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0. (1.75)
where
Aˆ := A+B0Λ,
Bˆ := B1+B0Ξ.
The cost functional of the follower can be written as
J1(x0, u0, u1) =
1
2
E
[∫ ∞
0
[
xT (t)Q1x(t)+(Λx(t)+Ξu1(t))TR10(Λx(t)+Ξu1(t))
+uT1 (t)R11u1(t)
]
dt
]
,
=
1
2
E
[∫ ∞
0
{
xT (t)Qˆx(t)+
[
[Λx(t)+Ξu1(t)]TR10[Λx(t)+Ξu1(t)]
+uT1 (t)R11u1(t)
]}
dt
]
, (1.76)
or, equivalently,
J1(x0, u1) =
1
2
E
[∫ ∞
0
{
xT (t)Qˆx(t)+2xT (t)Sˆu1(t)+uT1 (t)Rˆu1(t)
}
dt
]
, (1.77)
where
Qˆ := Q0+ΛTR10Λ,
Rˆ := R11+ΞTR10Ξ,
Sˆ := ΛTR10Ξ.
It should be noted that there exists a cross-coupling term 2xT (t)Sˆu1(t) in the cost func-
tional (1.77). By using the technique similar to the one used in the stochastic optimal
control problem [Chen and Zhang (2004)], follower’s optimal strategy u†1(t) = K
†
1x(t) can
be obtained, where
K†Fi =−Rˆ−1(P1Bˆ+ Sˆ)T , (1.78)
and P1 is the symmetric non-negative solution of the following SARE:
P1Aˆ+ AˆTP1+ATpP1Ap− (P1Bˆ+ Sˆ)Rˆ−1(P1Bˆ+ Sˆ)T + Qˆ = 0. (1.79)
Furthermore, to keep the optimality of the entire system unchanged, followers have to
determine Ξ satisfying the following equivalence relation.
K∗c1 ≡ K†1 ,
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which can establish from (1.70) and (1.78) as follows:
−R−101 BT1 Pc =−Rˆ−1(P1Bˆ+ Sˆ)T , (1.80)
or,
[R11+ΞTR10Ξ]R−101 B
T
1 Pc = B
T
1 P1+Ξ
TBT0 P1+Ξ
TR10Λ. (1.81)
By using relation (1.73) for Λ, we get
R11R−101 B
T
1 Pc+Ξ
TR10ΞR−101 B
T
1 Pc =
BT1 P1+Ξ
TBT0 P1−ΞTR10R−101 BT0 Pc+ΞTR10ΞR−101 BT1 Pc. (1.82)
Canceling the term ΞTR10ΞR−101 B
T
1 Pc from both sides of (1.82) we get
R11R−101 B
T
1 Pc = B
T
1 P1+Ξ
TBT0 P1−ΞTR10R−101 BT0 Pc, (1.83)
and after simpliﬁcation, the following MAEs can be found:
ΞT (BT0 P1−R10R−101 BT0 Pc) = R11R−101 BT1 Pc−BT1 P1. (1.84)
Remark 1.2. It should be noted that the incentive parameter Ξ can be uniquely determined
if and only if (BT0 P1−R10R−101 BT0 Pc) is non-singular.
Theorem 1.4. Suppose that the SARE in (1.71), SARE (1.79) and the MAEs (1.83) have
solutions. Then the strategy-set (1.66) under (1.70) and (1.78) constitutes the two-level
incentive Stackelberg strategies with H∞ constraint.
1.3 Research survey
The Stackelberg leadership model is a hierarchical strategy involving the ﬁrst move-
ment of the leader and then the consequent movement of the followers. The term
Stackelberg was used after the German economist Heinrich Freiherr von Stackelberg,
who introduced this idea in his article ‘Market structure and equilibrium (Marktform
und Gleichgewicht)’ in 1934. The properties of Stackelberg games for two play-
ers have been extensively studied in [Starr and Ho (1969)]. Subsequently, this two-
player static game was extended to a dynamic game with different information patterns
[Chen and Cruz (1972), Simaan et al. (1973)]. Among the information patterns, closed-
loop Stackelberg strategies with applications were attracting considerable research in-
terest as – LQ problems [Medanic (1978), Basar and Selbuz (1979), Tolwinski (1981)].
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The idea of team-optimal solutions opens new directions for closed-loop Stackelberg
strategies. In [Basar and Olsder (1980)], the necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for both
ﬁnite- and inﬁnite-horizon closed-loop feedback solutions were derived for a team prob-
lem in which all players optimized a leader’s cost functional jointly. Furthermore,
[Salman and Cruz (1983)] derived team-optimal closed-loop Stackelberg strategies for sys-
tems with slow and fast modes.
An incentive Stackelberg strategy is one where the leader achieves his/her team-
optimal solution to the hierarchical game by using an incentive mechanism. Through
the last four decades, incentive Stackelberg games are the growing interest in research
(see, e.g., [Basar and Olsder (1980), Ho et al. (1982), Ishida and Shimemura (1983),
Zheng et al. (1984), Mizukami and Wu (1987), Mizukami and Wu (1988)], and references
therein). The purpose of the incentive mechanism is to induce virtual cooperation in non-
cooperative followers so that optimal system performance (reﬂected in the leader’s objec-
tive function) is achieved through hierarchical decision-making [Saksena and Cruz (1985)].
A two-person, continuous-time, linear differential game problems under quadratic cost
functions for both players were derived in [Basar and Olsder (1980)]. In that paper, the
authors treated both the ﬁnite- and the inﬁnite-horizon cases. Unlike the discrete-time ver-
sion of [Basar and Selbuz (1979)], which article used a closed-loop team-optimal strategy
in a continuous-time differential game. In the recent years, there were many papers and
works dealing with the incentive Stackelberg strategy. In [Zheng and Basar (1982)], the
existence and derivation of the afﬁne-excitation Stackelberg strategy were studied by using
the geometric method. In [Zheng et al. (1984)], the closed-loop Stackelberg strategy and
incentive policy in the dynamic decision problem were widely discussed. With several con-
trol problems, dynamic games for both continuous- and discrete-time systems have been
extensively studied (see e.g. [Bas¸ar and Olsder (1999)] and references therein).
In [Mizukami and Wu (1987), Mizukami and Wu (1988)], incentive Stackelberg strate-
gies were derived for LQ differential games, where the two leaders and one fol-
lower to the ﬁrst paper and one leader and two followers to the second paper were
considered. In recent years, incentive Stackelberg games with robust control theory
have been studied for discrete-time linear systems with a deterministic disturbance in
[Ahmed and Mukaidani (2016), Mukaidani et al. (2017c)]. In both articles, one leader and
multiple non-cooperative followers were considered. A similar structure was adapted in
[Ahmed et al. (2017a), Mukaidani et al. (2017d), Mukaidani and Xu (2018)] for stochas-
tic case with H∞ constraint. On the other hand, continuous-time stochastic systems
were investigated for an inﬁnite-horizon incentive Stackelberg game in [Mukaidani (2016),
Ahmed et al. (2017b)], where multiple leaders and multiple followers were considered. In
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[Mukaidani et al. (2017b)], incentive Stackelberg strategy with multiple leaders and mul-
tiple followers were considered for the stochastic Markov jumping control problem. It
should be noted that [Ahmed et al. (2017b)] discussed two-level hierarchical stochastic
games with M leaders and N followers with H∞ constraint.
On the other hand, a linear parameter-varying (LPV) system was introduced in
[Shamma (1988)] for analyzing the “gain-scheduling” problem. Gain scheduling involves
implementing a family of linear controllers such that controller coefﬁcients (gains) are
changed (scheduled) based on the current values of the scheduled variables. In short, gain
scheduling is a control design approach that builds a nonlinear controller for a nonlinear
plant by patching a set of linear controllers.
1.4 Objectives and outlines
The primary objective of this research is to investigate the incentive Stackelberg strategy
for various dynamic systems. The incentive Stackelberg games are examined for the sys-
tems including external disturbances which are attenuated under the H∞ constraint. Solving
game problems of multiple players with disturbance terms is more difﬁcult while stochas-
tic systems are observed. In the incentive Stackelberg games, players are divided into two
groups, leaders, and followers. Therefore, games with several constraints cause compli-
cated problems including accuracy of results. In other words, the incentive Stackelberg
game with such a complex pattern is a new approach in the two-level hierarchy. For this
approach, it is necessary to face the computational complexity for solving algebraic Riccati
equations (AREs). Besides, preliminary research and synthesis of the LPV system is pro-
vided for multiple decision makers. We aim to better understand to implement our current
idea for LPV easily in further.
This thesis attempts to consider the incentive Stackelberg game for both the discrete-
and continuous-time framework, both deterministic and stochastic systems are investigated.
In the case of continuous-time and LPV systems, only stochastic structures are included in
this thesis. For all schemes, linear quadratic optimal control is investigated only for sim-
plicity. However, the investigation of nonlinear problems is our future research. Therefore,
after discussing the basic problem of stochastic LQ systems, four major chapters can be
viewed afterward.
This thesis consists of seven chapters. In Chapter 1, the research background, moti-
vation, research survey, objectives, and outlines of the thesis are described. Some basic
deﬁnitions and preliminary results are also introduced in this chapter. Chapter 2 of the the-
sis summarizes some of the preliminary mathematical problems for this study. This chapter
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is an overview of the stochastic LQ systems. Several problems based on discrete-time and
continuous-time stochastic optimal control are solved. Stochastic dynamic programming
(DP) and Itoˆ’s lemma are outlined. In particular, we discuss the concept of the solution of
multi-player games considering Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimality. The exogenous
disturbance problem and its attenuation of the H∞ constraint are presented and will play an
important role in later developments.
In Chapter 3, the incentive Stackelberg game for a discrete-time deterministic system
is considered. It explains two levels of hierarchy with one leader and multiple followers.
Followers are supposed to act non-cooperatively. Exogenous disturbance also exists in the
system and is attenuated under the H∞ constraint. In this work, the team-optimum solution
of the leader is formulated based on the result of [Zhang et al. (2007)]. By simulating a
set of cross-coupled backward difference Riccati equations (CCBDREs), the leader’s team
optimal solution can be found. The H∞ constraint for disturbance attenuation is taken into
account at the same time. On the other hand, the optimal strategy of the followers based
on the Nash equilibrium guarantees the leader’s team optimal solution. The expression
is also derived for the inﬁnite-horizon case. An algorithm for solving the set of cross-
coupling algebra Riccati equations (CCARE) is developed. A numerical example shows
the efﬁciency of the proposed method.
Chapter 4 investigates the incentive Stackelberg game for discrete-time stochastic sys-
tems. The structure of this game is very similar to that described in Chapter 3. It is a
single leader and multiple non-cooperative followers with an exogenous disturbance at-
tenuating under the H∞ constraint in the 2-level hierarchy. Therefore, Chapter 4 can be
viewed as the stochastic version of the deterministic game described in Chapter 3. In this
chapter, we determine the leader’s incentive Stackelberg strategies according to the result
of [Zhang et al. (2007)] of the stochastic discrete-time system with disturbance. The in-
formation pattern of this problem question is as follows. The leader can access all the
values of the follower’s decision at each stage of the process. An incentive mechanism
for leading non-cooperative followers is virtual cooperation to achieve system goals. To
solve the problem in the case of ﬁnite- and inﬁnite-horizon, a set of cross-coupled stochas-
tic backward difference Riccati equation (SBDRE) and stochastic matrix-valued difference
equations (SMVDEs) are derived, correspondingly. Furthermore, the Nash equilibrium of
the followers guarantees the leader’s team optimal solution. A Lyapunov-based recursive
algorithm has also been designed to reduce the computational complexity. Academic and
practical numerical examples guarantee the efﬁciency of the proposed method.
In Chapter 5, the continuous-time incentive Stackelberg games for multiple leaders and
multiple followers are investigated. The external disturbance is included with the system,
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as usual. To explain this kind of game, consider that the M leader and the N follower
belong to two groups. By adjusting the values of M and N, we can form any suitable
hierarchical game. That is why we call it a generic construction. The information pattern
of the game is more complex than before we followed. Each leader must achieve the Nash
equilibrium and use the H∞ constraint to reduce the external disturbance. Each leader will
individually announce the incentive Stackerberg strategy for each follower. Each follower
employs a leader incentive mechanism that follows the Nash equilibrium in a follower
group. Leaders and followers do not cooperate with their group. In this chapter, the Nash
equilibrium of the leader under the H∞ constraint is derived based on the inﬁnite-horizontal
stochastic H2/H∞ control problem of [Chen and Zhang (2004)]. We can get the strategy-
set by solving a set of cross-coupled stochastic algebraic Riccati equations (CCSAREs)
and matrix algebraic equations (MAEs). The leaders achieve the Nash equilibrium by
attenuating disturbance under the H∞ constraint. Simultaneously, the followers achieve the
Nash equilibrium regarding the leaders’ incentives with the worst-case disturbance. The
solution can be easily found using Lyapunov-based iterations. To illustrate our ﬁndings,
we present a simple numerical example.
Chapter 6 discusses the Pareto optimal strategy for the stochastic LPV system with mul-
tiple players. In the dynamic game of uncertain stochastic systems, multiple participants
can be used for more realistic plants. The system includes disturbances that are attenuated
under the H∞ constraint. This section can be seen as an extension of [Mukaidani (2017a)].
This is because the ﬁxed gain controller is also considered here to understand the prac-
tical implementation. In this chapter, we design a method for Pareto optimal solution
that satisﬁes the H∞ norm condition. We redesigned the stochastic bounded real lemma
[Ku and Wu (2015)] and the linear quadratic control [Rotondo (2015)] to ﬁnd the solution.
Solvability conditions are established using linear matrix inequalities (LMIs). For multiple
players, a Pareto optimal strategy-set is designed. The Pareto optimal strategy-set can be
found by solving a set of cross-coupling matrix inequalities (CCMI). A numerical example
is provided to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed model of the LPV system.
However, for stochastic LPV systems, the H∞ constraint incentive Stackelberg game is not
investigated in this chapter. This will be our future research. It should be noted that some
basic results on the LMI problems are presented in Appendix A as a preliminary study of
this chapter.
Finally, in Chapter 7, the thesis is concluded with some motivating guidelines for future
research. It should be noted that Appendix B contains some of the basic results of output
feedback control as a preliminary study of future research.
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Chapter 2
Basic Problems of Stochastic Linear
Quadratic (LQ) Systems
Optimization problems can be divided into two groups, static and dynamic. An optimiza-
tion problem that does not change over time is called a static optimization problem. Many
scientiﬁc and business applications require the control of systems developed over time,
called dynamic systems. Since time can vary discretely and continuously, dynamic systems
are separated into discrete- and continuous-time systems. This study plans to deal with both
types of systems, with the emphasis on continuous-time systems. Optimal control of the
dynamic system addresses the ﬁnding of control actions achieved in an optimal manner en-
suring the stability of the control. There are various types of stability in describing solutions
to difference (for discrete-time) or differential (for continuous-time) equations in dynami-
cal systems. The most important type is that solution stability approaches the equilibrium
point discussed in the Lyapunov stability theory. An optimal control problem consists of
a cost functional and a set of difference or differential equations describing the trajectories
of the control variables that minimize the cost functional.
In this research, we focus only on the linear control system composed of linear dif-
ference or differential equations. There are several reasons for choosing linear optimal
control instead of general optimal control. For example, many engineering problems are
linear before adding controllers. It is easy to physically implement, takes less time to calcu-
late, applies to small signal based nonlinear systems, and computation algorithm proposes
nonlinear optimization design. The specialty of linear control is that the plant to be con-
trolled as well as the control unit that produces optimal control are assumed to be linear.
The linear optimal controllers are attained by operating with quadratic performance in-
dices. Such pattern of linear control that minimizes the sum (for discrete-time) or integral
(for continuous-time) of the quadratic function assessed by the control and state variables
is called linear quadratic (LQ) optimal control. LQ optimal control initiated by Kalman
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[Kalman (1960)] plays a major role in control theory. Many researchers have conducted ex-
tensive studies on deterministic LQ problems [Anderson and Moore (1989), Lewis (1986)].
In [Wonham (1968)], Wonham introduced the stochastic LQ optimal control governed by
the Ito differential equations. Systems perturbed by Gaussian white noise are called linear
quadratic Gaussian control problems and have become the most popular in control theory
research [Athans (1971)].
The main idea of LQ control design is to minimize the quadratic cost functional,∫ ∞
0 (x
TQx+uTRu)dt. It turns out that regardless of the values ofQ and R, the cost functional
has a unique minimum that can be obtained by solving the Algebraic Riccati Equation. The
parameters Q and R can be used as design parameters to penalize the state variables and
the control signals. The larger these values are, the more we penalize these signals. Basi-
cally, choosing a large value for R means we try to stabilize the system with less (weighted)
energy. This is usually called an expensive control strategy. On the other hand, choosing
a small value for R means we do not want to penalize the control signal (cheap control
strategy). Similarly, if we choose a large value for Q means we try to stabilize the system
with the least possible changes in the states and large Q implies less concern about the
changes in the states. Since there is a trade-off between the two, we may want to keep Q
as I (identity matrix) and only alter R. We can choose a large R, if there is a limit on the
control output signal (for instance, if large control signals introduce sensor noise or cause
actuator’s saturation), and choose a small R if having a large control signal is not a problem
for the system.
Indeed, with random choice of Q and R matrices, the optimal regulators do not provide
good set point tracking performance. Conventionally, control engineers often select the
weighting matrices based on trial and error approach, which not only makes the design
tedious but also provides a non optimized response. One more methodology adopted in the
design of optimal controller is that the initial values of weighting matrices could be chosen
as Q =CTC and R = BTB, where C comes from the controlled output y =Cx and B is the
coefﬁcient matrix of the control input (u); and after the initial trial, if the performance is
not satisfactory these weights can be altered again to get the desired response. However,
this approach once again makes use of trial and error method.
2.1 Discrete-time stochastic optimal control problems
In the framework of discrete-time, the decision maker observes state variables for each time
period. The objective is to optimize the sum of expected values of the objective function
over the entire period. New observations are made in each time period, and the control
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variables are optimally adjusted. The optimal solution for the current time can be found
by iterating the matrix Riccati equation from the last period back to the current period.
The discrete-time stochastic linear quadratic optimal control problem can be expressed as
follows:
J(x0, u) :=min
1
2
E
[
xT (Tf )Q(Tf )x(Tf )+
Tf−1
∑
k=0
[xT (k)Q(k)x(k)+uT (k)R(k)u(k)]
]
, (2.1)
where Q(k) = QT (k)≥ 0; R(k) = RT (k)> 0; E[·] is the expected operator conditional on
x0; superscript T indicates the transpose of a matrix and 0< Tf < ∞ is the time range. The
state equation is deﬁned as follows:
x(k+1) = A(k)x(k)+B(k)u(k)+Ap(k)x(k)w(k), x(0) = x0, (2.2)
where x(t) ∈ Rn is the state vector; u(t) ∈ Rnu is the control input; w(t) ∈ R is a one-
dimensional wiener process; and A(k), B(k), Ap(k) are the coefﬁcient matrices of suitable
dimensions.
Theorem 2.1. If the following stochastic backward difference Riccati equation (SBDRE)
has a solution P(k)> 0:
P(k) =AT (k)P(k+1)A(k)+ATp (k)P(k+1)Ap(k)−AT (k)P(k+1)B(k)
× [R(k)+BT (k)P(k+1)B(k)]−1BT (k)P(k+1)A(k)+Q(k), P(Tf +1) = 0, (2.3)
then, the discrete-time stochastic system (2.2) with cost functional (2.1) have the following
optimal state feedback control:
u∗(k) =−[R(k)+BT (k)P(k+1)B(k)]−1BT (k)P(k+1)A(k)x(k). (2.4)
Proof. According to dynamic programming algorithm we can write discrete-time stochas-
tic quadratic Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) as follows:
V (k) =min
u(k)
1
2
E
[
xT (k)Q(k)x(k)+uT (k)R(k)u(k)+V (k+1)
]
=min
u(k)
1
2
E
[
xT (k)Q(k)x(k)+uT (k)R(k)u(k)+ xT (k+1)P(k+1)x(k+1)+2v(k+1)
]
,
(2.5)
where V (k) is a quadratic function with a stochastic increment as follows:
V (k) =
1
2
xT (k)P(k)x(k)+ v(k) (2.6a)
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v(k+1) =
1
2
Tr[P(k+1)Ap(k)x(k)xT (k)ATp (k)]+ v(k), v(Tf ) = 0, (2.6b)
with the symmetric positive deﬁnite matrix P.
Using equation (2.6b), the following result can be found form (2.5):
V (k) =min
u(k)
1
2
E
[
xT (k)Q(k)x(k)+uT (k)R(k)u(k)
+ [A(k)x(k)+B(k)u(k)]TP(k+1)[A(k)x(k)+B(k)u(k)]
+Tr[P(k+1)Ap(k)x(k)xT (k)ATp (k)]+2v(k)
]
,
=min
u(k)
1
2
E
[
xT (k)[Q(k)+AT (k)P(k+1)A(k)+ATp (k)P(k+1)Ap(k)]x(k)
+uT (k)[R(k)+BT (k)P(k+1)B(k)]u(k)+2xT (k)AT (k)P(k+1)B(k)u(k)
]
+ v(k),
(2.7)
To minimize the right hand side of (2.7) with respect to the control input u(k) we obtain
the following state feedback optimal control scheme:
u∗(k) =−[R(k)+BT (k)P(k+1)B(k)]−1BT (k)P(k+1)A(k)x(k), (2.8)
Comparing right hand sides of (2.6a) and (2.7), the following stochastic backward differ-
ence Riccati equation (SBDRE) can be derived using (2.8):
P(k) =AT (k)P(k+1)A(k)+ATp (k)P(k+1)Ap(k)−AT (k)P(k+1)B(k)
× [R(k)+BT (k)P(k+1)B(k)]−1BT (k)P(k+1)A(k)+Q(k), P(Tf +1) = 0. (2.9)
For inﬁnite-horizon case, the state equation and the cost functional have the following
form:
x(k+1) = Ax(k)+Bu(k)+Apx(k)w(k), x(0) = x0, (2.10a)
J(x0, u) :=min
1
2
E
[
∞
∑
k=0
[xT (k)Qx(k)+uT (k)Ru(k)]
]
, (2.10b)
where Q = QT ≥ 0, R = RT > 0. It should be noted that for the inﬁnite-horizon case, the
coefﬁcient matrices are considered to be constant matrices of appropriate dimensions.
Lemma 2.1. Suppose that there exists a symmetric constant matrix P > 0 that solves the
following SARE of the system (2.10):
P = ATPA+ATpPAp−ATPB[R+BTPB]−1BTPA+Q. (2.11)
then the optimal control problem admits a state feedback solution,
u(k) =−[R+BTPB]−1BTPAx(k), (2.12)
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Proof. Using optimal control u∗(k) = Kx(k), the state feedback system (2.10) can be writ-
ten as
x(k+1) = (A+BK)x(k)+Apx(k)w(k), x(0) = x0, (2.13)
with cost functional
J(x0) :=min
1
2
E
[
∞
∑
k=0
xT (k)[Q+KTRK]x(k)
]
. (2.14)
Suppose that there exits a symmetric positive deﬁnite matrix P such that the SARE (2.11)
holds for all admissible control inputs. Let us deﬁne the Lyapunov candidate function
E[V (x(k))] = E[xT (k)Px(k)], (2.15)
where V (x(k)> 0 for all x(k) = 0.
The difference between corresponding trajectory of the system (2.10) is given by
E[ΔV (x(k))] = E[V (x(k+1))−V (x(k))]
= E[xT (k+1)Px(k+1)− xT (k)Px(k)]
= E[xT (k)(A+BK)TP(A+BK)x(k)]
+E[xT (k)ATpPApx(k)]−E[xT (k)Px(k)]
= E[xT (k)[(A+BK)TP(A+BK)+ATpPAp−P]x(k), (2.16)
which is stable if E[ΔV (x(k))] < 0. Then, we can form the discrete-time Lyapunov stabi-
lizable equation [Zhang et al. (2008)] as follows:
(A+BK)TP(A+BK)+ATpPAp−P =−(Q+KTRK) (2.17)
Substituting the value of K =−[R+BTPB]−1BTPA to equation (2.17) and simplifying, we
can get the following SARE:
P = ATPA+ATpPAp−ATPB[R+BTPB]−1BTPA+Q. (2.18)
Hence, Lemma 2.1 is proved.
2.2 Continuous-time stochastic optimal control problems
Consider the following continuous-time stochastic linear quadratic optimal control prob-
lem:
dx(t) = [A(t)x(t)+B(t)u(t)]dt+Ap(t)x(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0, (2.19a)
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J(x0, u) :=
1
2
E
[
xT (Tf )Q(Tf )x(Tf )+
∫ Tf
0
(
xT (t)Q(t)x(t)+uT (t)R(t)u(t)
)
dt
]
, (2.19b)
where x(t) ∈ L 2F (R+, Rn) is the state vector; u(t) ∈ L 2F (R+, Rnu) is the control in-
put; w(t) ∈ R is a one-dimensional wiener process; A(t), B(t), Ap(t), Q(t) = QT (t) ≥ 0,
R(t) = RT (t) > 0 are the coefﬁcient matrices of suitable dimensions; E[·] is the expected
operator conditional on x0; 0< Tf <∞ is the time range;L 2F (R+, R
) denotes the space of
nonanticipative stochastic processes. In order to solve the above-mentioned optimal control
problem, the following theorem can be obtained.
Theorem 2.2. For the stochastic optimal control problem (2.19), suppose that the following
stochastic Riccati differential equation (SRDE) has the solution PT (t) = P(t)≥ 0:
−P˙(t) =AT (t)P(t)+P(t)A(t)+ATp (t)P(t)Ap(t)+Q(t)
−P(t)B(t)R−1(t)BT (t)P(t), P(Tf ) = Q(Tf ), (2.20)
then the optimal control problem admits a state feedback solution,
u∗(t) =−R−1(t)BT (t)P(t)x(t). (2.21)
Proof. In order to prove the Theorem 2.2, the stochastic dynamic programming (SDP)
method and the stochastic maximum principle can be considered. The following two sec-
tions derive the Theorem 2.2 as two different techniques.
2.2.1 Stochastic dynamic programming (SDP)
We deﬁne the ﬁnite-horizon value function,
v(t,x) =
1
2
min
u(t)∈U
E
[∫ Tf
t
{xT (s)Q(s)x(s)+uT (s)R(s)u(s)}ds
]
. (2.22)
It will satisfy the stochastic Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation,
−vt = min
u(t)∈U
[
1
2
(xT (t)Q(t)x(t)+uT (t)R(t)u(t))+ vTx (A(t)x(t)+B(t)u(t))
+
1
2
(Ap(t)x(t))T (Ap(t)x(t))vxx], (2.23)
with boundary condition: v(Tf ,x) = 12x
T (Tf )Q(Tf )x(Tf ).
To minimize the right hand side of (2.23) with respect to the control input u(t) we get,
R(t)u∗(t)+BT (t)vx = 0, (2.24)
32
or,
u∗(t) =−R−1(t)BT (t)vx. (2.25)
Now, if we insert this optimal state feedback control input u∗(t) into equation (2.23) we
get,
−vt =12(x
T (t)Q(t)x(t)+ vTx B(t)R
−1(t)BT (t)vx)+ vTx (A(t)x(t)−B(t)R−1(t)BT (t)vx)
+
1
2
xT (t)ATp (t)Ap(t)x(t)vxx,
=
1
2
(xT (t)Q(t)x(t)− vTx B(t)R−1(t)BT (t)vx)+ vTx A(t)x(t)+
1
2
xT (t)ATp (t)Ap(t)x(t)vxx,
(2.26)
with boundary condition:
v(Tf ,x) =
1
2
xT (Tf )Q(Tf )x(Tf ).
Now let
v(t,x) =
1
2
xT (t)P(t)x(t), (2.27)
where P(t) is a symmetric positive semideﬁnite matrix. Therefore,
vx = P(t)x(t),
and
vxx = P(t).
So, from (2.26) we get,
−1
2
xT (t)P˙(t)x(t) =
1
2
(xT (t)Q(t)x(t)− xT (t)P(t)B(t)R−1(t)BT (t)P(t)x(t))
+ xT (t)P(t)A(t)x(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
2 x
T (t)(P(t)A(t)+AT (t)P(t))x(t)
+
1
2
xT (t)ATp (t)P(t)Ap(t)x(t), (2.28)
with boundary condition: P(Tf ) = Q(Tf ). Simply,
−P˙(t) =AT (t)P(t)+P(t)A(t)+ATp (t)P(t)Ap(t)+Q(t)
−P(t)B(t)R−1(t)BT (t)P(t), P(Tf ) = Q(Tf ). (2.29)
Moreover, substituting vx = P(t)x(t) into equation (2.25), we can obtain the state feedback
optimal control input,
u∗(t) =−R−1(t)BT (t)P(t)x(t). (2.30)
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2.2.2 Stochastic maximum principle
Recall the continuous-time stochastic system (2.19a) with linear quadratic cost (2.19b). In
order to ﬁnd the solution of this optimal control problem by stochastic maximum principle
[Peng (1990)], let us consider the Hamiltonian:
H(x, u, p, q)
:=
1
2
[xT (t)Q(t)x(t)+uT (t)R(t)u(t)]+ pT (A(t)x(t)+B(t)u(t))+qTAp(t)x(t). (2.31)
It follows the necessary conditions from the stochastic maximum principle:
dp =−∂H
∂x
dt+qdw =−(Q(t)x(t)+AT (t)p+ATp (t)q)dt+qdw(t). (2.32)
with boundary condition:
p(Tf ) = Q(Tf )x(Tf ).
The optimal control input:
∂H
∂u
= R(t)u∗(t)+BT (t)p = 0, or, u∗(t) =−R−1(t)BT (t)p. (2.33)
Target: To ﬁnd p from (2.32) which is still a stochastic differential equation, cannot solve
it directly. Ito’s lemma is introduced to solve this problem.
Assume that p(t) and x(t) are related by p(t) = θ(t,x(t)). Now using Ito’s lemma to
θ(t,x(t)) for the given stochastic differential equation (2.19a), we have
dθ = [θt+θx(A(t)x(t)−B(t)R−1(t)BT (t)θ)+ 12x
TATp (t)θxxAp(t)x(t)]dt+θxAp(t)x(t)dw(t).
(2.34)
Comparing equation (2.32) and (2.34) we get:
θt +θx(A(t)x(t)−B(t)R−1(t)BT (t)θ)+ 12x
T (t)ATp (t)θxxAp(t)x(t)
=−(Q(t)x(t)+AT (t)θ +ATp (t)q), (2.35a)
q = θxAp(t)x(t) (2.35b)
with boundary condition:
θ(Tf , x(Tf )) = Q(Tf )x(Tf ).
Then, the equation (2.35a) and (2.35b) can be combined as the following simpliﬁed form:
−θt =θx(A(t)x(t)−B(t)R−1(t)BT (t)θ)+ 12x
T (t)ATp (t)θxxAp(t)x(t)
+(Q(t)x(t)+AT (t)θ +ATp (t)θxAp(t)x(t)), (2.36)
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with boundary condition:
θ(Tf , x(Tf )) = Q(Tf )x(Tf ).
Now, let us consider θ = P(t)x(t) with PT (t) = P(t) ≥ 0, which implies θx = P(t)
and θxx = 0. On the other hand, θ(Tf , x(Tf )) = P(Tf )x(Tf ) = Q(Tf )x(Tf ), which implies
P(Tf ) = Q(Tf ). So the equation (2.36) can be transferred as follows:
−P˙(t)x(t) =P(t)(A(t)x(t)−B(t)R−1(t)BT (t)P(t)x(t))
+(Q(t)x(t)+AT (t)P(t)x(t)+ATp (t)P(t)Ap(t)x(t)) (2.37)
with boundary condition:
P(Tf ) = Q(Tf ).
Canceling x(t) from both sides of (2.37), the following stochastic Riccati differential equa-
tion (SRDE)can be obtained:
−P˙(t) =AT (t)P(t)+P(t)A(t)+ATp (t)P(t)Ap(t)+Q(t)
−P(t)B(t)R−1(t)BT (t)P(t), P(Tf ) = Q(Tf ). (2.38)
Moreover, substituting vx = P(t)x(t) into equation (2.25), we can obtain the state feedback
optimal control input,
u∗(t) =−R−1(t)BT (t)P(t)x(t). (2.39)
2.2.3 Inﬁnite-horizon case
To derive the result for an inﬁnite horizon case, the following facts are used.
Consider the following stochastic system:
dx(t) = [Ax(t)+Bu(t)]dt+Apx(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0. (2.40)
Deﬁnition 2.1. [Chen and Zhang (2004)] The stochastic controlled system (2.40) is called
stabilizable (in the mean square sense), if there exists a feedback control u(t) =Kx(t), such
that for any x0 ∈ Rn, the closed-loop system
dx(t) = [A+BK]x(t)dt+Apx(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0. (2.41)
is asymptotically mean square stable, i.e.,
lim
t→∞E[x(t)
T x(t)] = 0, (2.42)
where is K a constant matrix
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Deﬁnition 2.2. If there exist feedback control
u(t) = Kx(t),
such that for any x(0) = x0, the closed-loop stochastic system (2.40) is asymptotically
mean-square stable, then the stochastic system is called stabilizable.
Deﬁnition 2.3. [Chen and Zhang (2004)] Consider the following stochastic system with
measurement equation.
dx(t) = Ax(t)dt+Apx(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0, (2.43a)
z(t) =Cx(t), (2.43b)
where x(t)∈Rn is the state vector and z(t)∈Rnz is the output measurement; A, Ap ∈Rn×n
and C ∈ Rnz×n are the coefﬁcient matrices. If z(t)≡ 0, ∀ t ≥ 0 implies x0 = 0, (A, Ap | C)
is called exactly observable.
To check the exact observability for the system (2.43) we can ﬁnd the following obsev-
ability matrix [Zhang and Chen (2004)]:
Os =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
C
CA
CAp
CApA
CAAp
CA2
CA2p
...
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
Then, (A, Ap|C) is exactly observable iff rank(Os) = n.
Lemma 2.2. Assume that stochastic system (2.43a) is asymptotically mean-square stable.
Let us deﬁne
J = E
[∫ ∞
0
xT (t)CTCx(t)dt
]
. (2.44)
If (A, Ap | C) is exactly observable, then (A, Ap) is stable if the following stochastic alge-
braic Lyapunov equation:
ATP+PA+ATpPAp+C
TC = 0, (2.45)
has a unique positive deﬁnite solution P = PT . Moreover,
J = E[xT (0)Px(0)]. (2.46)
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Proof. Let V (x(t)) = x(t)TPx(t) be the Lyapunov candidate for the system (2.43a), where
P is a symmetric positive semi-deﬁnite matrix. Now applying Itoˆ’s formula, we obtain
dV (x(t)) =VxAx(t)+
1
2
xT (t)ATpVxxApx(t)
= xT (t)[ATP+PA+ATpPAp]x(t), (2.47)
which is stable if dV (x(t)) < 0. If (A, Ap | C) is exactly observable, we can form the
Lyapunov stabilizable equation by integrating and taking expectoration operator (E[·]) in
(2.47) as follows:
E
[∫ ∞
0
xT (t)[ATP+PA+ATpPAp]x(t)dt
]
= E
[∫ ∞
0
xT (t)CTCx(t)dt
]
, (2.48)
i.e.,
ATP+PA+ATpPAp+C
TC = 0. (2.49)
Hence, the ﬁrst part of Lemma 2.2 is proved.
Let us consider the proof of second part.
E
[∫ t
0
xT (s)CTCx(s)ds
]
=−E
[∫ t
0
xT (s)[ATP+PA+ATpPAp]x(s)ds
]
=−E
[∫ t
0
xT (s)P˙x(s)ds
]
[Itoˆ’s formula (2.48).]
= E[xT (0)Px(0)]−E[xT (t)Px(t)]
= E[xT (0)Px(0)], when t → ∞.
Hence the Lemma 2.2 is proved.
Now, consider the next stochastic linear quadratic optimal control problem in the case
of inﬁnite-horizon:
dx(t) = [Ax(t)+Bu(t)]dt+Apx(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0, (2.50a)
J(x0, u) :=
1
2
E
[∫ ∞
0
(
xT (t)Qx(t)+uT (t)Ru(t)
)
dt
]
, (2.50b)
where A, B, Ap, Q=QT ≥ 0, R=RT > 0 are the coefﬁcient matrices of suitable dimensions.
In order to solve the above-mentioned optimal control problem, the following result can be
obtained.
37
Theorem 2.3. For the stochastic optimal control problem (2.50), suppose that the following
stochastic algebraic Riccati equation (SARE) has the solution PT = P≥ 0:
PA+ATP+Q−PBR−1BTP+ATpPAp = 0, (2.51)
then the optimal control problem admits a state feedback solution,
u∗(t) = Kx(t) =−R−1BTPx(t). (2.52)
Proof. Recall SRDE (2.20) of Theorem 2.2. As Tf → ∞, P(t) approaches to steady-state.
Therefore, P˙(t) = 0. Then form equation (2.20), we can obtain the following stochastic
algebraic Riccati equation (SARE):
PA+ATP+Q−PBR−1BTP+ATpPAp = 0. (2.53)
Moreover, using the same technique as ﬁnite-horizon case, the optimal state feedback con-
trol can be derived as follows:
u∗(t) = Kx(t) =−R−1BTPx(t). (2.54)
For Lyapunov stability analysis, consider SARE (2.53) as the form of stochastic algebraic
Lyapunov equation:
(A+BK)TP+P(A+BK)+(Q+KTRK)+ATpPAp = 0, (2.55)
with K =−R−1BTP. By Lemma 2.2, if (A+BK, Ap |
√
Q+KTRK) is exactly observable,
then (A+ BK, Ap) is stable if the stochastic algebraic Lyapunov equation (2.55) has a
unique positive deﬁnite solution P = PT .
2.2.4 Numerical examples
Finite-horizon case
Consider the linear stochastic differential equation:
dx(t) = (−x(t)+u(t))dt+ εx(t)dw(t), x(0) = 1, (2.56a)
J(x0, u) := E
[∫ 1
0
(x2(t)+u2(t))dt
]
. (2.56b)
To ﬁnd the optimal control for the above problem. Hamiltonian is deﬁned by
H = x2+u2+ p(−x+u)+qεx. (2.57)
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It follows the necessary conditions from the stochastic maximum principle:
dx∗(t) =
∂H
∂ p
dt+ εx∗(t)dw(t) = (−x∗(t)+u(t))dt+ εx∗(t)dw(t). (2.58)
with initial condition x∗(0) = 1.
dp =− ∂H
∂x(t)
dt+qdw(t) =−(2x(t)− p+qε)dt+qdw(t). (2.59)
with boundary condition: p(1) = 0.
The optimal control input:
∂H
∂u(t)
= 2u∗(t)+ p = 0,or, u∗(t) =− p
2
. (2.60)
To ﬁnd p from (2.59) which is still a stochastic differential equation, cannot solve it directly.
Assume that p(t) and x∗(t) are related by p(t) = θ(t,x∗(t)). Now using Ito’s lemma to
θ(t,x∗(t)), we have (omitting ∗ from x∗ for the simplicity of notation)
dθ = [θt +θx
(
−x(t)− θ
2
)
+
1
2
θxx(εx(t))2]dt+θxεx(t)dx. (2.61)
Comparing equation (2.59) and (2.61) we get:
θt +θx
(
−x(t)− θ
2
)
+
1
2
θxx(εx(t))2 =−(2x(t)−θ +qε), (2.62a)
q = θxεx(t) (2.62b)
with boundary condition: θ(1,x) = 0. Then, the equation (2.62) means the following
simpliﬁed form:
−θt = 2x(t)−θ +θxε2x(t)+θx
(
−x(t)− θ
2
)
+
1
2
θxx(εx(t))2. (2.63)
with boundary condition: θ(1,x) = 0. Since (2.63) is a deterministic partial differential
equation, so we can solve it numerically by using backward difference formula. This pro-
vides the solution for the control input in an open-loop pattern.
For Closed-loop pattern, let θ = zx, or, θx = z and θxx = 0.
On the other hand, θ(1,x) = z(1)x = 2xor, z(1) = 2.
So the equation (2.63) takes the for
−z˙x = 2x− zx+ zε2x− zx− z
2x
2
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or, z˙ =
z2
2
+(2− ε2)z−2; z(1) = 2. (2.64)
We can solve the differential equation (2.64) numerically by backward difference formula.
Solving the system (2.64) for z, we can ﬁnd the state feedback optimal control from
(2.60),
u∗(t) =−p/2=−(z/2)x(t). (2.65)
The state trajectory can be depicted by Fig. 2.1 and can be detected by the following
equation:
x(t+h) = x(t)+h(−1− z/2)x(t)+ εx(t)
√
hN(0,1), x(0) = 1. (2.66)
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Fig. 2.1: Finite-horizon state trajectory.
Inﬁnite-horizon case
Recall the stochastic linear quadratic optimal control problem (2.50). Let us consider the
following system matrices:
A =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
−2.98 0.93 0 −0.034
−0.99 −0.21 0.035 −0.0011
0 0 0 1
0.39 −5.555 0 −1.89
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ , B =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
−0.032
0
0
−1.6
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ , x0 =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
1
0.5
−0.5
−1
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ ,
Ap = 0.1A, Q = diag
[
1.5 0.8 2.3 1.9
]
, R = diag
[
2.5 1.8 1.3 0.9
]
.
In order to solve this optimal control problem let us consider the SARE (2.51) as the fol-
lowing nonlinear matrix function:
G (P) = PA+ATP+Q−PBR−1BTP+ATpPAp = 0. (2.67)
To solve the nonlinear matrix function (2.67) Newton’s method can be applied as follows:
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Newton’s Method
The iterative form of the SARE (2.67) by Newton’s iteration is:
P(k+1)(A−SP(k))+(A−SP(k))TP(k+1) +ATpP(k+1)Ap+P(k)SP(k) +Q = 0, (2.68)
where S = BR−1BT and k = 0, 1, . . ..
This result can be established using Newton’s method as follows. By the deﬁnition of
Newton’s method, the following equation holds:
vecP(k+1) =vecP(k)−
[
∂vecG (P)
∂ (vecP)T
∣∣∣∣
P=P(k)
]−1
vecG (P(k))
= vecP(k)−
[
(A−SP(k))T ⊗ In+ In⊗ (A−SP(k))T +ATp ⊗ATp
]−1
vecG (P(k)).
(2.69)
Thus, the operation (A−SP(k))T ⊗ In+ In⊗ (A−SP(k))T +ATp ⊗ATp yields[
(A−SP(k))T ⊗ In+ In⊗ (A−SP(k))T +ATp ⊗ATp
]
(2.70)
×(vecP(k+1)−vecP(k))+vecG (P(k)) = 0. (2.71)
Moreover, using the formulation vec(AXB) = [BT ⊗A]vecX in the left hand side of (2.71),
we obtain
LHS=
[
(A−SP(k))T ⊗ In+ In⊗ (A−SP(k))T +ATp ⊗ATp
]
× (vecP(k+1)−vecP(k))+vecG (P(k))
= vec
[
(P(k+1)−P(k))(A−SP(k))+(A−SP(k))T (P(k+1)−P(k))
+ATp (P
(k+1)−P(k))Ap
]
+vecG (P(k))
= vec
[
P(k+1)(A−SP(k))+(A−SP(k))TP(k+1) +ATpP(k+1)Ap
]
−vec
[
P(k)(A−SP(k))+(A−SP(k))TP(k) +ATpP(k)Ap
]
+vecG (P(k))
= vec
[
P(k+1)(A−SP(k))+(A−SP(k))TP(k+1) +ATpP(k+1)Ap+P(k)SP(k) +Q
]
= 0 (RHS).
which is the desired result.
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Theorem 2.4. Newton-Kantorovich theorem [Yamamoto 1986, Ortega 1990] : Assume that
G : Rn → Rn (2.72)
is differentiable on a convex set D. Suppose that the inverse of map G exists and moreover
it is differentiable on set D and that
||G′(x)−G′(y)|| ≤ γ||x−y|| (2.73)
for all x, y ∈ D.
Proof. Suppose that there is an x0 ∈ D such that
||G′(x0)−1|| ≤ β (2.74)
||G′(x0)−1G(x0)|| ≤ η (2.75)
and
θ := βγη < 1/2 (2.76)
Assume that
S := { x : ||x−x0|| ≤ t∗ } ⊂ D (2.77)
and
t∗ =
1−√1−2θ
βγ
(2.78)
Then Newton iterations
xk+1 = xk−G′(xk)−1G(xk), (2.79)
k = 0, 1, · · · are well deﬁned and converge to a solution x∗ of G(x) = 0 in S. Moreover,
the solution x∗ is unique in S˜∩D, where
S˜ := { x : ||x−x0|| ≤ t˜ } ⊂ D (2.80)
t˜ =
1+
√
1−2θ
βγ
(2.81)
and error estimate is given by
||x∗ −xk|| ≤ (2θ)
2k
2kβγ
= 21−k(2θ)2
k−1η , k = 0, 1, ... (2.82)
Hence, Newton-Kantorovich theorem is proved.
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Newton’s algorithm
Inputs: Let P = P(0) be the given initial matrix; ITER is the maximum number of itera-
tions; TOL is the tolerance of convergence.
Output: Solution matrix P.
Step 1 For k = 1, 2, · · · , ITER do Step 2 to Step 3.
Step 2 Calculate the following newtons formula:
vecP(k+1) = vecP(k)−
[
∂vecG (P)
∂ (vecP)T
∣∣∣∣
P=P(k)
]−1
vecG (P(k)), (2.83)
where
∂vecG (P)
∂ (vecP)T
= AT ⊗ In+ In⊗AT − In⊗PBR−1BT −BR−1BTP⊗ In+ATp ⊗ATp .
Step 3 If ‖P(k+1)−P(k)‖< TOL, stop.
Step 4: Output
Step 5: End
This task can also be accomplished by using the Lyapunov iterative technique in Step 2 of
the above algorithm. The MATLAB built-in command lyap is very useful for this kind of
simulation. The application of this algorithm through MATLAB simulation provides the
following results:
P =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
2.7357 −7.5039 1.3446 0.7675
−7.5039 23.8648 −4.9545 −2.9577
1.3446 −4.9545 4.0786 1.3543
0.7675 −2.9577 1.3543 0.9572
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ ,
K =
[
0.5262 −1.9890 0.8840 0.6224] .
k Lyapunov method Newton’s method
0 2.4970 2.4970
1 3.0127×10−1 3.1088×10−1
2 1.3197×10−3 1.0294×10−3
3 2.2233×10−6 4.1651×10−9
4 5.886×10−9 6.4285×10−15
5 1.7001×10−11
6 1.2671×10−13
7 6.7299×10−14
Table 2.1: Error in each iteration.
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Fig. 2.2: Trajectory of the state.
From Table 2.1, it can be observed that the algorithm converges to the exact solution
with an accuracy of ‖G (P(k))‖< 10−13 after seven iterations using the Lyapunov iterative
technique. It can also be observed that Newton’s method attains quadratic convergence only
after four iterations under the appropriate initial conditions. Therefore, Newton’s method
is potentially fast and more accurate than the widely used the Lyapunov iterative technique.
Fig. 2.2 shows the response of the system with a state trajectory. It shows that the state
variables x(k) can stabilize the given system, which implies that the proposed method is
very useful and reliable.
2.3 Solution concepts for multi-player problems
To understand the multi-player situation, let us consider the two-player game problems for
the cooperative and non-cooperative cases. Stochastic Pareto optimality and Nash equilib-
rium solution concepts are introduced for cooperative and non-cooperative game problems,
respectively. Let us consider the linear stochastic system of two players:
dx(t) = [Ax(t)+B1u1(t)+B2u2(t)]dt+Apx(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0, (2.84)
and the cost functionals are
J1(x0, u1, u2) =
1
2
E
[∫ Tf
0
(
xT (t)Q1x(t)+uT1 (t)R11u1(t)+u
T
2 (t)R12u2(t)
)
dt
]
, (2.85a)
J2(x0, u1, u2) =
1
2
E
[∫ Tf
0
(
xT (t)Q2x(t)+uT1 (t)R21u1(t)+u
T
2 (t)R22u2(t)
)
dt
]
, (2.85b)
where Qi = QTi ≥ 0, Ri j = RTi j ≥ 0 for i = j and Rii = RTii > 0, i, j = 1, 2.
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2.3.1 Pareto optimal solution
Let us consider the following linear stochastic system with linear quadratic cost functions,
dx(t) = [Ax(t)+
N
∑
i=1
Biui(t)]dt+Apx(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0, (2.86a)
Ji (x0, u1, . . . ,uN) :=
1
2
E
[∫ Tf
0
[
xT (t)Qix(t)+
N
∑
j=1
uTj (t)Ri ju j(t)
]
dt
]
, (2.86b)
where Qi = QTi ≥ 0, Ri j = RTi j ≥ 0 for i = j and Rii = RTii > 0, i, j = 1, . . . ,N.
Deﬁnition 2.4. A strategy-set (u1, · · · ,uN) is said to be a Pareto optimal strategy if it
minimizes a sum of the cost of functional of all players denoted by
J(u1, · · · ,uN) =
N
∑
i=1
riJi(x0, u1, · · · ,uN), (2.87)
where ∑Ni=1 ri = 1 for some 0< ri < 1.
Theorem 2.5. For the stochastic optimal control problem (2.86), suppose that the following
stochastic Riccati differential equation (SRDE) has the solution PT (t) = P(t)≥ 0:
−P˙(t) = P(t)A+ATP(t)+Q−P(t)BR−1BTP(t)+ATpP(t)Ap, P(Tf ) = 0, (2.88)
then the Pareto optimal control problem admits a state feedback solution,
u∗(t) =−R−1(t)BT (t)P(t)x(t), (2.89)
where
B :=
[
B1, . . . ,BN
]
,
u(t) =
⎡
⎢⎣u1(t)...
uN(t)
⎤
⎥⎦ ,
Q=
N
∑
i=1
riQi,
R= block diag
[
∑Ni=1 riRi1 . . . ∑
N
i=1 riRiN
]
.
Proof. If we centralized the system (2.86) base on the Deﬁnition 2.4, we can can rewrite it
as follows:
dx(t) = [Ax(t)+Bu(t)]dt+Apx(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0, (2.90a)
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J(x0, u) :=
1
2
E
[∫ Tf
0
(
xT (t)Qx(t)+uT (t)Ru(t)
)
dt
]
, (2.90b)
where
B :=
[
B1, . . . ,BN
]
,
u(t) =
⎡
⎢⎣u1(t)...
uN(t)
⎤
⎥⎦ ,
Q=
N
∑
i=1
riQi,
R= block diag
[
∑Ni=1 riRi1 . . . ∑
N
i=1 riRiN
]
.
We deﬁne the ﬁnite-horizon value function,
v(t,x) =
1
2
min
u(t)∈U
E
[∫ Tf
t
{xT (s)Qx(s)+uT (s)Ru(s)}ds
]
. (2.91)
It will satisfy the stochastic Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation,
−vt = min
u(t)∈U
[
1
2
(xT (t)Qx(t)+uT (t)Ru(t))+ vTx (A(t)x(t)+Bu(t))
+
1
2
(Ap(t)x(t))T (Ap(t)x(t))vxx], (2.92)
with boundary condition: v(Tf ,x) = 0.
To minimize the right hand side of (2.92) with respect to the control input u(t) we get,
Ru∗(t)+BT vx = 0, (2.93)
or,
u∗(t) =−R−1BT vx. (2.94)
Now, if we insert this optimal state feedback control input u∗(t) into equation (2.92) we
get,
−vt =12(x
T (t)Qx(t)+ vTx BR
−1BT vx)+ vTx (A(t)x(t)−BR−1BT vx)
+
1
2
xT (t)ATp (t)Ap(t)x(t)vxx,
=
1
2
(xT (t)Qx(t)− vTx BR−1BT vx)+ vTx A(t)x(t)+
1
2
xT (t)ATp (t)Ap(t)x(t)vxx, (2.95)
with boundary condition:
v(Tf ,x) = 0.
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Now let
v(t,x) =
1
2
xT (t)P(t)x(t), (2.96)
where P(t) is a symmetric positive semideﬁnite matrix. Therefore,
vx = P(t)x(t),
and
vxx = P(t).
So, from (2.95) we get,
−1
2
xT (t)P˙(t)x(t) =
1
2
(xT (t)Qx(t)− xT (t)P(t)BR−1BTP(t)x(t))
+ xT (t)P(t)A(t)x(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
2 x
T (t)(P(t)A(t)+AT (t)P(t))x(t)
+
1
2
xT (t)ATp (t)P(t)Ap(t)x(t), (2.97)
with boundary condition: P(Tf ) = 0. Simply,
−P˙(t) =P(t)A(t)+AT (t)P(t)+Q−P(t)BR−1BTP(t)+ATp (t)P(t)Ap(t), P(Tf ) = 0.
(2.98)
Moreover, substituting vx = P(t)x(t) into equation (2.94), we can obtain the state feedback
optimal control input,
u∗(t) =−R−1BTP(t)x(t). (2.99)
Inﬁnite-horizon case:
Let us consider the following linear stochastic system with linear quadratic cost functions,
dx(t) = [Ax(t)+
N
∑
i=1
Biui(t)]dt+Apx(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0, (2.100a)
Ji (x0, u1, . . . ,uN) :=
1
2
E
[∫ ∞
0
[
xT (t)Qix(t)+
N
∑
j=1
uTj (t)Ri ju j(t)
]
dt
]
, (2.100b)
where Qi = QTi ≥ 0, Ri j = RTi j ≥ 0 for i = j and Rii = RTii > 0, i, j = 1, . . . ,N.
Theorem 2.6. For the stochastic optimal control problem (2.100), suppose that the follow-
ing stochastic algebraic Riccati equation (SARE) has the solution PT = P≥ 0:
PA+ATP+Q−PBR−1BTP+ATpPAp = 0, (2.101)
then the optimal control problem admits a state feedback solution,
u∗(t) = Kx(t) =−R−1BTPx(t). (2.102)
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Proof. Recall SRDE (2.88) of Theorem 2.5. As Tf → ∞, P(t) approaches to steady-state.
Therefore, P˙(t) = 0. Then form equation (2.88), we can obtain the following stochastic
algebraic Riccati equation (SARE):
PA+ATP+Q−PBR−1BTP+ATpPAp = 0. (2.103)
Moreover, using the same technique as ﬁnite-horizon case, the optimal state feedback con-
trol can be derived as follows:
u∗(t) = Kx(t) =−R−1BTPx(t). (2.104)
For Lyapunov stability analysis, consider SARE (2.103) as the form of stochastic algebraic
Lyapunov equation:
(A+BK)TP+P(A+BK)+(Q+KTRK)+ATpPAp = 0, (2.105)
with K =−R−1BTP. By Lemma 2.2, if (A+BK, Ap |
√
Q+KTRK) is exactly observable,
then (A+BK, Ap) is stable if the stochastic algebraic Lyapunov equation (2.105) has a
unique positive deﬁnite solution P = PT .
2.3.2 Nash equilibrium solution
Recall the two-player game problem (2.84)–(2.85). We call the pair (u1, u2) ∈U1×U2 a
Nash equilibrium if
J1(x0, u∗1, u
∗
2)≤ J1(x0, u1, u∗2), ∀u1 ∈U1, (2.106a)
J2(x0, u∗1, u
∗
2)≤ J2(x0, u∗1, u2), ∀u2 ∈U2. (2.106b)
Theorem 2.7. If there exist two symmetric positive semi-deﬁnite matrices P1(t) and P2(t)
satisfying the following cross-coupling stochastic Riccati differential equations (SRDEs):
−P˙1(t) =(A+B2K2)TP1(t)+P1(t)(A+B2K2)+ATpP1Ap+Q1+KT2 R12K2
−P1(t)B1R−111 BT1 P1(t), P1(Tf ) = 0, (2.107a)
−P˙2(t) =(A+B1K1)TP2(t)+P2(t)(A+B1K1)+ATpP2Ap+Q2+KT1 R21K1
−P2(t)B2R−122 BT2 P2(t), P2(Tf ) = 0, (2.107b)
then, the state feedback strategy pair (u∗1(t), u
∗
2(t)) is a Nash equilibrium for the system
(2.84)–(2.85) , where
u∗1(t) = K1x(t) =−R−111 BT1 P1(t)x(t), (2.108a)
u∗2(t) = K2x(t) =−R−122 BT2 P2(t)x(t). (2.108b)
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Proof. Substituting u∗2(t) = K2x(t) into state equation (2.84) and the cost functional for the
ﬁrst player (2.85a) gives
dx(t) = [(A+B2K2)x(t)+B1u1(t)]dt+Apx(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0, (2.109a)
J1(x0, u1, u∗2) =
1
2
E
[∫ Tf
0
(
xT (t)Q1x(t)+uT1 (t)R11u1(t)+ x
T (t)KT2 R12K2x(t)
)
dt
]
.
(2.109b)
Hence, by Theorem 2.2, if the following stochastic Riccati differential equation (SRDE)
has the solution PT1 (t) = P1(t)≥ 0:
−P˙1(t) =(A+B2K2)TP1(t)+P1(t)(A+B2K2)+ATpP1Ap+Q1+KT2 R12K2
−P1(t)B1R−111 BT1 P1(t), P1(Tf ) = 0, (2.110)
then the stochastic optimal control problem (2.109) admits a state feedback solution,
u∗1(t) = K1x(t) =−R−111 BT1 P1(t)x(t). (2.111)
Conversely, substituting u∗1(t) = K1x(t) into state equation (2.84) and the cost functional
for the ﬁrst player (2.85b) gives
dx(t) = [(A+B1K1)x(t)+B2u2(t)]dt+Apx(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0, (2.112a)
J2(x0, u∗1, u2) =
1
2
E
[∫ Tf
0
(
xT (t)Q2x(t)+uT2 (t)R22u2(t)+ x
T (t)KT1 R21K1x(t)
)
dt
]
.
(2.112b)
Hence, by Theorem 2.2, if the following stochastic Riccati differential equation (SRDE)
has the solution PT2 (t) = P2(t)≥ 0:
−P˙2(t) =(A+B1K1)TP2(t)+P2(t)(A+B1K1)+ATpP2Ap+Q2+KT1 R21K1
−P2(t)B2R−122 BT2 P2(t), P2(Tf ) = 0, (2.113)
then the stochastic optimal control problem (2.112) admits a state feedback solution,
u∗2(t) = K2x(t) =−R−122 B2TP2(t)x(t). (2.114)
Hence the theorem is proved.
Inﬁnite horizon case
In the case of inﬁnite horizon, let us consider the linear stochastic system of two players:
dx(t) = [Ax(t)+B1u1(t)+B2u2(t)]dt+Apx(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0, (2.115)
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and the cost functionals are
J1(x0, u1, u2) =
1
2
E
[∫ ∞
0
(
xT (t)Q1x(t)+uT1 (t)R11u1(t)+u
T
2 (t)R12u2(t)
)
dt
]
, (2.116a)
J2(x0, u1, u2) =
1
2
E
[∫ ∞
0
(
xT (t)Q2x(t)+uT2 (t)R22u2(t)+u
T
1 (t)R21u1(t)
)
dt
]
, (2.116b)
where Qi = QTi ≥ 0, Ri j = RTi j ≥ 0 for i = j and Rii = RTii > 0, i, j = 1, 2.
Lemma 2.3. If there exist two symmetric positive semi-deﬁnite matrices P1 and P2 satisfy-
ing the following cross-coupling stochastic Riccati differential equations (SRDEs):
(A+B2K2)TP1+P1(A+B2K2)+ATpP1Ap+Q1+K
T
2 R12K2−P1B1R−111 BT1 P1 = 0,
(2.117a)
(A+B1K1)TP2+P2(A+B1K1)+ATpP2Ap+Q2+K
T
1 R21K1−P2B2R−122 BT2 P2 = 0,
(2.117b)
then, the state feedback strategy pair (u∗1(t), u
∗
2(t)) is a Nash equilibrium for the system
(2.115)–(2.116), where
u∗1(t) = K1x(t) =−R−111 BT1 P1x(t), (2.118a)
u∗2(t) = K2x(t) =−R−122 BT2 P2x(t). (2.118b)
Proof. Substituting u∗2(t) = K2x(t) into state equation (2.115) and the cost functional for
the ﬁrst player (2.116a) gives
dx(t) = [(A+B2K2)x(t)+B1u1(t)]dt+Apx(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0, (2.119a)
J1(x0, u1, u∗2) =
1
2
E
[∫ ∞
0
(
xT (t)Q1x(t)+uT1 (t)R11u1(t)+ x
T (t)KT2 R12K2x(t)
)
dt
]
.
(2.119b)
Hence, by Theorem 2.3, if the following stochastic Riccati differential equation (SRDE)
has the solution PT1 = P1 ≥ 0:
(A+B2K2)TP1+P1(A+B2K2)+ATpP1Ap+Q1+K
T
2 R12K2−P1B1R−111 BT1 P1 = 0,
(2.120)
then the stochastic optimal control problem (2.119) admits a state feedback solution,
u∗1(t) = K1x(t) =−R−111 BT1 P1x(t). (2.121)
Conversely, substituting u∗1(t) = K1x(t) into state equation (2.115) and the cost functional
for the ﬁrst player (2.116b) gives
dx(t) = [(A+B1K1)x(t)+B2u2(t)]dt+Apx(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0, (2.122a)
50
J2(x0, u∗1, u2) =
1
2
E
[∫ ∞
0
(
xT (t)Q2x(t)+uT2 (t)R22u2(t)+ x
T (t)KT1 R21K1x(t)
)
dt
]
.
(2.122b)
Hence, by Theorem 2.3, if the following stochastic Riccati differential equation (SRDE)
has the solution PT2 = P2 ≥ 0:
(A+B1K1)TP2+P2(A+B1K1)+ATpP2Ap+Q2+K
T
1 R21K1−P2B2R−122 BT2 P2 = 0,
(2.123)
then the stochastic optimal control problem (2.122) admits a state feedback solution,
u∗2(t) = K2x(t) =−R−122 B2TP2x(t). (2.124)
Hence the lemma is proved.
2.3.3 Numerical examples
Finite-horizon case:
Consider a linear stochastic two-player Nash equilibrium problem:
dx(t) = (−x+u1+u2)dt+ εxdw(t), x(0) = 1, (2.125)
with cost functionals
J1 =
1
2
E
[∫ 1
0
(x2+u21+2u
2
2)dt
]
, (2.126a)
J2 =
1
2
E
[∫ 1
0
(x2+2u21+u
2
2)dt
]
. (2.126b)
To ﬁnd the optimal control for the above problem.
We call a pair (u1, u2) ∈U1×U2 a Nash equilibrium if
J1(u∗1, u
∗
2)≤ J1(u1, u∗2), ∀u1 ∈U1, (2.127a)
J2(u∗1, u
∗
2)≤ J2(u∗1, u2), ∀u2 ∈U2. (2.127b)
In such case, the pair (u∗1, u
∗
2) can be deﬁned as
u∗1 =−P1x and u∗2 =−P2x, where (2.128)
−P˙1 = P1(−1−P2)+(−1−P2)TP1−P21 +1+2P22 +P1ε2, P1(1) = 0,
−P˙2 = P2(−1−P1)+(−1−P1)TP2−P22 +1+2P21 +P1ε2, P2(1) = 0.
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which imply
P˙1 = P21 +2P1P2+2P1−2P22 −1+P1ε2, P1(1) = 0, (2.129a)
P˙2 = P22 +2P1P2+2P2−2P21 −1+P1ε2, P2(1) = 0. (2.129b)
Solving the system (2.129) for P1 and P2 we can ﬁnd the optimal control from (2.128). The
state trajectory can be depicted by Fig. 2.3 and can be detected by the following equation:
x(t+h) = x(t)+h(−1−P1−P2)x(t)+ εx(t)
√
hN(0,1), x(0) = 1, (2.130)
where 0< h < 1 is a small step size of time.
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Fig. 2.3: Finite-horizon state trajectory.
Inﬁnite-horizon case:
Let us consider the following system matrices of the system (2.115)–(2.116) for a two-
player Nash equilibrium problem:
A =
⎡
⎣ −0.52 1.12 00 −0.24 1
0.23 0.85 −0.16
⎤
⎦ , Ap = 0.1A, x(0) =
⎡
⎣ 10.5
−0.6
⎤
⎦ ,
B1 =
⎡
⎣0.150.12
3.55
⎤
⎦ , B2 =
⎡
⎣ 0.23−0.52
0.28
⎤
⎦ ,
Q1 = diag( 1 1.5 2.1 ), Q2 = diag( 1.2 1.1 3.1 ),
R11 = 1.9, R12 = 2.5, R21 = 2.7, R22 = 3.5.
Applying Lemma 2.3, we can obtain the following results:
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P1 =
⎡
⎣8.4141e−1 6.2288e−1 1.0255e−16.2288e−1 2.2012 5.0173e−1
1.0255e−1 5.0173e−1 6.3970e−1
⎤
⎦ ,
P2 =
⎡
⎣ 1.0076 8.1692e−1 1.4292e−18.1692e−1 2.5452 6.2007e−1
1.4292e−1 6.2007e−1 9.0459e−1
⎤
⎦ ,
K1 =
[−2.9737e−1 −1.1256 −1.2350] ,
K2 =
[
4.3723e−2 2.7486e−1 1.0366e−2] .
It can be observed that the Lyapunov iterative algorithm converges to the exact solution
with an accuracy of 10−13 after 14 iterations. Fig. 2.4 shows the response of the system
with a state trajectory. It shows that the state variables x(k) can stabilize the given system,
which implies that the proposed method is very useful and reliable.
2.4 Disturbance attenuation problems
Consider the following stochastic linear system [Zhang and Chen (2004)]:⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
dx(t) = [Ax(t)+B2u(t)+B1v(t)]dt+Apx(t)dw(t),
z(t) =
[
Cx(t)
Du(t)
]
,
(2.131)
where x(0) = 0 and DTD = I. In (2.131), x(t) ∈ Rn is the state vector, u(t) ∈ Rnu is the
control input, v(t) ∈ Rnv is the disturbance, w(t) ∈ R is a one-dimensional wiener process
and z(t) ∈ Rnz is the controlled output.
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We want to minimize H2 performance of the output by controlling u(t) so that the
effect of disturbance v(t) will be eliminated under H∞ - constraint. Moreover, minimize the
desired cost function when worst-case disturbance v∗(t) is imposed.
For any disturbance attenuation γ > 0, we need to ﬁnd a state feedback control u∗(t) ∈
L 2F (R+, R
nu) such that,
(i) For v = 0, the perturbation operator
‖L ‖∞ = sup
v(t) ∈L 2F (R+, Rnv)
v = 0, x0 = 0
‖z‖
‖v‖ ,
= sup
v(t) ∈L 2F (R+, Rnv)
v = 0, x0 = 0
{
E
[∫ ∞
0
(xTCTCx+uTu)dt
]}1/2
{
E
[∫ ∞
0
vT v dt
]}1/2 < γ. (2.132)
(ii) For v = 0, u∗(t) stabilizes system (2.131) internally, i.e, limt→∞E[xT (t)x(t)] = 0.
(iii) For v(t) = v∗(t), worst-case disturbance, if exist, where
v∗(t) = argmin
v
J1(x0, u∗, v), ∀x0 ∈ Rn, (2.133)
with
J1(x0, u∗, v) = E
[∫ ∞
0
(γ2‖v‖2−‖z‖2)dt
]
, (2.134)
is applied to the system (2.131) u∗(t) minimizes the cost functional,
J2(x0, u, v∗) = ‖z‖2 = E
[∫ ∞
0
(xTCTCx+uTu)dt
]
. (2.135)
Equivalently condition (i), next theorem will also show that if J1(x0, u∗, v∗) ≥ 0, then u∗
is a solution to the stochastic H2/H∞ control. If an admissible control u(t) satisﬁes the
condition (i) and (ii), then u(t) is called a solution under H∞-constraint.
The inﬁnite horizon stochastic H2/H∞ control is associated with the two-player,
nonzero-sum Nash equilibrium strategies (u∗, v∗) deﬁned by,
J1(x0, u∗, v∗)≤ J1(x0, u∗, v), (2.136)
J2(x0, u∗, v∗)≤ J2(x0, u, v∗). (2.137)
If the previous (u∗, v∗) exists, then we say that the inﬁnite horizon H2/H∞ control admits
a pair of solutions.
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Theorem 2.8. For (2.131), suppose that the coupled AREs,
P1(A−B2BT2 P2)+(A−B2BT2 P2)TP1+ATpP1Ap = A˜T2 A˜2, (2.138)
P2(A−B2BT2 P2− γ−2B1BT1 P1)+(A−B2BT2 P2− γ−2B1BT1 P1)TP2+ATpP2Ap =−A˜T3 A˜3,
(2.139)
have a pair of solution (P1 ≤ 0,P2 ≥ 0), where A˜2 =
⎡
⎣ Cγ−1BT1 P1
BT2 P2
⎤
⎦ and A˜3 = [ CBT2 P2
]
. If
[A,Ap|C] and [A− γ−2B1BT1 P1,Ap|C] are exactly observable, then the stochastic H2/H∞
control problem admits a pair of solutions
u∗(t) =−BT2 P2x(t), (2.140)
v∗(t) =−γ−2BT1 P1x(t). (2.141)
Proof. To prove Theorem 2.8, we have to prove the following claims:
(i) (u∗, v∗) ∈L 2F (R+, Rnu)×L 2F (R+, Rnv) and (A−B2BT2 P2,Ap) is stable,
(ii) ‖L ‖∞ < γ and
(iii) u∗ minimizes the output energy ‖z‖22 when v∗ applied in (2.131), i.e.,
u∗ = argmin
u
J2(x0, u, v∗), ∀u ∈L 2F (R+, Rnu).
(i) By Lemma 3 of [Zhang and Chen (2004)], [A− B2BT2 P2 − γ−2B1BT1 P1, Ap|A˜3] is
exactly observable. So form Lemma 1 of [Zhang and Chen (2004)], (2.131) yields (A−
B2BT2 P2−γ−2B1BT1 P1,Ap) being stable. Hence, (u∗, v∗)∈L 2F (R+, Rnu)×L 2F (R+, Rnv).
Second, form Lemmas 1 and 3 of [Zhang and Chen (2004)], (2.138) yields (A −
BT2 P2P2,Ap) is stable, i.e., (2.131) is internally stabilizable by u(t) = u
∗(t) = −BT2 P2x(t).
So, we can write [Hinrichsen and Pritchard (1998)],
P1(A−B2BT2 P2)+(A−B2BT2 P2)TP1+ATpP1Ap−P2B2BT2 P2− γ−2P1B1BT1 P1−CTC = 0,
(2.142)
(ii) Substituting u(t) = u∗(t) =−BT2 P2x(t) into (2.131) gives⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
dx(t) =
{
(A−B2BT2 P2)x(t)+B1v(t)
}
dt+Apx(t)dw(t),
z(t) =
[
Cx(t)
−DBT2 P2x(t)
]
,
(2.143)
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where x(0) = x0. Applying Ito’s formula to (2.143) and considering (2.138), we have
E
[∫ ∞
0
d(xTP1x)
]
= E
[∫ ∞
0
{(
(A−B2BT2 P2)x+B1v
)
(P1x+ xTP1)+ xTATpP1Apx
}
dt
]
or, − xT0 P1x0 = E
[∫ ∞
0
{
xT (P1(A−B2BT2 P2)+(A−B2BT2 P2)TP2+ATpP1Ap)x
+ vTBT1 P1x+ x
TP1B1v
}
dt
]
= E
[∫ ∞
0
{
xT A˜T2 A˜2x+ v
TBT1 P1x+ x
TP1B1v
}
dt
]
= E
[∫ ∞
0
{
xT (CTC+ γ−2P1B1BT1 P1+P2B2B
T
2 P2)x+ v
TBT1 P1x+ x
TP1B1v
}
dt
]
= E
[∫ ∞
0
{
zT z+ γ2v∗
T
v∗+ vTBT1 P1x+ x
TP1B1v
}
dt
]
[suppose, v∗(t) =−γ−2BT1 P1x(t)]
or, E
[∫ ∞
0
{
γ2vT v− zT z}dt]= xT0 P1x0+E
[∫ ∞
0
{
γ2vT v+ γ2v∗
T
v∗ − γ2vT v∗ − γ2v∗T v
}
dt
]
= xT0 P1x0+ γ
2
E
[∫ ∞
0
(v− v∗)T (v− v∗)dt
]
(2.144)
So
J1(x0, u∗, v) = E
[∫ ∞
0
{
γ2vT v− zT z}dt]
= xT0 P1x0+ γ
2
E
[∫ ∞
0
(v− v∗)T (v− v∗)dt
]
≥ J1(x0, u∗, v∗) = xT0 P1x0.
(2.145)
Now, if we deﬁne an operatorL1v= v−v∗, then form (2.145) we have (for x(0) = x0 = 0):
J1(x0, u∗, v) = γ‖v‖2−‖z‖2 = γ2‖L1v‖2 ≥ ε‖v‖2 > 0
, for some ε > 0, which yields ‖L ‖∞ < γ .
(iii) Finally, when worst-case disturbance v = v∗(t) = −γ−2BT1 P1x(t) is applied to
(2.131), we have⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
dx(t) =
{
(A− γ−2B1BT1 P1)x(t)+B2u(t)
}
dt+Apx(t)dw(t)
z(t) =
[
Cx(t)
Du(t)
]
,
(2.146)
where x(0) = x0. Now the H2 optimization problem becomes a standard stochastic LQ
optimal control problem, so we can write [Rami and Zhou (2000)]
P2(A− γ−2B1BT1 P1)+(A− γ−2B1BT1 P1)TP2+ATpP1Ap−P2B2BT2 P2+CTC = 0, (2.147)
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which is the same as (2.139). Applying Ito’s formula in (2.146) considering (2.147) we get,
E
[∫ ∞
0
d(xTP2x)
]
= E
[∫ ∞
0
{(
(A− γ−2B1BT1 P1)x+B2u
)
(P2x+ xTP2)+ xTATpP2Apx
}
dt
]
or, − xT0 P2x0 = E
[∫ ∞
0
{
xTP2B2BT2 P2x− xTCTCx+uTBT2 P2x+ xTP2B2u
}
dt
]
[by (2.147)]
or, E
[∫ ∞
0
{
xTCTCx+uTu
}
dt
]
= xT0 P2x0+E
[∫ ∞
0
{
uTu+u∗
T
u∗+uTu∗ −uTu∗ −u∗T u
}
dt
]
or, J2(x0, u, v∗) = xT0 P2x0+E
[∫ ∞
0
(u−u∗)T (u−u∗)dt
]
. (2.148)
If we put u = u∗, then form (2.148) we get
J2(x0, u, v∗)≥ J2(x0, u∗, v∗) = xT0 P2x0. (2.149)
It can be shown that [A − γ−2BT1 P1,Ap|C] is exactly observable and [A − B2BT2 P2 −
γ−2BT1 P1,Ap|C] is stochastically detectable. So, the maximal solution of AREs (2.138)
and (2.139) can be written as (P1 ≤ 0, P2 ≥ 0).
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Chapter 3
H∞-Constrained Incentive Stackelberg
Game for Discrete-Time Systems with
Multiple Non-cooperative Followers
This chapter is based on a previously published article [Ahmed and Mukaidani (2016)].
3.1 Introduction
Stackelberg leadership model is a hierarchical strategy involving the ﬁrst movement of the
leader and then the consequent movement of followers. With several control problems,
dynamic games for both continuous- and discrete-time systems have been extensively
studied (see e.g. [Bas¸ar and Olsder (1999)] and references therein). Recently, due to the
growth of interest in multi-agent and cooperative systems, the theoretical game problem
and the applications have been widely investigated. The interest in multi-agent cooperative
systems with theoretical game problems and applications is increasing. For example, a
new class of multi-agent discrete-time dynamic games are demonstrated in terms of the
solutions of the discrete-time coupled Hamilton Jacobi equations [Abouheaf et al. (2013)].
In [Shen (2004)], a non-cooperative game with Nash equilibrium state feedback control
has been considered. Subsequently, Riccati design techniques and neural adaptive design
techniques for cooperative control of multi-agent systems with unknown dynamics has
been established in [Lewis et al. (2013)].
The open and closed-loop Stackelberg games are commonly used in dy-
namic non-cooperative games and the hierarchical decision making problems
[Bas¸ar and Olsder (1999)], [Medanic (1978)]. The basic feature of the Stackelberg
game is the leader determines his strategy ahead and the followers optimize their own
cost subject to the leader’s announcement. At last, the leader optimize his cost con-
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sidering the optimized followers’ constraints. Also, incentive Stackelberg strategy an
extensive idea in which the leader can achieve his team-optimal solution in a Stack-
elberg game. Over the past 40 years, the incentive Stackelberg strategy was studied
intensively (see e.g. [Ho et al. (1982), Basar and Selbuz (1979), Basar and Olsder (1980),
Zheng and Basar (1982), Zheng et al. (1984)] and references therein). In [Li et al. (2002)],
the team-optimal state feedback incentive Stackelberg strategy of discrete-time two-player
nonzero-sum dynamic games characterized by linear state dynamics and quadratic cost
functionals was developed. However, the deterministic disturbance is not taken into
account in these literatures. To the best of our knowledge, such perspective is lacking in
the literature in view of the case of the existence of the external disturbance in hierarchical
control strategy. Therefore, the incentive Stackelberg game for such systems seem to be
even more challenging.
In this Chapter, the incentive Stackelberg game for a discrete-time system with multiple
followers under H∞ constraint is considered. We discuss only two-level hierarchical games
with one leader and many non-cooperative followers. In our work, the conditions for the
existence of the leader’s team-optimal solution under the H∞ constraint are derived based
on the existing results in [Zhang et al. (2007)]. It is shown that a solution can be found
by solving a set of cross-coupled backward difference Riccati equations (CCBDREs).
Moreover, the followers’ strategies are established in such a way that satisﬁes the leader’s
team-optimal solution. Furthermore, we discuss the inﬁnite-horizon case and propose a
numerical algorithm to obtain a solution set of the coupled algebraic Riccati equations. A
numerical example demonstrates the efﬁciency of the proposed methodology.
Notation: The notations used in this Chapter are fairly standard. In denotes the n×n identity
matrix. block diag denotes the block diagonal matrix. [·] denotes the expectation operator.
Y = {y(k) : y(k) ∈ Rn}0≤k≤T = {y(0),y(1), . . . ,y(Tf )} denotes the ﬁnite sequences. The
l2-norm of y(k)∈ l2(NTf ,Rn) is deﬁned by ‖y(k)‖2l2(NTf ,Rn) :=∑
Tf
k=0[‖y(k)‖2], whereNTf :=
{0, 1, . . . ,Tf }.
3.2 Preliminary results
Consider the linear discrete-time system,
x(k+1) = A(k)x(k)+B(k)u(k), (3.1a)
x(0) = x0, k = 0, 1, . . . ,Tf , (3.1b)
where x(k) ∈ Rn represents the state vector, u(k) ∈ Rm denotes the control input, A(k) and
B(k) are assumed to be matrix-valued functions of suitable dimensions.
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Let us deﬁne the cost functional,
J(x0, u) :=
1
2
Tf
∑
k=0
[xT (k)Q(k)x(k)+2xT (k)S(k)u(k)+uT (k)R(k)u(k)], (3.2)
whereQ(k)=QT (k)≥ 0, R(k)=RT (k)> 0, Q(k)−ST (k)[R(k)]−1S(k)> 0 and 0< T <∞.
By using the similar technique of [Zhang et al. (2008)] and [Rami et al. (2002)] to ﬁnd an
admissible control of the above system, we can derive the following lemma3:
Lemma 3.1. Suppose that the following backward difference Riccati equation (BDRE) has
solution(s):
X(k) =ATS (k)X(k+1)AS(k)−ATS (k)X(k+1)V (k)X(k+1)AS(k)+Q(k)
−ST (k)[R(k)]−1S(k), X(T +1) = 0, (3.3)
where
AS(k) := A(k)−B(k)[R(k)]−1S(k),
V (k) := B(k)[Rˆ(k)]−1BT (k),
Rˆ := R(k)+BT (k)X(k+1)B(k),
Q(k)−ST (k)[R(k)]−1S(k)≥ 0.
Then, the optimal state feedback control is given by
u∗(k) = K∗(k)x(k) (3.4)
=−[Rˆ(k)]−1(BT (k)X(k+1)AS(k)+ [R(k)]−1S(k))x(k). (3.5)
In contrast to [Zhang et al. (2008)] and [Rami et al. (2002)], there exist a cross-coupling
term 2xT (k)S(k)u(k) in the cost functional (3.1) in a deterministic system.
Proof. Let us consider the Hamilton as follows:
H(k) =xT (k)Q(k)x(k)+2xT (k)S(k)u(k)+uT (k)R(k)u(k)+V (k+1)
=xT (k)Q(k)x(k)+2xT (k)S(k)u(k)+uT (k)R(k)u(k)
+ xT (k+1)X(k+1)x(k+1), (3.6)
where V (k) is a quadratic function as follows:
V (k) =
1
2
xT (k)X(k)x(k), V (Tf ) = 0, (3.7)
with the symmetric positive semi-deﬁnite matrix X(k).
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Using equation (3.1a), the following result can be found form (3.6):
H(k) =xT (k)Q(k)x(k)+2xT (k)S(k)u(k)+uT (k)R(k)u(k)
+ [A(k)x(k)+B(k)u(k)]TX(k+1)[A(k)x(k)+B(k)u(k)],
=xT (k)[Q(k)+AT (k)X(k+1)A(k)]x(k)
+2xT (k)[S(k)+AT (k)X(k+1)B(k)]u(k)+uT (k)[R(k)+BT (k)X(k+1)B(k)]u(k),
(3.8)
To minimize the right hand side of (3.8) with respect to the control input u(k) we obtain
the following state feedback optimal control scheme:
u∗(k) =−[R(k)+BT (k)X(k+1)B(k)]−1[S(k)+AT (k)X(k+1)B(k)]T x(k),
=−[Rˆ(k)]−1(BT (k)X(k+1)AS(k)+ [R(k)]−1S(k))x(k), (3.9)
where
AS(k) := A(k)−B(k)[R(k)]−1S(k),
Rˆ := R(k)+BT (k)X(k+1)B(k).
Comparing right hand sides of (3.49) and (3.8), the following backward difference Ric-
cati equation (BDRE) can be derived using (3.3):
X(k) =ATS (k)X(k+1)AS(k)−ATS (k)X(k+1)V (k)X(k+1)AS(k)+Q(k)
−ST (k)[R(k)]−1S(k), X(T +1) = 0. (3.10)
On the other hand, consider the following discrete-time system.
x(k+1) = A(k)x(k)+D(k)v(k), (3.11a)
z(k) =C(k)x(k), x(0) = x0, k = 0, 1, . . . Tf , (3.11b)
where v(k) ∈ Rnv represents the external disturbance. z(k) ∈ Rnz represents the controlled
output. The following deﬁnition is the counterpart of the deterministic case of the existing
results in [Zhang et al. (2007), Zhang et al. (2008)].
Deﬁnition 3.1. In system (3.11), if the disturbance input v(k) ∈ l2(NTf , Rnv) and the con-
trolled output z(k) ∈ l2(NTf , Rnz), then the perturbed operator
LTf := l
2(NTf , R
nv)→ l2(NTf , Rnz) (3.12)
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is deﬁned by
LTf v(k) :=Cx(k, 0, v), ∀v(k) ∈ l2(NTf , Rnv), (3.13)
with its norm
‖LTf ‖ := sup
v(k) ∈ l2(NTf , Rnv ),
v(k) = 0, x0 = 0
‖z(k)‖2l2(NTf , Rnz)
‖v(k)‖2l2(NTf , Rnv)
. (3.14)
The following lemma can be viewed as the deterministic version of
[Zhang et al. (2007), Zhang et al. (2008)].
Lemma 3.2. For the discrete time system (3.11), ‖LTf ‖ < γ for given γ > 0 if and only if
there exists a unique solution Y (k)≤ 0 to the following matrix difference equation.
Y (k) = AT (k)Y (k+1)A(k)−AT (k)Y (k+1)U(k)Y (k+1)A(k)
−CT (k)C(k), Y (T +1) = 0, (3.15)
where
U(k) := D(k)[Tγ(k)]−1DT (k),
Tγ(k) := γ2Inv +D
T (k)Y (k+1)D(k).
In this case, worst-case disturbance is given by
v∗(k) = F∗γ (k)x(k) =−[Tγ(k)]−1DT (k)Y (k+1)A(k)x(k). (3.16)
Proof. The corresponding cost function can be deﬁned as:
Jv(x0, v) :=
Tf
∑
k=0
[γ2vT (k)v(k)− xT (k)CT (k)C(k)x(k)]. (3.17)
Let us consider the Hamilton as follows:
H(k) =γ2vT (k)v(k)− xT (k)CT (k)C(k)x(k)+V (k+1)
=γ2vT (k)v(k)− xT (k)CT (k)C(k)x(k)+ xT (k+1)Y (k+1)x(k+1), (3.18)
where V (k) is a quadratic function as follows:
V (k) =
1
2
xT (k)Y (k)x(k), V (Tf ) = 0, (3.19)
with the symmetric positive semi-deﬁnite matrix Y (k).
62
Using equation (3.11a), the following result can be found form (3.18):
H(k) =γ2vT (k)v(k)− xT (k)CT (k)C(k)x(k)
+ [A(k)x(k)+D(k)v(k)]TY (k+1)[A(k)x(k)+D(k)v(k)],
=xT (k)[AT (k)Y (k+1)A(k)−CT (k)C(k)]x(k)
+2xT (k)[AT (k)Y (k+1)D(k)]v(k)+ vT (k)[γ2Inv +D
T (k)Y (k+1)D(k)]v(k),
(3.20)
To minimize the right hand side of (3.20) with respect to the disturbance input v∗(k) we
obtain the following state feedback worst-case disturbance:
v∗(k) =−[γ2Inv +DT (k)Y (k+1)D(k)]−1[AT (k)Y (k+1)D(k)]T x(k),
=−[Tγ(k)]−1DT (k)Y (k+1)A(k)x(k) (3.21)
where
Tγ(k) := γ2Inv +D
T (k)Y (k+1)D(k).
Comparing right hand sides of (3.19) and (3.20), the following backward difference Riccati
equation (BDRE) can be derived using (3.56):
Y (k) = AT (k)Y (k+1)A(k)−AT (k)Y (k+1)U(k)Y (k+1)A(k)
−CT (k)C(k), Y (T +1) = 0, (3.22)
where
U(k) := D(k)[Tγ(k)]−1DT (k).
3.3 H∞-constrained incentive Stackelberg game
3.3.1 Problem formulation
Consider a linear discrete-time system involving multiple followers deﬁned by
x(k+1) = A(k)x(k)+
N
∑
j=1
B0 j(k)u0 j(k)+
N
∑
j=1
Bj(k)u j(k)+D(k)v(k), (3.23a)
z(k) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
C(k)x(k)
G0(k)u0(k)
G1(k)u1(k)
...
GN(k)uN(k)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ , (3.23b)
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where x(0) = x0, GTi (k)Gi(k) = Imi , ui(k) ∈ l2(NTf , Rmi), i= 1, . . . ,N represents the i-th
follower’s control input. It should be noted that i = 0 represents the leader’s control input,
u0(k) =
[
uT01(k) · · · uT0N(k)
]T
,
and each i-th control input u0i, i = 1, . . . ,N is applied for each i-th follower. Deﬁne the
linear quadratic cost functionals as follows:
J0(x0, u0, u1, . . . ,uN , v)
:=
1
2
Tf
∑
k=0
[
xT (k)Q0(k)x(k)+
N
∑
j=1
{
uT0 j(k)R00 j(k)u0 j(k)+u
T
j (k)R0 j(k)u j(k)
}]
,
(3.24a)
Ji(x0, u0, u1, . . . ,uN , v)
:=
Tf
∑
k=0
[
xT (k)Qi(k)x(k)+uT0i(k)R0ii(k)u0i(k)+u
T
i (k)Rii(k)ui(k)
]
, (3.24b)
where Qi(k) =QTi (k)≥ 0, R00i(k) = RT00i(k)> 0, R0i(k) = RT0i(k)≥ 0, R0ii(k) = RT0ii(k)≥
0, Rii(k) = RTii (k)> 0, i= 1, . . . ,N. Furthermore, for given a disturbance attenuation level
γ > 0, deﬁne the performance function
Jγ(x0, u0, u1, . . . ,uN , v) :=
Tf
∑
k=0
[γ2‖v(k)‖2−‖z(k)‖2]. (3.25)
It should be noted that throughout the Chapter, each player only has access to perfect state
information and the following state feedback form deﬁned by the space of admissible strate-
gies Γi, i = 0, 1, . . . ,N is considered.
u0i(k) = u0i
(
k, x(k), x(0)
)
ui(k) = ui
(
k, x(k), x(0)
)
}
, i = 1, . . . ,N. (3.26)
The ﬁnite horizon H∞-constrained incentive Stackelberg game with multiple non-
cooperative followers is given below:
Given the disturbance attenuation level γ > 0, 0 < T < ∞, ﬁnd (if possible) strategies
u∗0i(k) ∈ l2(NTf , Rm0i), u∗i (k) ∈ l2(NTf , Rmi), i = 1, . . . ,N such that
i) for the worst-case disturbance v∗(k) ∈ l2(NTf , Rnv), the following inequalities hold:
J0(x0, u∗0, u
∗
1, . . . ,u
∗
N , v
∗) = min
(u0, u1, ... ,uN)
J0(x0, u0, u1, . . . ,uN , v∗), (3.27a)
Ji(x0, u∗01, . . . ,u
∗
0N , u
∗
1, . . . ,u
∗
N , v
∗)≤ Ji(x0, u∗0(−i), u∗−i, v∗), (3.27b)
64
where
u∗0(−i) := (u
∗
01, . . . ,u
∗
0(i−1), u0i, u
∗
0(i+1), . . . ,u
∗
0N),
u∗−i := (u
∗
1, . . . ,u
∗
i−1, ui, u
∗
i+1, . . . ,u
∗
N),
u0 j := u0 j(u j), u∗0 j = u0 j(u
∗
j), j = 1, . . . ,N,
u j := u j(u j), u∗j = u j(u
∗
j), j = 1, . . . ,N.
ii) The norm of the perturbed operator mentioned in (3.14) and the disturbance attenu-
ation level are related as
‖LTf ‖< γ, (3.28)
where ‖z(k)‖2l2(NTf , Rn) and ‖v(k)‖
2
l2(NTf , R
n)
in (3.14) are deﬁned as
‖z(k)‖2l2(NTf , Rn) :=
Tf
∑
k=0
[
‖C(k)x(k)‖2+‖u∗0(k)‖2+
N
∑
j=1
‖u∗j(k)‖2
]
‖v(k)‖2l2(NTf , Rn) :=
Tf
∑
k=0
[‖v(k)‖2].
It should be noted that a strategy pair (u∗0, u
∗
1, . . . ,u
∗
N) is called a team-optimal strategy
pair for the leader [Bas¸ar and Olsder (1999)]. The problem is that ﬁnd sufﬁcient condi-
tions such that Stackelberg strategy achieves a team-optimal value for J0. Furthermore, the
condition of (3.27b) is called Nash equilibrium condition.
3.3.2 Main results
First, the team optimization problem is solved by using the standard linear quadratic (LQ)
control under the worst disturbance. Let us consider the following LQ control problem.
x(k+1) = Av(k)x(k)+Bc(k)uc(k), (3.29a)
J0(x0, uc) :=
1
2
Tf
∑
k=0
[xT (k)Q0(k)x(k)+uTc (k)Rc(k)uc(k)], (3.29b)
where
Av(k) := A(k)+D(k)Fγ(k),
v∗(k) := Fγ(k)x(k),
uc(k) :=
[
uT0 (k) u
T
1 (k) · · · uTN(k)
]T
,
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Bc(k) :=
[
B0(k) B1(k) · · · BN(k)
]
,
B0(k) :=
[
B01(k) · · · B0N(k)
]
,
Rc(k) := block diag
(
R0(k) R01(k) · · ·R0N(k)
)
,
R0(k) := block diag
(
R001(k) · · ·R00N(k)
)
.
According to Lemma 3.1, the team-optimal control can be written as
u¯c(k) =
[
u¯T0 (k) u¯
T
1 (k) · · · u¯TN(k)
]T
= Kc(k)x(k) =
[
K0(k)
K1(k)
]
x(k)
=−[Rˆc(k)]−1BTc (k)P(k+1)Av(k)x(k), (3.30)
where P(k) satisﬁes the following BDRE
P(k) = ATv (k)P(k+1)Av(k)−ATv (k)P(k+1)Sc(k)P(k+1)Av(k)
+Q0(k), P(T +1) = 0, (3.31)
with
K0(k) :=
[
KT01(k) · · · KT0N(k)
]T
,
K1(k) :=
[
KT1 (k) · · · KTN (k)
]T
,
Sc(k) := Bc(k)[Rˆc(k)]−1BTc (k),
Rˆc(k) := Rc(k)+BTc (k)P(k+1)Bc(k).
Furthermore, the related team-optimal state response is given below.
x¯(k+1) = Av(k)x¯(k)+Bc(k)uc(k) = [Av(k)+Bc(k)Kc(k)]x¯(k), x¯(0) = x0. (3.32)
On the other hand, by using Lemma 3.2, the H∞ constraint condition can be obtained.
Namely, suppose that the following BDRE has the solution set.
W (k) =ATK(k)W (k+1)AK(k)−ATK(k)W (k+1)UW (k)W (k+1)AK(k)
−LK(k), W (T +1) = 0, (3.33)
where
AK(k) := A(k)+Bc(k)Kc(k),
UW (k) := D(k)[TWγ(k)]−1DT (k),
TWγ(k) := γ2Inv +D
T (k)W (k+1)D(k),
LK(k) :=CT (k)C(k)+KT0 (k)K0(k)+K
T
1 (k)K1(k).
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In this case, the worst-case disturbance is given by
v∗(k) = F∗γ (k)x(k) =−[TWγ(k)]−1DT (k)W (k+1)AK(k)x(k). (3.34)
It is assumed that the leader chooses the following incentive Stackelberg strategy:
u∗0i(k) = η0i(k)x(k)+ηii(k)ui(k), i = 1, 2, . . . ,N, (3.35)
where η0i(k) ∈ Rm0i×n and ηii(k) ∈ Rm0i×mi are strategy parameter matrices having the
following relation:
η0i(k) = K0i(k)−ηii(k)Ki(k), i = 1, 2, . . . ,N. (3.36)
It should be ensured that u∗0i(k), u
∗
i (k) and x
∗(k) are satisﬁed the H∞ constraint team-
optimal Nash equilibrium. Hence for i = 1, 2, . . . ,N,
u∗0i(k) =−[R00i(k)]−1BT0iP(k+1)x∗(k+1), (3.37a)
u∗i (k) =−[R0i(k)]−1BTi P(k+1)x∗(k+1). (3.37b)
Second, the followers’ optimization problem is solved. Consider the following cost func-
tional,
Ji(x0, u∗0, u1, . . . ,uN , v)
:=
1
2
Tf
∑
k=0
[
xT (k)Qi(k)x(k)+u∗T0i (k)R0ii(k)u
∗
0i(k)+u
T
i (k)Rii(k)ui(k)
]
, i = 1, . . . ,N,
(3.38)
where u∗0(k) = u
∗
0(k, x(k), x(0)) can be obtained by (3.35).
In order to establish the sufﬁcient condition for optimality, the following Hamiltonian is
deﬁned.
Hi(ui, αi) :=
1
2
[
xT (k)Qi(k)x(k)+u∗T0i (k)R0ii(k)u
∗
0i(k)+u
T
i (k)Rii(k)ui(k)
]
+αTi (k+1)
[
Av(k)x(k)+B0i(k)u∗0i(k)+
N
∑
j=1, j =i
B0 j(k)u∗0 j(k)
+Bi(k)ui(k)+
N
∑
j=1, j =i
B j(k)u j(k)
]
. (3.39)
Hence we have,
αi(k) =
∂Hi(ui, αi)
∂x(k)
= Q˜i(k)x(k)+ A˜Ti (k)αi(k+1), αi(T +1) = 0, (3.40)
67
where
A˜i(k) := Av(k)+B0i(k)η0i(k)+
N
∑
j=1, j =i
[B0 j(k)K0 j(k)+Bj(k)Kj(k)],
Q˜i(k) := Qi(k)+ηT0i(k)R0ii(k)η0i(k).
Now, consider αi(k) = Pi(k)x(k) then the following BDRE can be derived:
Pi(k) =A˜Ti (k)Pi(k+1)A˜i(k)− X˜Ti (k)Y˜−1i (k)X˜i(k) (3.41)
+ Q˜i(k), Pi(T +1) = 0, i = 1, 2, . . . ,N, (3.42)
where
X˜i(k) := B˜Ti (k)Pi(k+1)A˜i(k)+η
T
ii (k)R0ii(k)η0i(k),
Y˜i(k) := R˜i(k)+ B˜Ti (k)Pi(k+1)B˜i(k),
B˜i(k) := Bi(k)+B0i(k)ηii(k),
R˜i(k) := Rii(k)+ηTii (k)R0ii(k)ηii(k).
The followers’ optimal strategy will be determined by
∂Hi(ui, αi)
∂ui(k)
= Rii(k)u∗i (k)+Bi(k)
Tαi(k+1) = 0, (3.43)
which implies
u∗i (k) = K˜i(k)x(k) = [Y˜i(k)]
−1X˜i(k)x(k), i = 0, 1, . . . ,N. (3.44)
Remark 3.1. It should be noted that the incentive parameter ηii(k) can be uniquely deter-
mined if and only if Y˜i(k) is non-singular.
3.4 Inﬁnite horizon case
The inﬁnite-horizon H∞-constrained incentive Stackelberg game is studied in this section.
Deﬁnition 3.2. [Zhang et al. (2008)] The following discrete-time system:{
x(k+1) = Ax(k),
z(k) =Cx(k), x(0) = x0 ∈ Rn, k ∈ NTf ,
(3.45)
or (A, C) is said to be exactly observable if z(k)≡ 0, ∀k ∈ NTf implies x0 = 0.
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Deﬁnition 3.3. [Zhang et al. (2008)] The linear discrete-time system
x(k+1) = Ax(k)+Bu(k), x(0) = x0, (3.46)
∀k = k ∈ N is said to be mean-square stable if for any x0 ∈ Rn, the corresponding state
satisﬁes lim
k→∞
‖x(k)‖ = 0. The system (3.46) is said to be stabilizable in the mean square
sense if for a constant matrix K, there exists a feedback control law u(k) = Kx(k), that
stabilizes the system (3.46) mean square stable.
By using Lemma 3.1, we have the following result under the inﬁnite horizon case as
the extension: Suppose that the linear discrete-time system
x(k+1) = Ax(k)+Bu(k), x(0) = x0, (3.47)
∀k = k ∈ NTf is mean-square stable, where A and B are assumed to be constant matrices of
suitable dimensions. Let us deﬁne the cost functional
J(x0, u) :=
∞
∑
k=0
[xT (k)Qx(k)+2xT (k)Su(k)+uT (k)Ru(k)], (3.48)
where Q = QT ≥ 0, R = RT > 0, and Q−SR−1ST > 0.
Lemma 3.3. For the discrete-time optimal control problem (3.47) with cost functional
(3.48), the optimal feedback strategy is given by
u∗(k) = Kx(k) =−Rˆ−1(BTXAS+R−1S)x(k), (3.49)
where XT = X ≥ 0 is the solution of the following algebraic Riccati equation (ARE):
X =ATS XAS−ATS XVXAS+Q−STR−1S, (3.50)
with
AS := A−BR−1S,
V := BRˆ−1BT ,
Rˆ := R+BTXB,
Q−STR−1S ≥ 0.
Proof. Using optimal control u∗(k) = Kx(k), the state feedback system (3.47) can be writ-
ten as
x(k+1) = (A+BK)x(k), x(0) = x0, (3.51)
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with cost functional
J(x0, u∗) :=
∞
∑
k=0
[xT (k)(Q+2SK+KTRK)x(k)]. (3.52)
Suppose that there exits a symmetric positive deﬁnite matrix X such that the ARE (3.56)
holds for all admissible control inputs. Let us deﬁne the Lyapunov candidate function
V (x(k)) = xT (k)Xx(k), (3.53)
where V (x(k)> 0 for all x(k) = 0.
The difference between corresponding trajectory of the system (3.51) is given by
ΔV (x(k)) =V (x(k+1))−V (x(k))
= xT (k+1)Xx(k+1)− xT (k)Xx(k)
= xT (k)(A+BK)TX(A+BK)x(k)− xT (k)Xx(k)
= xT (k)[(A+BK)TX(A+BK)−X ]x(k), (3.54)
which is stable if ΔV (x(k))< 0. Then, we can form the discrete-time Lyapunov stabilizable
equation as follows:
(A+BK)TX(A+BK)−X =−(Q+2SK+KTRK) (3.55)
Substituting the value of K = −Rˆ−1(BTXAS +R−1S) to equation (3.55) and simplifying,
we can get the following ARE:
X =ATS XAS−ATS XVXAS+Q−STR−1S, (3.56)
with
AS := A−BR−1S,
V := BRˆ−1BT ,
Rˆ := R+BTXB,
Q−STR−1S ≥ 0.
Hence, Lemma 3.3 is proved.
On the other hand, consider the following discrete-time system.
x(k+1) = Ax(k)+Dv(k), (3.57a)
z(k) =Cx(k), x(0) = x0, k = 0, 1, . . . Tf , (3.57b)
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with performance
Jγ(x0, v) :=
∞
∑
k=0
[γ2‖v(k)‖2−‖z(k)‖2], (3.58)
where v(k) ∈ Rnv represents the external disturbance. z(k) ∈ Rnz represents the controlled
output.
Lemma 3.4. For the discrete time system (3.57), ‖LTf ‖< γ for given disturbance attenua-
tion level γ > 0, the worst-case disturbance is given by
v∗(k) = Fγx(k) =−T−1γ DTYAx(k), (3.59)
if and only if there exists a unique solution Y ≤ 0 to the following matrix difference equa-
tion:
Y = ATYA−ATYUYA−CTC, (3.60)
where
U := DT−1γ D
T ,
Tγ := γ2Inv +D
TYD.
Proof. Using the worst-case disturbance v∗(k) = Fγx(k), the state feedback system (3.57a)
can be written as
x(k+1) = (A+DFγ)x(k), x(0) = x0, (3.61)
with cost functional
Jγ(x0, v) =
∞
∑
k=0
[γ2xT (k)FTγ Fγx(k)− xT (k)CTCx(k)]
=
∞
∑
k=0
xT (k)(γ2FTγ Fγ −CTC)x(k). (3.62)
Suppose that there exits a symmetric positive deﬁnite matrix Y such that the ARE (3.60)
holds for all admissible control inputs. Let us deﬁne the Lyapunov candidate function
V (x(k)) = xT (k)Yx(k), (3.63)
where V (x(k)> 0 for all x(k) = 0.
The difference between corresponding trajectory of the system (3.57) is given by
ΔV (x(k)) =V (x(k+1))−V (x(k))
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= xT (k+1)Yx(k+1)− xT (k)Yx(k)
= xT (k)(A+DFγ)TY (A+DFγ)x(k)− xT (k)Yx(k)
= xT (k)[(A+DFγ)TY (A+DFγ)−Y ]x(k), (3.64)
which is stable if ΔV (x(k))< 0. Then, we can form the discrete-time Lyapunov stabilizable
equation as follows:
(A+DFγ)TY (A+DFγ)−Y =−(γ2FTγ Fγ −CTC) (3.65)
Substituting the value of Fγ = −T−1γ DTYA to equation (3.65) and simplifying, we can get
the following ARE:
Y = ATYA−ATYUYA−CTC, (3.66)
where
U := DT−1γ D
T ,
Tγ := γ2Inv +D
TYD.
Hence, Lemma 3.4 is proved.
Consider a time-invariant linear discrete-time system with multiple follower is de-
scribed by
x(k+1) = Ax(k)+
N
∑
j=1
B0 ju0 j(k)+
N
∑
j=1
Bju j(k)+Dv(k), (3.67a)
z(k) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Cx(k)
G0u0(k)
G1u1(k)
...
GNuN(k)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ , (3.67b)
where x(0) = x0, GTi Gi = Imi .
The cost functionals are deﬁned as
J0(x0, u0, u1, . . . ,uN , v)
:=
1
2
∞
∑
k=0
[
xT (k)Q0x(k)+
N
∑
j=1
uT0 j(k)R00 ju0 j(k)+
N
∑
j=1
uTj (k)R0 ju j(k)
]
, (3.68a)
Jγ(x0, u0, u1, . . . ,uN , v) :=
∞
∑
k=0
[γ2‖v(k)‖2−‖z(k)‖2], (3.68b)
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Ji(x0, u0, u1, . . . ,uN , v)
:=
1
2
∞
∑
k=0
[
xT (k)Qix(k)+uT0i(k)R0iiu0i(k)+u
T
i (k)Riiui(k)
]
, i = 1, . . . ,N, (3.68c)
where Qi =QTi ≥ 0, i= 0, 1, . . . ,N, R00i = RT00i > 0, R0i = RT0i ≥ 0, R0ii = RT0ii ≥ 0, Rii =
RTii > 0.
In order to solve this problem, ﬁrst we ﬁnd the leader’s team optimal solution u∗c(k)
attenuating the disturbance under H∞ constraint. We can accomplish this task by consider-
ing uc(k) and v(k) to perform Nash equilibrium. While considering worst-case disturbance
v∗(k) = Fγx(k), we can solve it by Lemma 3.3 for the system (3.67) with cost functional
(3.68a); and while considering team-optimal state feedback control u∗c(k) = Kcx(k) for
the system (3.67) with cost functional (3.68b), we can obtain the solution by Lemma 3.4.
Hence, the following cross-coupled algebraic Riccati equations (CCAREs) can be found:
P = ATv PAv−ATv PScPAv+Q0, (3.69a)
W = ATKWAK −ATKWUWWAK −LK, (3.69b)
where
Av := A+DFγ ,
AK := A+BcKc,
Sc := BcRˆ−1c B
T
c ,
UW := DT−1Wγ D
T ,
Fγ :=−T−1Wγ DTWAK,
TWγ := γ2Inv +D
TWD,
Rˆc := Rc+BTc PBc,
LK :=CTC+KTc Kc,
Kc :=
[
K0
K1
]
=−Rˆ−1c BTc PAv,
K0 :=
[
KT01 · · · KT0N
]T
,
K1 :=
[
KT1 · · · KTN
]T
,
Bc :=
[
B0 B1 · · · BN
]
,
Rc := block diag
(
R0 R01 · · ·R0N
)
.
On the other hand, to ensure each i-th follower’s optimal state feedback Nash equilibrium
strategy for the system (3.67) with cost functional (3.68c), we can use the BDRE (3.42) and
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the followers’ optimal strategy (3.44) determined for the ﬁnite-horizon case. According to
Lemma 3.3, these results can be extended inﬁnitely and the following CCARE can be
established:
Pi = A˜Ti PiA˜i− X˜Ti Y˜−1i X˜i+ Q˜i, (3.70a)
K˜i =−[Y˜i]−1X˜i, i = 1, 2, . . . ,N, (3.70b)
where
A˜i := A+DFγ +B0iη0i+
N
∑
j=1, j =i
[B0 jK0 j +BjKj],
X˜i := B˜Ti PiA˜i+η
T
ii R0iiη0i,
Y˜i := R˜i+ B˜Ti PiB˜i,
B˜i := Bi+B0iηii,
Q˜i := Qi+ηT0iR0iiη0i, R˜i := Rii+η
T
ii R0iiηii.
Remark 3.2. It should be noted that the incentive parameter ηii can be uniquely deter-
mined if and only if Y˜i is non-singular.
Proposition 3.1. If there exists a solutions set of the CCAREs (3.69) and (3.70) then the
following strategy-sets for leader, followers and under the worst-case disturbance are de-
ﬁned correspondingly for the two-level incentive Stackelberg game with H∞ constraint as:
u∗0i(k) := η0ix(k)+η
∗
iiu
∗
i (k) = K0ix(k), (3.71a)
u∗i (k) := K˜ix(k), (3.71b)
v∗(k) := Fγx(k). (3.71c)
In order to solve the CCAREs of (3.69) and (3.70), ﬁrst the following computational
algorithm is based on the Lyapunov iteration:{
P(r+1) = [A(r)v ]TP(r+1)A
(r)
v − [A(r)v ]TP(r)S(r)c P(r)A(r)v +Q0,
W (r+1) = [A(r)K ]
TW (r+1)A(r)K − [A(r)K ]TW (r)U (r)W W (r)A(r)K −L(r)K , r = 0, 1, . . .
(3.72a)
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
P(s+1)i = [A˜
(s)
i ]
TP(s+1)i A˜
(s)
i − [X˜ (s)i ]T [Y˜ (s)i ]−1X˜ (s)i + Q˜(s)i ,
[η(s+1)ii ]
T =−
((
Rii+BTi P
(s+1)
i B0iη
(s)
ii +B
T
i P
(s+1)
i Bi
)
K˜(s)i +B
T
i P
(s+1)
i A˜
(s)
i
)
×
(
BT0iP
(s+1)
i B0iη
(s)
ii K˜
(s)
i +B
T
0iP
(s+1)
i BiK˜
(s)
i +B
T
0iP
(s+1)
i A˜
(s)
i +R0iiK0i
)−1
,
s = 0, 1, . . . i = 1, 2, . . . ,N,
(3.72b)
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where P(0) = P(0)i = In, W
(0) =−In, η(0)ii = η(0)(ii) ,
A(r)v := A+DF
(r)
γ ,
A(r)K := A+BcK
(r)
c ,
S(r)c := Bc[Rˆ
(r)
c ]
−1BTc ,
U (r)W := D[T
(r)
Wγ ]
−1DT ,
F(r)γ :=−[T (r)Wγ ]−1DTW (r)AK,
T (r)Wγ := γ
2Inv +D
TW (r)D,
Rˆ(r)c := Rc+BTc P
(r)Bc,
L(r)K :=C
TC+[K(r)c ]TK
(r)
c ,
K(r)c :=−[Rˆ(r)c ]−1BTc P(r)A(r)v ,
A˜(s)i := A+DFγ +B0iη
(s)
0i +
N
∑
j=1, j =i
[B0 jK0 j +BjKj],
X˜ (s)i := B˜
T
i P
(s)
i A˜
(s)
i +[η
(s)
ii ]
TR0iiη
(s)
0i ,
Y˜ (s)i := R˜i+ B˜
T
i P
(s)
i B˜i,
K˜(s)i :=−[Y˜ (s)i ]−1X˜ (s)i ,
B˜(s)i := Bi+B0iη
(s)
ii , Q˜
(s)
i := Qi+[η
(s)
0i ]
TR0iiη
(s)
0i ,
R˜(s)i := Rii+[η
(s)
ii ]
TR0iiη
(s)
ii .
It should be noted that the initial guess of ηii has to be chosen appropriately. It should be
also noted that the convergence of the algorithm (3.72) is not unclear for the reader. In
the next section, a numerical example will show that this algorithm can be worked well in
practice.
3.5 Numerical example
In order to demonstrate the efﬁciency of our proposed three strategies, a simple numerical
example is investigated. Here we present the example for inﬁnite-horizon case with two
non-cooperative players. Let us consider the following system matrices:
A =
[
0.52 1.12
0 −0.24
]
, B01 =
[
0.138 0.20
−0.55 0.84
]
, B02 =
[
0.312 1.20
−1.25 1.03
]
,
B1 =
[
0.15 −0.11
0.12 2.28
]
, B2 =
[
0.23 −0.45
−0.52 1.02
]
,
D =
[
0.054 −0.076
−0.035 −0.094
]
, C =
[
1 2
]
,
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Q0 =
[
1 0
0 2
]
, Q1 =
[
2 0
0 1
]
, Q2 =
[
1 0.5
0.5 3
]
,
R001 = 1.9I2, R002 = 2.5I2, R01 = 2.7I2, R02 = 3.5I2,
R011 = 4.8I2, R022 = 5I2, R11 = 0.3I2, R22 = 0.5I2.
We choose the disturbance attenuation level as γ = 5. First, the CCAREs (3.69a) and
(3.69b) are solved by using the algorithm (3.72a). These solutions that attain the H∞-
constrained team-optimal solutions are given below:
P =
[
1.1667 0.3607
0.3607 2.7939
]
, W =
[ −1.0756 −2.1544
−2.1544 −4.3203
]
,
Kc =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
−0.0252 −0.0708
−0.0308 −0.0418
−0.0433 −0.1219
−0.1511 −0.3038
−0.0175 −0.0354
0.0186 0.0879
−0.0201 −0.0351
0.0431 0.1098
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, Fγ =
[ −0.0001 −0.0003
−0.0024 −0.0047
]
.
Second, the CCAREs (3.70a) and (3.70b) are solved by using the algorithm (3.72b).
P1 =
[
2.1814 0.3941
0.3941 1.8618
]
, P2 =
[
1.2091 0.9408
0.9408 3.9370
]
,
η11 =
[
1.6976 0.6457
1.1122 1.1856
]
, η22 =
[−0.3909 −0.9033
0.8427 0.8926
]
.
The algorithm (3.72b) converges to the required solution with an accuracy of 1.0e− 12
order after ten iterations. It should be noted that the incentive strategy (3.71a) that will be
announced by the leader can calculated as
u0i(k) = η∗0ix(k)+η
∗
iiui(k), (3.73)
where
η01 =
[−0.0075 −0.0675
−0.0334 −0.1066
]
, η02 =
[−0.0122 −0.0364
−0.1727 −0.3722
]
.
In fact, after announcing this incentive, the followers’ strategy can be computed by applying
the standard LQ theory
u∗i (k) = [R˜i+ B˜
T
i PiB˜i]
−1[B˜Ti PiA˜i+η
T
ii R0iiη0i]x(k), (3.74)
which implies
u∗1(k) =
[−0.0175 −0.0354
0.0186 0.0879
]
x(k),
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Fig. 3.1: Trajectory of the state.
u∗2(k) =
[−0.0201 −0.0351
0.0431 0.1098
]
x(k).
Indeed, it can be observed that this matrix gain is equal to K˜i. Namely, it can be conﬁrmed
that the followers take the team-optimal solution with H∞ constraint eventually. In fact,
after announcing this incentive, the followers’ strategy can be computed by applying the
standard LQ theory.
u∗i (k) =−[R˜i+ B˜Ti PiB˜i]−1[B˜Ti PiA˜i+ηTii R0iiη0i]x(k), (3.75)
Fig. 3.1 shows the response of the system with a state trajectory. In addition, Fig. 3.1
represents that the state variables x(k) can stabilize the given system, which implies that
the proposed method is very useful and reliable.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter investigates the incentive Stackelberg game for discrete-time deterministic
systems. However, stochastic systems are not considered here. It is the motivation to
choose a deterministic system to extend it to a stochastic system. This chapter studies the
most common linear quadratic (LQ) optimal control in the game problems. In order to solve
the LQ problem, discrete-time maximum principle is deeply studied. This chapter involves
one leader and multiple followers rewarding the Starkberg game. For this game, incentive
Stackelberg strategy is a broad idea, and leaders can implement his team-optimal solution
in a Stackelberg game. In the followers’ group, players are supposed to be non-cooperative;
subsequently, Nash equilibrium is investigated.
77
The deterministic disturbances and their attenuation to systems under the H∞ constraint
is the main attraction of this chapter. Problems involving deterministic disturbance must
be attenuated at a given target called disturbance attenuation level γ > 0. Surprisingly, the
concept of solving the disturbance reduction problem under the H∞ constraint seems like
a Nash equilibrium between the disturbance input and the control input. In this game, an
incentive structure is developed in such a way that leader achieve team-optimal solution
attenuating the disturbance under H∞ constraint. Simultaneously, followers achieve their
Nash equilibrium ensuring the incentive Stackelberg strategies of the leaders while the
worst-case disturbance is considered.
This chapter also derives results based on a structure similar to the ﬁnite time domain
case under inﬁnite time domain conditions. In an inﬁnite-horizon case, incentive Stackel-
berg game with one leader and multiple followers has also investigated for a discrete time
systems with H∞ constraint. Leader’s team-optimal solution attenuating the disturbance
under H∞ constraint is also implemented. On the other hand, followers ensure their Nash
equilibrium under the leader’s incentives considering the worst-case disturbance. The main
attraction of the inﬁnite horizon situation is Lyapunov stability theory. Using Lyapunov sta-
bility theory, several theorems and lemmas have been proved.
In this chapter, the team-optimal solution for the leader is achieved in contrast to mul-
tiple non-cooperative followers’ optimal state feedback gain. The sufﬁcient condition for
optimality according to the followers’ act subject to the Nash equilibrium condition was
also veriﬁed. The solution sets for incentive Stackelberg strategy are found by solving a
set of backward difference Riccati equations (BDREs) in the ﬁnite-horizon case. On the
other hand, it is shown that the results of the inﬁnite-horizon case are found by solving a
set of algebraic Riccati equations (AREs). An algorithm based on Lyapunov iterations is
developed to obtain a solution set of the coupled algebraic Riccati equations. In order to
ensure the stability of the system, the state trajectory ﬁgure is presented. To demonstrate
the effectiveness of the proposed method, a numerical example is demonstrated. However,
this chapter only investigates one leader, which leads many leaders to further study.
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Chapter 4
H∞-Constrained Incentive Stackelberg
Games for Discrete-Time Stochastic
Systems with Multiple Followers
This chapter is based on a previously published article [Ahmed et al. (2017a)].
4.1 Introduction
The Stackelberg game is a strategic game in which a leader declare his/her strategy
ﬁrst. Then, followers perform their optimal decisions subject to the leader’s announce-
ment. Finally, the leader will modiﬁes his/her action conﬁrming the followers’ response.
Subsequently, this two-player static game was extended to a dynamic game with dif-
ferent information patterns [Chen and Cruz (1972), Simaan et al. (1973)]. Among the
information patterns, closed-loop Stackelberg strategies with applications were attract-
ing considerable research interest as - linear quadratic (LQ) problems [Medanic (1978),
Basar and Selbuz (1979), Tolwinski (1981)]. The idea of team-optimal solutions opens
new directions for closed-loop Stackelberg strategies. In [Basar and Olsder (1980)], nec-
essary and sufﬁcient conditions for both ﬁnite- and inﬁnite-horizon closed-loop feedback
solutions were derived for a team problem in which all players optimized a leader’s cost
functional jointly. Furthermore, [Salman and Cruz (1983)] derived team-optimal closed-
loop Stackelberg strategies for systems with slow and fast modes.
The purpose of the incentive mechanism is to induce virtual cooperation in non-
cooperative followers so that optimal system performance (reﬂected in the leader’s objec-
tive function) is achieved through hierarchical decision-making [Saksena and Cruz (1985)].
An incentive Stackelberg strategy is one where the leader achieves their team-optimal
solution to the hierarchical game by using an incentive mechanism. The following
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two steps are the main elements of an incentive Stackelberg problem [Ho et al. (1982),
Basar and Olsder (1980)]. i) The leader determines a team-optimal strategy-set and an-
nounces it ahead of time. ii) Knowing the incentive, based on the leader’s announced
team-optimal strategy, each follower chooses a strategy so as to minimize their own cost.
It should be noted that no matter how the followers behave, the leader can achieve their
own team-optimal equilibrium by using the corresponding incentive strategy-set. Incen-
tive Stackelberg games apply to organizations with several participants and with organi-
zational objective functions that may not be the same as the members’ objective func-
tions. In the theory of teams, each member of the organization has access to differ-
ent information. In this game, by contrast, it is an important feature that the leader
is able to induce followers to cooperate with them as a team, with the leader’s objec-
tive function as the objective function of the team, while the followers also optimize
their own objective functions [Salman and Cruz (1981)]. Incentive Stackelberg strategies
have been extensively studied for more than 30 years (see e.g. [Salman and Cruz (1981),
Ho et al. (1982), Saksena and Cruz (1985), Zheng and Basar (1982), Zheng et al. (1984)]
and references therein). In [Mizukami and Wu (1988)], incentive Stackelberg games with
one leader and two non-cooperative followers were solved for an LQ differential game. In
[Li et al. (2002)], a team-optimal state feedback incentive Stackelberg strategy for discrete-
time two-player nonzero-sum dynamic games was developed for LQ problems. However,
none of those studies have considered stochastic noise and deterministic disturbances in the
system, which make the problem more challenging.
In recent years, incentive Stackelberg games with robust control theory have
been studied for discrete-time linear systems in [Ahmed and Mukaidani (2016),
Mukaidani et al. (2017c)]. In [Ahmed and Mukaidani (2016)], one leader and multi-
ple non-cooperative followers are considered a deterministic system, whereas our cur-
rent study focuses stochastic systems. Unlike [Mukaidani et al. (2017c)], where one
leader and one follower are considered a stochastic system, this Chapter deals with one
leader and multiple non-cooperative followers. Similar to [Ahmed and Mukaidani (2016)]
and [Mukaidani et al. (2017c)], a deterministic disturbance is considered in this Chap-
ter, which is also seen in [Mukaidani et al. (2017d)]. On the other hand, continuous-
time stochastic systems are investigated for an inﬁnite-horizon incentive Stackelberg
game in [Mukaidani (2016)], where multiple non-cooperative leaders are considered. In
[Mukaidani and Xu (2018)], an incentive Stackelberg strategy for continuous-time stochas-
tic linear systems with exogenous disturbances is derived. One leader and multiple non-
cooperative followers are considered there and no discussion is included for a discrete-
time case yet. This is one of the vital reasons that motivates us to investigate our cur-
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rent study. Accordingly, this Chapter might be viewed as a discrete-time version of
[Mukaidani and Xu (2018)].
Fig. 4.1: Structure of the incentive Stackelberg game.
This Chapter investigates incentive Stackelberg games with one leader and multi-
ple non-cooperative followers for a discrete-time stochastic system with an exogenous
deterministic disturbance, which will be attenuated under the H∞ constraint. We dis-
cuss only two-level hierarchical games with one leader and multiple non-cooperative fol-
lowers and the hierarchical structure is depicted in Fig. 4.1. Among multiple players
Pi, i = 0, 1, ... ,N; P0 is considered as the leader and P1, ... ,PN are considered as the
followers, under the speciﬁcation that each follower acts non-cooperatively.
We prove that the leader’s discrete-time incentive Stackelberg strategies exist un-
der an H∞ constraint, based on existing results for ﬁnite-horizon H2/H∞ discrete-time
stochastic systems [Zhang et al. (2007)], by means of the state feedback information
structure. It should be noted that this information structure seems to be conservative.
However, as an engineering application of incentive Stackelberg strategies, a scheduling
problem involving a packet switch operating in a ring architecture has been introduced
[Saksena and Cruz (1985)]. In this problem, the leader represents the central processor and
the followers represent the local link controllers. The information structure of the prob-
lem is such that the leader has access to both the decision values and observations of all
the followers at each stage of the process. The design of incentive mechanisms that in-
duce non-cooperative followers to virtually cooperate in achieving some system-wide goal
is an important feature of hierarchical decision-making. Therefore, a state feedback in-
formation structure is sufﬁcient to guarantee the existence of an incentive strategy. It is
shown that a solution can be found by solving four cross-coupled stochastic matrix-valued
difference equations (SMVDEs) and a stochastic back-ward difference Riccati equation
(SBDRE) in the ﬁnite-horizon case. Moreover, the Nash equilibrium strategies of the fol-
lowers are derived in such a way that ensure the leader’s team-optimal solution. Apart from
the ﬁnite-horizon case, four cross-coupled stochastic matrix-valued algebraic equations
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(SMVAEs) corresponding to the existing result in [Zhang et al. (2008)] and a stochastic
algebraic Riccati equation (SARE) are derived in the inﬁnite horizon case to determine
the leader’s discrete-time incentive Stackelberg strategies. A recursive algorithm based on
the Lyapunov iteration is also designed to ease the complexity of computation. Finally, an
academic and a practical numerical examples demonstrate the efﬁciency of the proposed
methodology.
This is the ﬁrst attempt to formulate a one leader/multiple followers discrete-time linear
stochastic control problem with an external disturbance. Our main contributions, demon-
strated in the subsequent discussion, are as follows. i) The addition of disturbances to this
type of problem, and their attenuation under an H∞ constraint, is considered for the ﬁrst
time. ii) Multiple non-cooperative followers in such a discrete-time stochastic system are
considered for the ﬁrst time. iii) We realize a team-optimal solution for the leader, while
simultaneously guaranteeing the Nash equilibrium states of the followers. iv) To solve this
problem, a recursive algorithm based on the Lyapunov equation has been developed. v) The
system model is new and quite comprehensive in that it covers time-varying parameters,
stochastic control schemes, state-multiplicative noise, and exogenous disturbance inputs,
thereby more closely reﬂecting real-world systems.
Notation: The notations used in this Chapter are fairly standard. In denotes the n× n
identity matrix; block diag(·) denotes the block diagonal matrix; diag(·) denotes the di-
agonal matrix; δi j denotes the Kronecker delta; E[·] denotes the expectation operator,
NTf := {0, 1, ... ,Tf } and N := {0, 1, ...}. The l2-norm of y(·) ∈ l2w(NTf ,Rn) is deﬁned by
‖y(·)‖2l2w(NTf ,Rn) :=
Tf
∑
k=0
E[‖y(k)‖2].
Finally, deﬁne an N-tuple
γ := (γ1, ... ,γN) ∈ Γ1× ...×ΓN ,
for given sets Γi, we write
γ∗−i(α) := (γ
∗
1 , ... ,γ
∗
i−1, α, γ
∗
i+1, ... ,γ
∗
N),
where the superscript (∗) is used in the optimal case.
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4.2 Deﬁnitions and preliminaries
Consider a discrete-time stochastic system with the deterministic disturbance.⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
x(k+1) = A(k)x(k)+B(k)u(k)+D(k)v(k)+Ap(k)x(k)w(k), x(0) = x0,
z(k) =
[
C(k)x(k)
G(k)u(k)
]
, GT (k)G(k) = Inu , k ∈ NTf ,
(4.1)
where u(k) ∈ l2w(NTf , Rnu) represents the control input, v(k) ∈ l2w(NTf , Rnv) represents the
disturbance input and z(k) ∈ l2w(NTf , Rnz) represents the controlled output, w(k) is a real-
valued random variable deﬁned in the ﬁltered probability space, second-order process with
E[w(k)] = 0 and E[w(s)w(k)] = δsk [Zhang et al. (2007), Zhang et al. (2008)].
Given the disturbance attenuation level γ > 0,0 < Tf < ∞, an optimal state feedback
control u∗(k) ∈ l2w(NTf , Rnu) deﬁned as
u∗(k) := K(k)x(k) ∈ Rnu ,
can be found (if existing) such that:
(i) For the closed-loop system⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
x(k+1) = (A(k)+B(k)K(k))x(k)+D(k)v(k)+Ap(k)x(k)w(k), x(0) = x0,
z(k) =
[
C(k)x(k)
G(k)K(k)x(k)
]
, GT (k)G(k) = Inu , k ∈ NTf ,
(4.2)
the following condition holds:
‖LTf ‖H∞ := sup
v ∈ l2w(NTf , Rnv ),
v = 0, x0 = 0
‖z‖l2w(NTf , Rnz)
‖v‖l2w(NTf , Rnv)
< γ, (4.3)
where
‖z‖l2w(NTf , Rnz) :=
(
Tf
∑
k=0
E
[
xT (k)CT (k)C(k)x(k)+ xT (k)KT (k)K(k)x(k)
]) 12
,
‖v‖l2w(NTf , Rnv) :=
(
Tf
∑
k=0
E
[
vT (k)v(k)
]) 12
.
(ii) For the worst-case disturbance v∗(k) ∈ l2w(NTf , Rnv), if existing, is implemented in
(4.1), u∗(k) optimizes the cost
Ju(u, v∗) := ‖z‖2l2w(NTf , Rnz) =
Tf
∑
k=0
E
[
xT (k)CT (k)C(k)x(k)+ xT (k)KT (k)K(k)x(k)
]
. (4.4)
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When such (u∗, v∗) exists, we say that the ﬁnite horizon H2/H∞ control is solvable. Here,
the worst-case disturbance means
v∗(k) := argmin
v
Jv(u∗,v), (4.5)
where
Jv(u, v) := γ2‖v‖2l2w(NTf , Rnv)−‖z‖
2
l2w(NTf , R
nz) (4.6)
is associated with the system (4.1). Then, the ﬁnite horizon H2/H∞ control is equivalent to
the following Nash equilibrium (u∗, v∗):
Ju(u∗, v∗)≤ Ju(u, v∗), (4.7a)
Jv(u∗, v∗)≤ Jv(u∗, v). (4.7b)
Lemma 4.1. [Zhang et al. (2007)] For given disturbance attenuation level γ > 0, the ﬁnite
horizon H2/H∞ control for the system (4.1) has solutions (u∗, v∗) as
u∗(k, x(k)) := K(k)x(k),
v∗(k, x(k)) := Fγ(k)x(k),
with K(k)∈Rnu×n and Fγ(k)∈Rnv×n, k∈NTf being matrix-valued functions, iff the follow-
ing four cross-coupled SMVDEs have solutions (P(k), W (k); K(k), Fγ(k)) with P(k) ≥ 0
and W (k)≤ 0, k ∈ NTf :
P(k) = ATv (k)P(k+1)Av(k)+A
T
p (k)P(k+1)Ap−ATv (k)P(k+1)B(k)
× Rˆ−1(k)BT (k)P(k+1)Av(k)+CT (k)C(k), P(Tf +1) = 0, (4.8a)
K(k) =−Rˆ−1(k)BT (k)P(k+1)Av(k), (4.8b)
W (k) = ATu (k)W (k+1)Au(k)+A
T
p (k)W (k+1)Ap(k)−ATu (k)W (k+1)U(k)W (k+1)Au(k)
−CT (k)C(k)−KT (k)K(k), W (Tf +1) = 0, (4.8c)
Fγ(k) =−T−1γ (k)DT (k)W (k+1)Au(k), (4.8d)
where
Av(k) := A(k)+D(k)Fγ(k),
Au(k) := A(k)+B(k)K(k),
U(k) := D(k)T−1γ (k)D
T (k),
Rˆ(k) := Inu +B
T (k)P(k+1)B(k)> 0,
Tγ(k) := γ2Inv +D
T (k)W (k+1)D(k)> 0.
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Proof. Necessary condition Substituting u∗(k, x(k)) = K(k)x(k) in (4.1), we obtain (4.2).
By Lemma 3 of [Zhang et al. (2007)], (4.8c) has a unique solution W (k) ≥ 0. From
the sufﬁcient condition of Lemma 3 of [Zhang et al. (2007)], the worst-case disturbance
v∗(k, x(k)) can be determined by
v∗(k, x(k)) = Fγ(k)x(k) =−T−1γ (k)DT (k)W (k+1)Au(k)x(k). (4.9)
On the other hand, implementing v(k, x(k)) = v∗(k, x(k)) = Fγ(k)x(k) in (4.1), we obtain⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
x(k+1) = A(k)x(k)+B(k)u(k)+D(k)Fγ(k)x(k)+Ap(k)x(k)w(k), x(0) = x0,
z(k) =
[
C(k)x(k)
G(k)u(k)
]
, GT (k)G(k) = Inu , k ∈ NTf .
(4.10)
While the problem is to minimize the linear quadratic cost functional Ju(u, v∗), it turns to
be a standard discrete-time LQ optimal problem. By Theorem 2.1, (4.8a) provides a unique
solution P(k)≥ 0. Moreover, the optimal state feedback control can be determined by
u∗(k, x(k)) = K(k)x(k) =−Rˆ−1(k)BT (k)P(k+1)Av(k)x(k). (4.11)
Sufﬁcient condition Substituting u∗(k, x(k)) = K(k)x(k) in (4.1), we obtain (4.2). From
(4.8c) and Lemma 3 of [Zhang et al. (2007)], we have ‖LTf ‖H∞ < γ . By Lemma 2 of
[Zhang et al. (2007)] and (4.8c), we obtain
Jv(u∗, v) =
Tf
∑
k=0
E[γ2‖v(k)‖2−‖z(k)‖2]≥ Jv(u∗, v∗) = xT0W (0)x0. (4.12)
Therefore, form (4.12), we see that v∗(k, x(k)) = Fγ(k)x(k) is the worse case disturbance.
Similarly, it can be shown that
Ju(u, v∗) =
Tf
∑
k=0
E[‖z(k)‖2 ≥ Ju(u∗, v∗) = xT0 P(k)x0. (4.13)
Therefore,
Ju(u∗, v∗)≤ Ju(u, v∗), (4.14a)
Jv(u∗, v∗)≤ Jv(u∗, v), (4.14b)
which imply that the strategy pair (u∗, v∗) solves the ﬁnite horizon H2/H∞ control problem
for the system (4.1).
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Lemma 4.2. Consider the linear discrete-time stochastic system
x(k+1) = A(k)x(k)+B(k)u(k)+Ap(k)x(k)w(k), x(0) = x0, k ∈ NTf , (4.15)
where u(k)∈Rm denotes the control input. A(k), B(k) and Ap(k) are assumed to be matrix-
valued functions of suitable dimensions.
Let us deﬁne the cost functional
J(x0, u) :=
Tf
∑
k=0
E[xT (k)Q(k)x(k)+2xT (k)S(k)u(k)+uT (k)R(k)u(k)], (4.16)
where Q(k) =QT (k)≥ 0, R(k) =RT (k)> 0, Q(k)−S(k)R−1(k)ST (k)> 0 and 0< Tf <∞.
Then there exists a matrix-valued function P(k) > 0 that solves the following SBDRE
of the system (4.15)–(4.16):
P(k) =ATs (k)P(k+1)As(k)+A
T
p (k)P(k+1)Ap(k)−ATs P(k+1)B(k)
× Rˆ−1(k)BT (k)P(k+1)As(k)+Qs(k), P(Tf +1) = 0, (4.17)
where
As(k) := A(k)−B(k)R−1(k)ST (k),
Rˆ := R(k)+BT (k)P(k+1)B(k),
Qs(k) := Q(k)−S(k)R−1(k)ST (k),
and the optimal state feedback control in this case is given by
u∗(k) = K(k)x(k) =−Rˆ−1(k)[ST (k)+BT (k)P(k+1)A(k)]x(k). (4.18)
Proof. To prove Lemma 4.2, we use the matrix Lagrangian multiplier method as
in [Rami and Zhou (2000)]. At ﬁrst, we transfer the LQ problem (4.15)–(4.16) in terms
of the state covariance matrices X(k) = E[xT (k)x(k)]. For this instance, we use a closed-
loop state feedback control law
u(k) = K(k)x(k), for k = 1, ..., Tf , (4.19)
where K(k) is the gain matrix for any x0 ∈ Rn, the closed-loop system
x(k+1) =[A(k)+B(k)K(k)]x(k)+Ap(k)x(k)w(k), x(0) = x0, (4.20)
with cost functional
J(x0, u) :=
Tf
∑
k=0
E[xT (k)Q(k)x(k)+2xT (k)S(k)K(k)x(k)+KT (k)xT (k)R(k)K(k)x(k)].
(4.21)
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Then, by a simple calculation an equivalent form of the state equation (4.15) can be written
as
X(k+1) =A(k)X(k)AT (k)+B(k)K(k)X(k)AT (k)
+A(k)X(k)KT (k)BT (k)+B(k)K(k)X(k)KT (k)BT (k)+Ap(k)X(k)ATp (k),
(4.22)
and the equivalent cost functional of (4.16) is
J (X(k)) = min
K(0), ..., K(N)∈Rm×n
Tr[{Q(k)+2S(k)K(k)+KT (k)R(k)K(k)}X(k)]. (4.23)
Here, the system (4.22)–(4.23) seems to be a deterministic optimal control problem. The
Lagrangian function can be represented as follows,
L=
Tf
∑
k=0
Hk, (4.24)
where
Hk =Tr[{Q(k)+2S(k)K(k)+KT (k)R(k)K(k)}X(k)]+Tr[P(k+1){A(k)X(k)AT (k)
+B(k)K(k)X(k)AT (k)+A(k)X(k)KT (k)BT (k)+B(k)K(k)X(k)KT (k)BT (k)
+Ap(k)X(k)ATp (k)−X(k+1)}], (4.25)
and the matrices P(0), ..., P(Tf ) are the Lagrangian multipliers. The ﬁrst-order necessary
conditions for optimality are
∂Hk
∂K(k)
= 0,
∂Hk
∂X(k)
= P(k), for k = 1, ..., Tf , P(Tf +1) = 0.
The calculation of the above derivatives leads to the following equations:
[R(k)+BT (k)P(k+1)B(k)]K(k)+ST (k)+BT (k)P(k+1)A(k) = 0, (4.26)
P(k) = Q(k)+AT (k)P(k+1)A(k)+ATp (k)P(k+1)Ap(k)+K
T (k)[R(k)
+BT (k)P(k+1)B(k)]K(k)+KT (k)[ST (k)+BT (k)P(k+1)A(k)]
+ [S(k)+AT (k)P(k+1)B(k)]K(k), P(Tf +1) = 0. (4.27)
Now, by using Lemma 3.1 of [Rami et al. (2002)], we can see that the existence of a so-
lution K(0), ..., K(Tf ) to equation (4.26) and the solution is given by the following deter-
ministic gain matrices:
K(k) =− [R(k)+BT (k)P(k+1)B(k)]−1[ST (k)+BT (k)P(k+1)A(k)]. (4.28)
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Transferring the gains from equation (4.28) into equation (4.27), we obtain the following
backward difference formula for the Lagrangian multipliers:
P(k) = AT (k)P(k+1)A(k)+ATp (k)P(k+1)Ap(k)− [S(k)+AT (k)P(k+1)B(k)]
× [R(k)+BT (k)P(k+1)B(k)]−1[ST (k)+BT (k)P(k+1)A(k)]
+Q(k), P(Tf +1) = 0. (4.29)
Alternatively, equation (4.29) can be rewritten as,
P(k) =ATs (k)P(k+1)As(k)+A
T
p (k)P(k+1)Ap(k)
−ATs P(k+1)B(k)Rˆ−1R(k)BT (k)P(k+1)As(k)+Qs(k), P(Tf +1) = 0, (4.30)
where
As(k) := A(k)−B(k)R−1(k)ST (k),
Rˆ(k) := R(k)+BT (k)P(k+1)B(k),
Qs(k) := Q(k)−ST (k)R−1(k)S(k).
Using equation (4.28), the closed-loop optimal state feedback control can be written as
u∗(k) = K(k)x(k) =−Rˆ−1(k)[ST (k)+BT (k)P(k+1)A(k)]x(k). (4.31)
To complete the proof of the lemma, we need to show now Rˆ(k) ≥ 0, k ∈ NTf . Let us
suppose that there exists Rˆ(l) associated with a negative eigenvalue λ . Denote the unitary
eigenvector corresponding to λ as vλ (i.e., vTλ vλ = 1 and Rˆ(l)vλ = λvλ ). Let δ = 0 be an
arbitrary scalar and construct a control sequence as follows,
uˆ(k) =
{
−Rˆ−1(k)Sˆ(k)x(k) k = l,
δ |λ |− 12 vλ − Rˆ−1(k)Sˆ(k)x(k) k = l,
(4.32)
where Sˆ(k) := ST (k)+BT (k)P(k+1)A(k). The associated cost functional is
J(x0, uˆ(0), ..., uˆ(Tf )) = E
[
Tf
∑
k=0
[uˆ(k)+ Rˆ(k)−1Sˆ(k)x(k)]T Rˆ(k)[uˆ(k)
+ Rˆ(k)−1Sˆ(k)x(k)]+ xT0 P(0)x0
]
=
(
δ
|λ | 12
vλ
)T
Rˆ(l)
(
δ
|λ | 12
vλ
)
+E[xT0 P(0)x0]
=−δ 2+E[xT0 P(0)x0].
Deﬁnitely, as δ →∞, J(x0, uˆ(0), ..., uˆ(Tf ))→−∞ which contradicts our assumption.
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Deﬁnition 4.1. [Zhang et al. (2008)] The following discrete-time stochastic system:{
x(k+1) = Ax(k)+Apx(k)w(k),
z(k) =Cx(k), x(0) = x0 ∈ Rn, k ∈ N,
(4.33)
or (A, Ap/C) is said to be exactly observable if z(k)≡ 0, ∀k ∈ N implies x0 = 0.
Deﬁnition 4.2. [Zhang et al. (2008)] The linear discrete-time stochastic system
x(k+1) = Ax(k)+Bu(k)+Apx(k)w(k), x(0) = x0, (4.34)
∀k = k ∈ N is said to be mean-square stable if for any x0 ∈ Rn, the corresponding state
satisﬁes lim
k→∞
E‖x(k)‖ = 0. The system (4.34) is said to be stabilizable in the mean square
sense if there exists a mean-square feedback stabilizing control law u(k) = Kx(k), where K
is a constant matrix.
By using Lemma 4.2, we have the following result under the inﬁnite horizon case as
the extension:
Suppose that the linear discrete-time stochastic system
x(k+1) = Ax(k)+Bu(k)+Apx(k)w(k), x(0) = x0, (4.35)
∀k = k ∈ N is mean-square stable, where A, B and Ap are assumed to be constant matrices
of suitable dimensions.
Let us deﬁne the cost functional
J(x0, u) :=
∞
∑
k=0
E[xT (k)Qx(k)+2xT (k)Su(k)+uT (k)Ru(k)], (4.36)
where Q = QT ≥ 0, R = RT > 0, and Q−SR−1ST > 0.
Lemma 4.3. There exists a symmetric constant matrix P> 0 that solves the following SARE
of the system (4.35)–(4.36):
P =ATs PAs+A
T
pPAp−ATs PBRˆ−1BTPAs+Qs, (4.37)
where
As := A−BR−1ST ,
Rˆ := R+BTPB,
Qs := Q−SR−1ST ,
and the optimal state feedback control in this case is given by
u∗(k) = Kx(k) =−Rˆ−1 [ST +BTPA]x(k). (4.38)
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Proof. Using optimal control u∗(k) = Kx(k), the state feedback system (4.35) can be writ-
ten as
x(k+1) = (A+BK)x(k)+Apx(k)w(k), x(0) = x0, (4.39)
with cost functional
J(x0, u∗) :=
∞
∑
k=0
E[xT (k)(Q+2SK+KTRK)x(k)]. (4.40)
Suppose that there exits a symmetric positive deﬁnite matrix P such that the SARE (4.37)
holds for all admissible control inputs. Let us deﬁne the Lyapunov candidate function
E[V (x(k))] = E[xT (k)Px(k)], (4.41)
where V (x(k)> 0 for all x(k) = 0.
The difference between corresponding trajectory of the system (4.35) is given by
E[ΔV (x(k))] = E[V (x(k+1))−V (x(k))]
= E[xT (k+1)Px(k+1)− xT (k)Px(k)]
= E[xT (k)(A+BK)TP(A+BK)x(k)]
+E[xT (k)ATpPApx(k)]−E[xT (k)Px(k)]
= E[xT (k)[(A+BK)TP(A+BK)+ATpPAp−P]x(k), (4.42)
which is stable if E[ΔV (x(k))] < 0. Then, we can form the discrete-time Lyapunov stabi-
lizable equation as follows:
(A+BK)TP(A+BK)+ATpPAp−P =−(Q+2SK+KTRK) (4.43)
Substituting the value of K = −Rˆ−1(BTPAS +R−1S) to equation (4.43) and simplifying,
we can get the following SARE:
P =ATs PAs+A
T
pPAp−ATs PBRˆ−1BTPAs+Qs, (4.44)
where
As := A−BR−1ST ,
Rˆ := R+BTPB,
Qs := Q−SR−1ST ,
Hence, Lemma 4.3 is proved.
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4.3 Problem formulation
Consider a linear discrete-time stochastic system with state-dependent noise deﬁned by⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
x(k+1) = A(k)x(k)+
N
∑
j=1
[
B0 j(k)u0 j(k)+Bj(k)u j(k)
]
+D(k)v(k)+Ap(k)x(k)w(k), x(0) = x0,
z(k) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
C(k)x(k)
G0(k)u0(k)
G1(k)u1(k)
...
GN(k)uN(k)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ , G
T
i (k)Gi(k) = Imi , k ∈ NTf , i = 0, 1, ... ,N,
(4.45)
where x(k)∈ l2w(NTf , Rn) represents the state vector, u0(k)= col
[
u01(k) · · · u0N(k)
]∈
l2w(NTf , Rm0), m0 =
N
∑
i=0
m0i, i = 1, ... ,N represents the leader’s control input correspond-
ing to i-th follower and ui(k) ∈ l2w(NTf , Rmi), i = 1, ... ,N represents the i-th follower’s
control input, v(k) ∈ l2w(NTf , Rnv) represents the disturbance input and z(k) ∈ l2w(NTf , Rnz)
represents the controlled output.
In many real-world control problems, most physical systems and processes include
unmodeled uncertainties in the deterministic exogenous input v(k), such as external distur-
bances. These introduce serious difﬁculties in the control and design of systems, in contrast
with the stochastic perturbations due to the Wiener process. The H∞ control method is a
well-known approach to reducing the inﬂuence of these inputs and plays an important role
in reducing the effect of such deterministic disturbances.
Throughout this Chapter, let (Ω, F , P) be a given ﬁltered probability space, where
w(k) is a real-valued random variable deﬁned in the ﬁltered probability space, second-order
process with E[w(k)] = 0 and E[w(s)w(k)] = δsk [Zhang et al. (2007), Zhang et al. (2008)].
For simplicity, we choose the closed-loop state feedback information structure for the
leader and followers control. Moreover, it provides the advantage of complete control
allowing us to access the control tools directly. In practical, we can see the problem of
packet switch operating problem referred in [Saksena and Cruz (1985)] is solved by a state
feedback control.
On the other hand, the linear quadratic cost functionals of the leader and followers, are
given by
J0(x0, u0, u1, ... ,uN , v)
:=
Tf
∑
k=0
E
[
xT (k)Q0(k)x(k)+
N
∑
j=1
{
uT0 j(k)R00 j(k)u0 j(k)+u
T
j (k)R0 j(k)u j(k)
}]
, (4.46a)
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Ji(x0, u0, u1, ... ,uN , v)
:=
Tf
∑
k=0
E
[
xT (k)Qi(k)x(k)+uT0i(k)R0ii(k)u0i(k)+u
T
i (k)Rii(k)ui(k)
]
, (4.46b)
where
Q0(k) :=CT (k)C(k), R00i(k) = RT00i(k)> 0, R0i(k) = R
T
0i(k)≥ 0,
Qi(k) = QTi (k)≥ 0, R0ii(k) = RT0ii(k)≥ 0, Rii(k) = RTii (k)> 0,
for i = 1, ... ,N are matrices for any time step k.
Deﬁnition 4.3. For one leader and N follower’s team problem, suppose that
J0(u0, u1, ... ,uN) is the leader’s cost functional, where u0 is the leader’s control and
ui, i = 1, 2, ... ,N is the i-th follower’s control. A strategy-set (u∗0, u
∗
1, ... ,u
∗
N) is called
the team-optimal solution of the game if
J0(u∗0, u
∗
1, ... ,u
∗
N)≤ J0(u0, u1, ... ,uN), (4.47)
for any u0 and ui, i = 1, 2, ... ,N.
It should be noted that if J0 is LQ form and strict convex, then a unique optimal solution
exists [Bas¸ar and Olsder (1999)].
According to [Basar and Selbuz (1979)], [Mizukami and Wu (1988)], the framework of
the incentive Stackelberg games can be described as follows:
(a) The player P0 announces the following feedback pattern strategy in advance to the
players Pi:
u0i(k) = u0i(k,x(k),ui(k)) = η0i(k)x(k)+ηii(k)ui(k), (4.48)
where η0i(k)∈Rm0i×n and ηii(k)∈Rm0i×mi , i= 1, ... ,N are discrete strategy param-
eter matrices.
(b) Each player Pi decides his/her own optimal strategy u∗i (k), i = 1, ... ,N under the
Nash equilibrium solution concept, considering the announced strategy of the player
P0.
(c) The player P0 ﬁnalizes the incentive Stackelberg strategy
u∗0i(k) = u
∗
0i(k,x(k),u
∗
i (k)) = η0i(k)x(k)+ηii(k)u
∗
i (k), (4.49)
for each player Pi, i = 1, ... ,N so that the team-optimal solution can be achieved.
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The presence of the external disturbance v(k) affects the controlled output z(k) through
the state vector x(k) which is measured by the perturbed operator LTf : l
2
w(NTf , Rnv) →
l2w(NTf , Rnz) [Zhang et al. (2007)] and its H∞-norm is deﬁned by
‖LTf ‖H∞ := sup
v ∈ l2w(NTf , Rnv ),
v = 0, x0 = 0
‖z‖l2w(NTf , Rnz)
‖v‖l2w(NTf , Rnv)
, (4.50)
where
‖z‖l2w(NTf , Rnz) :=
(
xT (k)Q0(k)x(k)+
N
∑
j=0
uTj (k)u j(k)
) 1
2
,
‖v‖l2w(NTf , Rnv) :=
(
Tf
∑
k=0
E
[
vT (k)v(k)
]) 12
.
An important fact is that the effect of this disturbance cannot be avoided but weakened to
some extent (disturbance attenuation level) γ > ‖LTf ‖H∞ . In other words, it is designed as
the team controller (u0, u1, ... ,uN) and the disturbance v are playing a zero-sum game, in
which the cost is
Jv(x0, u0, u1, ... ,uN , v) =
Tf
∑
k=0
E[γ2‖v(k)‖2−‖z(k)‖2], ∀v(k) = 0. (4.51)
In order to attenuate the efﬁciency of the disturbance under the H∞-norm, the problem of
H∞-constraint is inevitable.
The ﬁnite-horizon H∞-constrained incentive Stackelberg game with multiple non-
cooperative followers can be formulated as follows. For any disturbance attenuation level
γ > 0, 0< Tf <∞, we need to ﬁnd an incentive strategy of P0 by (4.49) and a state feedback
strategy
u∗i (k) := Ki(k)x(k) ∈ l2w(NTf , Rmi),
of Pi, i = 1, ... ,N considering the worst-case disturbance
v∗(k) := Fγ(k)x(k) ∈ l2w(NTf , Rnv),
such that
(i) The trajectory of the closed-loop system (4.45) satisﬁes the following team-optimal
condition (4.52a) along with H∞ constraint condition (4.52b),
J0(x0,u∗0,u
∗
1, ... ,u
∗
N ,v
∗)≤ J0(x0,u0,u1, ... ,uN ,v∗), (4.52a)
0≤ Jv(x0,u∗0,u∗1, ... ,u∗N ,v∗)≤ Jv(x0,u∗0,u∗1, ... ,u∗N ,v). (4.52b)
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(ii) A set of decision (u∗0i, u
∗
i ) ∈ Rm0i+mi , i = 1, ... ,N satisfying the following Nash
equilibrium inequality:
Ji(x0,u∗0,u
∗
1, ... ,u
∗
N ,v
∗)≤ Ji(x0,γ∗−i(u0i),γ∗−i(ui),v∗). (4.53)
Then, the strategy-set (u∗0i, u
∗
i ) ∈ Rm0i+mi , i = 1, ... ,N constitutes both a team-
optimal incentive Stackelberg strategy with the H∞ constraint of the leader and
Nash equilibrium strategies of the followers for a two-level hierarchical game
[Bas¸ar and Olsder (1999)].
4.4 Main result
Suppose that for each strategy pair (u0i, ui) ∈ Γ0×Γi, the linear discrete-time stochastic
system (4.45) has a unique solution for all x0, and the value of Ji are well-deﬁned, where Γi
is deﬁned as the space of admissible strategy of player Pi, i= 0, 1, ... ,N. First, to ﬁnd the
team-optimal solution triplet (u∗0i, u
∗
i , v
∗) with the H∞ constraint, we centralize the control
inputs of the system (4.45) as follows,⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
x(k+1) = A(k)x(k)+Bc(k)uc(k)+D(k)v(k)+Ap(k)x(k)w(k), x(0) = x0,
z(k) =
[
C(k)x(k)
Gc(k)uc(k)
]
, GTc (k)Gc(k) = I∑Ni=1(m0i+mi), k ∈ NTf ,
(4.54)
where
Bc(k) :=
[
B0(k) B1(k) · · · BN(k)
]
,
uc(k) := col
[
u0(k) u1(k) · · · uN(k)
]
,
B0(k) :=
[
B01(k) · · · B0N(k)
]
,
Gc(k) := block diag(G0(k) G1(k) · · · GN(k)) .
Moreover, the leader’s cost functional (4.46a) can be rewritten as,
J0(x0, u0, u1, ... ,uN , v) :=
Tf
∑
k=0
E
[
xT (k)Q0(k)x(k)+uTc (k)Rc(k)uc(k)
]
, (4.55)
where
Q0(k) :=CT (k)C(k),
Rc := block diag
(
R00(k) R01(k) · · · R0N(k)
)
,
R00 := block diag
(
R001(k) · · · R00N(k)
)
.
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Now, to apply Lemma 4.1, we assume that the following four cross-coupled SMVDEs have
solutions (P(k), W (k); Kc(k), Fγ(k)) with P(k)≥ 0 and W (k)≤ 0:
P(k) = ATv (k)P(k+1)Av(k)+A
T
p (k)P(k+1)Ap−ATv (k)P(k+1)Sc(k)P(k+1)Av(k)
+Q0(k), P(Tf +1) = 0, (4.56a)
Kc(k) =−Rˆ−1c (k)BT (k)P(k+1)Av(k), (4.56b)
W (k) = ATu (k)W (k+1)Au(k)+A
T
p (k)W (k+1)Ap(k)−ATu (k)W (k+1)U(k)W (k+1)Au(k)
−LK(k), W (Tf +1) = 0, (4.56c)
Fγ(k) =−T−1γ (k)DT (k)W (k+1)Au(k), (4.56d)
where
Av(k) := A(k)+D(k)Fγ(k),
Rˆc(k) := Inu +B
T (k)P(k+1)B(k)> 0,
Kc(k) :=
[
K0(k)
K1(k)
]
,
K0(k) :=
[
KT01(k) · · · KT0N(k)
]T
,
K1(k) :=
[
KT1 (k) · · · KTN (k)
]T
,
Au(k) := A(k)+Bc(k)Kc(k),
LK(k) := Q0(k)+Kc(k)TKc(k),
Sc(k) := Bc(k)Rˆ−1c B
T
c (k),
Tγ(k) := γ2Inv +D
T (k)W (k+1)D(k)> 0,
U(k) := D(k)T−1γ (k)D
T (k).
Then, we ﬁnd the state feedback strategy pair
(u∗c(k), v
∗(k)) := (Kc(k)x(k), Fγ(k)x(k)).
This strategy pair is the team-optimal solution with the H∞ constraint. More explicitly,
u∗0i(k) = K0i(k)x(k)
=−[R00i(k)+BT0i(k)P(k+1)B0i(k)]−1BT0i(k)P(k+1)Av(k)x(k), (4.57a)
u∗i (k) = Ki(k)x(k)
=−[R0i(k)+BTi (k)P(k+1)Bi(k)]−1BTi (k)P(k+1)Av(k)x(k), (4.57b)
v∗(k) = Fγ(k)x(k)
=−[γ2Inv +DT (k)W (k+1)D(k)]−1DT (k)W (k+1)Au(k)x(k). (4.57c)
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It is assumed that the leader chooses the following incentive Stackelberg strategy corre-
sponding to the i-th follower [Mizukami and Wu (1988)]:
u∗0i(k) := η0i(k)x(k)+ηii(k)u
∗
i (k), i = 1, 2, ... ,N. (4.58)
Using (4.57a), (4.57b) and (4.58) η0i(k) and ηii(k) have the following relation:
η0i(k) := K0i(k)−ηii(k)Ki(k), i = 1, 2, ... ,N. (4.59)
As the second step, the non-cooperative followers’ Nash strategy-set is derived where the
leader’s incentive Stackelberg strategy is considered. For this purpose, we can rewrite the
system for i-th follower using the strategy triplet (γ∗−i(u0i), γ∗−i(ui), v∗) as follows,
x(k+1) =A(k)x(k)+
N
∑
j=1, j =i
B0 j(k)u∗0 j(k)+B0i(k)[η0i(k)x(k)+ηii(k)ui(k)]
+
N
∑
j=1, j =i
B j(k)u∗j(k)+Bi(k)ui(k)+D(k)v
∗(k)+Ap(k)x(k)w(k), x(0) = x0,
(4.60)
with cost functional
Ji(x0, γ∗−i(u0i), γ
∗
−i(ui), v
∗)
:=
Tf
∑
k=0
E
[
xT (k)Qi(k)x(k)+ [η0i(k)x(k)+ηii(k)ui(k)]TR0ii(k)[η0i(k)x(k)
+ηii(k)ui(k)]+uTi (k)Rii(k)ui(k)
]
, i = 1, ... ,N. (4.61)
Using simpliﬁed notations the above system can be written as
x(k+1) =A˜i(k)x(k)+ B˜i(k)ui(k)+Ap(k)x(k)w(k), x(0) = x0, (4.62)
with cost functional
Ji(x0, γ∗−i(u0i), γ
∗
−i(ui), v
∗)
:=
Tf
∑
k=0
E
[
xT (k)Q˜i(k)x(k)+2xTi (k)S˜i(k)ui(k)+u
T
i (k)R˜i(k)ui(k)
]
, i = 1, ... ,N,
(4.63)
where
A˜i(k) := A(k)+D(k)Fγ(k)+B0i(k)η0i(k)+
N
∑
j=1, j =i
[B0 j(k)K0 j(k)+Bj(k)Kj(k)],
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B˜i(k) := Bi(k)+B0i(k)ηii(k),
S˜i(k) := ηT0i(k)R0ii(k)ηii(k),
Q˜i(k) := Qi(k)+ηT0i(k)R0ii(k)η0i(k),
R˜i(k) := Rii(k)+ηTii (k)R0ii(k)ηii(k).
Now, by applying Lemma 4.2, the following SBDRE has solution(s) Pi(k) corresponding
to each i-th follower:
Pi(k) =AˆTi (k)Pi(k+1)Aˆi(k)+A
T
p (k)Pi(k+1)Ap(k)− AˆTi (k)Pi(k+1)B˜i(k)
× Rˆ−1i (k)B˜Ti (k)Pi(k+1)Aˆi(k)+ Qˆi(k), Pi(Tf +1) = 0, (4.64)
where
Aˆi(k) := A˜i(k)− B˜i(k)R˜−1i (k)S˜Ti (k),
Rˆi(k) := R˜i(k)+ B˜Ti (k)Pi(k+1)B˜i(k),
Qˆi(k) := Q˜i(k)− S˜i(k)R˜−1i (k)S˜Ti (k),
and each i-th follower’s optimal state feedback Nash equilibrium strategy is determined by
u∗i (k) = K˜i(k)x(k) =−Rˆ−1i (k)
[
S˜Ti (k)+ B˜
T
i (k)Pi(k+1)Aˆi(k)
]
x(k), (4.65)
i= 1, ... ,N. Owing to the equivalence of (4.57b) and (4.65), that is Ki(k) = K˜i(k) we have
the relation,
Ki(k) =−Rˆ−1i (k)
[
S˜Ti (k)+ B˜
T
i (k)Pi(k+1)A˜i
]
,
or,
[R˜i(k)+ B˜Ti (k)Pi(k+1)B˜i(k)]Ki(k) =−S˜Ti (k)− B˜Ti (k)Pi(k+1)A˜i(k),
or,
[Rii(k)+ηTii (k)R0ii(k)ηii(k)+ [Bi(k)+B0i(k)ηii(k)]
TPi(k+1)B˜i(k)]Ki(k)
=−[ηT0i(k)R0ii(k)ηii(k)]T − [Bi(k)+B0i(k)ηii(k)]TPi(k+1)A˜i(k),
or,
Rii(k)Ki(k)+ηTii (k)R0ii(k)ηii(k)Ki(k)
+BTi (k)Pi(k+1)B˜i(k)Ki(k)+η
T
ii (k)B
T
0i(k)Pi(k+1)B˜i(k)Ki(k)
=−ηTii (k)R0ii(k)K0i(k)+ηTii (k)R0ii(k)ηii(k)Ki(k)−BTi (k)Pi(k+1)A˜i(k)
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−ηTii (k)BT0i(k)Pi(k+1)A˜i(k),
[using relation (4.59) η0i(k) = K0i(k)−ηii(k)Ki(k)],
or,
ηTii (k) =−[Rii(k)Ki(k)+BTi (k)Pi(k+1)B˜i(k)Ki(k)+Bi(k)T (k)Pi(k+1)A˜i(k)]
× [BT0i(k)Pi(k+1)B˜i(k)Ki(k)+BT0iPi(k+1)A˜i(k)+R0ii(k)K0i(k)]−1
or,
ηTii (k) =−
(
Rii(k)Ki(k)+BTi (k)Pi(k+1)A˜i(k)
)(
R0ii(k)K0i(k)+BT0i(k)Pi(k+1)A˜i(k)
)−1
,
(4.66)
where
A˜i(k) := A˜i(k)+ B˜i(k)Ki(k), i = 1, ... ,N.
Remark 4.1. It should be noted that the incentive parameter ηii(k) can be uniquely deter-
mined if and only if
(
R0ii(k)K0i(k)+BT0i(k)Pi(k+1)A˜i(k)
)
is non-singular.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose that four cross-coupled SMVDEs (4.56), SBDRE (4.64), and equa-
tion (4.66) have solutions. Then, strategy-set (4.49) is associated with (4.65) from the
two-level incentive Stackelberg strategy-set with H∞ constraint as formulated in Section
4.4, where η0i and ηii are determined through (4.59) and (4.66), respectively.
Remark 4.2. It should be noted that if we substitute η0i(k) from relation (4.59) into SBDRE
(4.64), then SBDRE (4.64) will have two unknowns, Pi(k) and ηii(k). Further, by solving
the two equations, (4.64) and (4.66), it will be possible to obtain a solution for Pi(k) and
ηii(k).
4.5 Inﬁnite-horizon Case
The inﬁnite-horizon H∞-constrained incentive Stackelberg game is investigated in this sec-
tion. Consider a time-invariant linear stochastic discrete-time system such as,⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
x(k+1) = Ax(k)+
N
∑
j=1
B0 ju0 j(k)+
N
∑
j=1
Bju j(k)
+Dv(k)+Apx(k)w(k), x(0) = x0,
z(k) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Cx(k)
G0u0(k)
G1u1(k)
...
GNuN(k)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ , G
T
i Gi = Inu , k ∈ N.
(4.67)
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Moreover, the cost functionals are deﬁned as
J0(x0, u0, u1, ... ,uN , v)
:=
∞
∑
k=0
E
[
xT (k)Q0x(k)+
N
∑
j=1
{
uT0 j(k)R00 ju0 j(k)+u
T
j (k)R0 ju j(k)
}]
, (4.68a)
Ji(x0, u0, u1, ... ,uN , v)
:=
∞
∑
k=0
E
[
xT (k)Qix(k)+
N
∑
j=1
uT0 j(k)R0i ju0 j(k)+u
T
i (k)Riiui(k)
]
, i = 1, ... ,N, (4.68b)
where
Q0 :=CTC, R00i = RT00i > 0, R0i = R
T
0i ≥ 0,
Qi = QTi ≥ 0, R0ii = RT0ii ≥ 0, Rii = RTii > 0,
for all i = 0, 1, ... ,N. The inﬁnite-horizon H∞-constrained incentive Stackelberg game
with multiple non-cooperative followers can be formulated as follows:
For any disturbance attenuation level γ > 0, we need to ﬁnd an incentive strategy of P0
by
u∗0i(k) = u
∗
0i(k,x(k),u
∗
i (k)) = η0ix(k)+ηiiu
∗
i (k), (4.69)
where parameters η0i and ηii are to be determined and a state feedback strategy
u∗i (k) := Kix(k) ∈ l2w(N, Rmi),
of Pi, i = 1, ... ,N considering the worst-case disturbance
v∗(k) = Fγx(k) ∈ l2w(N, Rnv),
such that
(i) the trajectory of the closed-loop system (4.67) satisﬁes the following team-optimal
condition (4.70a) along with H∞ constraint conditions (4.70b)
J0(x0,u∗0,u
∗
1, ... ,u
∗
N ,v
∗)≤ J0(x0, u0,u1, ... ,uN ,v∗), (4.70a)
0≤ Jv(x0,u∗0,u∗1, ... ,u∗N ,v∗)≤ Jv(x0,u∗0,u∗1, ... ,u∗N ,v), (4.70b)
where
Jv(x0, u0, u1, ... ,uN , v) :=
Tf
∑
k=0
E[γ2‖v(k)‖2−‖z(k)‖2], ∀v(k) = 0,
‖z(k)‖2 = xT (k)Q0x(k)+
N
∑
j=0
uTj (k)u j(k),
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(ii) a set of decision (u∗0i, u
∗
i ) ∈ Rm0i+mi , i = 1, ... ,N satisfying the following Nash
equilibrium inequality:
Ji(x0,u∗0,u
∗
1, ... ,u
∗
N ,v
∗)≤ Ji(x0,γ∗−i(u0i),γ∗−i(ui),v∗). (4.71)
Then, the strategy-set (u∗0i, u
∗
i ) ∈ Rm0i+mi , i = 1, ... ,N constitutes both team-
optimal incentive Stackelberg strategy with H∞ constraint of the leader and
Nash equilibrium strategies of the followers for a two-level hierarchical game
[Bas¸ar and Olsder (1999)].
Note that, if the inequality (4.70b) holds, it ensures the following condition for H∞ con-
straint:
‖L‖H∞ = sup
v ∈ l2w(N, Rnv ),
v = 0, x0 = 0
‖z‖l2w(N, Rnz)
‖v‖l2w(N, Rnv)
< γ. (4.72)
First, to ﬁnd the team-optimal solution triplet (u∗0i, u
∗
i , v
∗) with H∞ constraint, rearrange
the system (4.67) as follows,⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
x(k+1) = Ax(k)+Bcuc(k)+Dv(k)+Apx(k)w(k), x(0) = x0,
z(k) =
[
Cx(k)
Gcuc(k)
]
, GTc Gc = I∑Ni=1(m0i+mi), k ∈ N,
(4.73)
where x(0) = x0, k ∈ N,
Bc :=
[
B0 B1 · · · BN
]
,
B0 :=
[
B01 · · · B0N
]
,
uc(k) := col
[
u0(k) u1(k) · · · uN(k)
]
,
Gc := block diag
(
G0 G1 · · · GN
)
.
Moreover, the leader’s cost functional (4.68a) can be rewritten as
J0(x0, u0, u1, ... ,uN , v) :=
∞
∑
k=0
E
[
xT (k)Q0x(k)+uTc (k)Rcuc(k)
]
, (4.74)
where
Rc := block diag
(
R00 R01 · · · R0N
)
,
R00 := block diag
(
R001 · · · R00N
)
.
Now, according to [Zhang et al. (2008)], for the system (4.73), suppose the following four
cross-coupled SMVAEs have solutions (P, W ; Kc, Fγ) with P > 0 and W < 0:
P = ATv PAv+A
T
pPAp−ATv PScPAv+Q0, (4.75a)
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Kc =−Rˆ−1c BTPAv, (4.75b)
W = ATuWAu+A
T
pWAp−ATuWUWAu−LK, (4.75c)
Fγ =−T−1γ DTWAu, (4.75d)
where
Av := A+DFγ ,
Rˆc := Inu +B
TPB > 0,
Au := A+BcKc,
LK := Q0+KTc Kc,
Kc :=
[
K0
K1
]
,
K0 :=
[
KT01 · · · KT0N
]T
,
K1 :=
[
KT1 · · · KTN
]T
,
Sc := BcRˆ−1c B
T
c ,
U := DT−1γ D
T ,
Tγ := γ2Inv +D
TWD > 0.
If (A, Ap/C) and (A+DFγ , Ap/C) are exactly observable, then the state feedback strategy
pair
(u∗c(k), v
∗(k)) := (Kcx(k), Fγx(k)),
is the team-optimal solution for the system (4.73) under H∞ constraint. More explicitly,
u∗0i(k) = K0ix(k) =−
[
R00i+BT0iPB0i
]−1
BT0iPAvx(k), (4.76a)
u∗i (k) = Kix(k) =−
[
R0i+BTi PBi
]−1
BTi PAvx(k), (4.76b)
v∗(k) = Fγx(k) =−[γ2Inv +DTWD]−1DTWAux(k). (4.76c)
Secondly, to derive followers’ Nash strategy-set, we can rewrite the system for i-th
follower as
x(k+1) = A˜ix(k)+ B˜iui(k)+Apx(k)w(k), x(0) = x0, (4.77)
with cost functional
Ji(x0, γ∗−i(u0i), γ
∗
−i(ui), v
∗) :=
∞
∑
k=0
E
[
xT (k)Q˜ix(k)+2xTi S˜iui(k)+u
T
i (k)R˜iui(k)
]
, (4.78)
where
A˜i := A+DFγ +B0iη0i+
N
∑
j=1, j =i
[B0 jK0 j +BjKj],
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B˜i := Bi+B0iηii, Q˜i := Qi+ηT0iR0iiη0i,
S˜i := ηT0iR0iiηii,
R˜i := Rii+ηTii R0iiηii, i = 1, ... ,N.
Now, applying Lemma 4.3, there exists a symmetric constant matrix Pi > 0 corresponding
to each i-th follower that solves the following SARE:
Pi = AˆTi PiAˆi+A
T
pPiAp− AˆTi PiB˜iRˆ−1i B˜Ti PiAˆi+ Qˆi, (4.79)
where
Aˆi := A˜i− B˜iR˜−1i S˜Ti , Rˆi := R˜i+ B˜Ti PiB˜i, Qˆi := Q˜i− S˜iR˜−1i S˜Ti .
Then, each i-th follower’s optimal state feedback Nash equilibrium strategy is determined
by
u∗i (k) = K˜ix(k) =−Rˆ−1i
[
S˜Ti + B˜
T
i PiAˆi
]
x(k), i = 1, ... ,N. (4.80)
Due to the equivalence of (4.76b) and (4.80), that is Ki = K˜i we have the relation
Ki =−Rˆ−1i
[
S˜Ti + B˜
T
i PiA˜i
]
,
or,
[R˜i+ B˜Ti PiB˜i]Ki =−S˜Ti − B˜Ti PiA˜i,
or,
[Rii+ηTii R0iiηii+[Bi+B0iηii]
TPiB˜i]Ki =−[ηT0iR0iiηii]T − [Bi+B0iηii]TPiA˜i,
or,
RiiKi+ηTii R0iiηiiKi+B
T
i PiB˜iKi+η
T
ii B
T
0iPiB˜iKi
=−ηTii R0iiK0i+ηTii R0iiηiiKi−BTi PiA˜i−ηTii BT0iPiA˜i,
[using relation η0i = K0i−ηiiKi]
or,
ηTii =−[RiiKi+BTi PiB˜iKi+BTi PiA˜i][BT0iPiB˜iKi+BT0iPiA˜i+R0iiK0i]−1,
or,
ηTii =−
(
RiiKi+BTi PiA˜i
)(
R0iiK0i+BT0iPiA˜i
)−1
, (4.81)
where
A˜i := A˜i+ B˜iKi, i = 1, ... ,N.
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Remark 4.3. It should be noted that the incentive parameter ηii can be uniquely deter-
mined if and only if
(
R0iiK0i+BT0iPiA˜i
)
is non-singular.
Parameter η0i can be determined by the following equation:
η0i = K0i−ηiiKi, i = 1, 2, ... ,N. (4.82)
Theorem 4.2. Suppose that a discrete-time stochastic system (4.67) is stabilizable and
that four cross-coupled SMVAEs (4.75) have the solution set (P, W ; Kc, Fγ) such that
P> 0, W < 0 and (A, Ap/C) and (A+DFγ , Ap/C) are exactly observable. If SARE (4.79)
and equation (4.81) have solutions Pi > 0 and ηii, respectively, then the strategy-sets (4.69)
and (4.80) from the two-level incentive Stackelberg strategy-set with H∞ constraint are
formulated, as shown in Section 4.5.
In order to solve four cross-coupled SMVAEs of (4.75) and SARE (4.79) along with
(4.81) the following Lyapunov based computational algorithm is used:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
P(r+1) = [A(r)v ]TP(r+1)A
(r)
v +ATpP
(r)Ap− [A(r)v ]TP(r)S(r)c P(r)A(r)v +Q0,
K(r)c =−[Rˆ(r)c ]−1BTc P(r)A(r)v ,
W (r+1) = [A(r)u ]TW (r+1)A
(r)
u +ATpW
(r)Ap− [A(r)u ]TW (r)U (r)W (r)A(r)u −L(r)K ,
F(r)γ =−[T (r)γ ]−1DTW (r)A(r)u ,
(4.83a)
{
P(s+1)i = [Aˆ
(s)
i ]
TP(s+1)i Aˆ
(s)
i +A
T
pP
(s)
i Ap− [Aˆ(s)i ]TP(s)i B˜(s)i [Rˆ(s)i ]−1[B˜(s)i ]TP(s)i Aˆ(s)i + Qˆ(s)i ,
[η(s+1)ii ]
T =−(RiiK(s)i +BTi P(s+1)i A˜(s)i )(R0iiK0i+BT0iP(s+1)i A˜(s)i )−1,
(4.83b)
where r = 0, 1, ... , s = 0, 1, ... ,
P(0) = P(0)i = In, W
(0) =−In, η(0)ii = η0ii ,
A(r)v := A+DF
(r)
γ ,
A(r)u := A+BcK
(r)
c ,
S(r)c := Bc[Rˆ
(r)
c ]
−1BTc ,
U (r) := D[T (r)γ ]−1DT ,
T (r)γ := γ2Inv +D
TW (r)D,
Rˆ(r)c := Rc+BTc P
(r)Bc,
L(r)K :=C
TC+[K(r)c ]TK
(r)
c ,
A˜(s)i := A+DFγ +B0iη
(s)
0i +
N
∑
j=1, j =i
[B0 jK0 j +BjKj],
B˜(s)i := Bi+B0iη
(s)
ii ,
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S˜i := [η
(s)
0i ]
TR0iiη
(s)
ii ,
Q˜(s)i := Qi+[η
(s)
0i ]
TR0iiη
(s)
0i ,
R˜(s)i := Rii+[η
(s)
ii ]
TR0iiη
(s)
ii ,
A˜
(s)
i := A˜
(s)
i + B˜
(s)
i K
(s)
i ,
Aˆ(s)i := A˜
(s)
i − B˜(s)i [R˜(s)i ]−1[S˜(s)i ]T ,
Rˆ(s)i := R˜
(s)
i +[B˜
(s)
i ]
TPiB˜
(s)
i ,
Qˆ(s)i := Q˜
(s)
i − S˜(s)i [R˜(s)i ]−1[S˜(s)i ]T ≥ 0.
It should be noted that the initial choice of η0ii has to be chosen appropriately. In the next
section, an academic and a practical numerical examples demonstrate that this algorithm
operates well in practice.
4.6 Numerical examples
In this section, we investigate two simple numerical examples to demonstrate the existence
of our proposed incentive Stackelberg strategy-set.
4.6.1 An academic example
First, we present an example for the inﬁnite-horizon case with two non-cooperative players.
Later, to show the convergence of our results, we present some graphs of the same problem
in Fig. 4.2–4.5 considering a ﬁnite time interval. Let us consider the following system
matrices:
x(0) =
⎡
⎣ 10.5
−0.5
⎤
⎦ , A =
⎡
⎣ 0.52 1.12 00 −0.24 0
0.23 0.85 −0.16
⎤
⎦ , Ap = 0.1A,
B01 =
⎡
⎣ 0.138 0.20 1.15−0.55 0.84 −1.11
5.23 0 0.11
⎤
⎦ , B02 =
⎡
⎣ 0.312 1.20 0.24−1.25 1.03 0.65
3.55 0 0.22
⎤
⎦ ,
B1 =
⎡
⎣0.15 −0.11 0.450.12 2.28 0.03
3.55 0 0.22
⎤
⎦ , B2 =
⎡
⎣ 0.23 −0.45 0.22−0.52 1.02 0.02
0.28 2.11 1.96
⎤
⎦ ,
D =
⎡
⎣ 0.054 −0.076 0.23−0.035 −0.094 0.043
0.023 0.043 0.013
⎤
⎦ , C = [1 2 1 ] ,
Q0 = diag( 1 1 2 ), Q1 = diag( 1 1.5 2.1 ), Q2 = diag( 1.2 1.1 3.1 ),
R001 = 1.9I3, R002 = 2.5I3, R01 = 2.7I3, R02 = 3.5I3,
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R011 = 4.8I3, R022 = 5I3, R11 = 0.3I3, R22 = 0.5I3.
We choose the disturbance attenuation level as γ = 5.
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Fig. 4.2: Convergence graph of diagonal elements of P(k), W (k).
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Fig. 4.3: Convergence graph of diagonal elements of P1(k), P2(k).
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Fig. 4.4: Convergence graph of diagonal elements of η11(k), η22(k).
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Fig. 4.5: Convergence graph of diagonal elements of η01(k), η02(k).
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First, for the inﬁnite-horizon case, four cross-coupled SMVAEs (4.75) are solved us-
ing algorithm (4.83a). These solutions attain an H∞-constrained team-optimal solutions as
presented below:
P =
⎡
⎣ 1.1166 2.4780e-1 −1.1222e-32.4780e-1 1.5448 −5.6224e-3
−1.1222e-3 −5.6224e-3 2.0016
⎤
⎦ ,
Kc =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
K01
K02
K1
K2
⎤
⎥⎥⎦=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
−1.5655e-2 −8.0571e-2 1.8506e-2
−3.2647e-2 −4.9939e-2 4.9357e-4
−1.1706e-1 −2.6894e-1 −1.9856e-3
−1.8913e-2 −7.8576e-2 8.7567e-3
−1.1254e-1 −2.1784e-1 −4.3089e-4
−2.6742e-2 −4.6254e-2 8.2324e-4
−1.3440e-2 −2.8877e-2 1.3626e-3
−1.1534e-2 4.2314e-3 4.9096e-3
−3.7172e-2 −8.2997e-2 2.7749e-3
−1.7687e-2 −3.1838e-2 6.5192e-4
1.9603e-2 4.4974e-2 4.9832e-3
−1.4987e-2 −3.8356e-2 3.7607e-3
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
W =
⎡
⎣ −1.0656 −2.1303 −9.9778e-1−2.1303 −4.2664 −1.9946
−9.9778e-1 −1.9946 −1.0008
⎤
⎦ ,
Fγ =
⎡
⎣ 3.9128e-5 7.2135e-5 −1.1007e-6−1.5614e-3 −2.8465e-3 3.5938e-5
2.2915e-3 4.1800e-3 −5.3389e-5
⎤
⎦ .
Then, SARE (4.79) and equation (4.81) are solved using algorithm (4.83b).
P1 =
⎡
⎣ 1.1187 2.6472e-1 −6.9279e-42.6472e-1 2.1096 −6.5987e-3
−6.9279e-4 −6.5987e-3 2.1022
⎤
⎦ ,
P2 =
⎡
⎣ 1.3242 2.5554e-1 −1.2502e-32.5554e-1 1.6418 −6.1620e-3
−1.2502e-3 −6.1620e-3 3.1012
⎤
⎦ ,
η11 =
⎡
⎣6.6542e-2 1.7460e-1 1.4531e-12.2761e-1 2.2356 3.3869e-1
1.8710e-2 −6.5111e-1 1.4926e-1
⎤
⎦ ,
η22 =
⎡
⎣ 1.7417e-1 1.3506 1.4480−3.6335e-2 −2.4805 −1.0267
1.1609 8.1400 4.4421
⎤
⎦ .
Algorithm (4.83) converges to the required solution with an accuracy of 1.0e-12 order after
28 and 8 iterations respectively. Furthermore, the incentive Stackelberg strategy (4.69) that
106
0 5 10 15 20
−0.5
0
0.5
1
Time, k
x(
k)
x1
x2
x3
Fig. 4.6: Trajectory of the state.
will be announced by the leader can be calculated as,
u∗0i(k) = η0ix(k)+ηiiu
∗
i (k), (4.84)
where
η01 =
⎡
⎣−7.3449e-3 −6.7328e-2 1.7155e-28.7881e-3 −2.4716e-2 −1.1732e-2
−1.1877e-1 −2.5325e-1 7.7147e-4
⎤
⎦ ,
η02 =
⎡
⎣−2.0608e-2 −7.8234e-2 −3.5325e-3−7.9949e-2 −1.4682e-1 1.5815e-2
−9.9203e-2 −2.0499e-1 −5.7203e-2
⎤
⎦ .
In fact, after announcing this incentive, the followers’ strategy can be computed by apply-
ing the standard LQ theory.
u∗i (k) =−[R˜i+ B˜Ti PiB˜i]−1[B˜Ti PiA˜i+ηTii R0iiη0i]x(k), (4.85)
which implies
u∗1(k) =
⎡
⎣−1.3440e-2 −2.8877e-2 1.3626e-3−1.1534e-2 4.2314e-3 4.9096e-3
−3.7172e-2 −8.2997e-2 2.7749e-3
⎤
⎦x(k),
u∗2(k) =
⎡
⎣−1.7687e-2 −3.1838e-2 6.5192e-41.9603e-2 4.4974e-2 4.9832e-3
−1.4987e-2 −3.8356e-2 3.7607e-3
⎤
⎦x(k).
Indeed, it can be observed that this matrix gain is equal to K˜i. Namely, it can be conﬁrmed
that the followers adopt the team-optimal solution with the H∞ constraint eventually.
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Second, considering a ﬁnite time interval, the evaluation of P(k) and W (k) are given
in Fig. 4.2, which clearly show the convergence of the solution of SMVDEs (4.56a) and
(4.56c). In a similar manner, convergences of Pi(k) corresponding to each i-th follower, as
referred to SBDRE (4.64), are shown in Fig. 4.3. Moreover, by solving (4.66), we present
the convergence of η11(k) and η22(k) in Fig. 4.4 and by (4.59), we present η01(k) and
η02(k) in Fig. 4.5. It should be noted that for (P, W ), (P1, P2), (η11, η22) and (η01, η02),
the authenticity of results in the inﬁnite-horizon case can be veriﬁed easily by comparing
with Figures 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5, respectively while we consider the time parameter, k →
∞, in the ﬁnite-horizon case.
Fig. 4.6 shows the response of the system with a state trajectory. It should be noted that
w(k) is chosen as the stochastic-process-dependent random disturbance such thatE[w(k)] =
0 and |w(.)| ≤ 30. Furthermore, Fig. 4.6 represents that the state variables x(k) can stabilize
the given system, which implies that the proposed method is very useful and reliable.
4.6.2 A simple practical example
In order to demonstrate the efﬁciency of our proposed strategies, an R–L–C electrical circuit
that can be represented stochastic system in Fig. 4.7 is considered. In this network, Ri, ri,
i = 1, 2, R and L are the resistances and the inductance, respectively. The capacitances are
denoted by Ci, i = 1, 2. Moreover, E01(t) := u01(t), E02(t) := u02(t) and E1(t) := u1(t),
E2(t) := u2(t) denote the applied voltages, that is, the control inputs as the leaders and the
followers, respectively. i(t) denote the electric current in the inductance L.
Fig. 4.7: Circuit diagram.
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According to Fig. 4.7, for the Follower 1, current through the resistor:
i11 =
V −E1
R1
, (4.86)
and current into the capacitor:
i12 =C1
dV
dt
. (4.87)
Let us consider,
i1 = i11+ i12, (4.88)
which implies that the current trough the Follower 1 is,
i1 =
V −E1
R1
+C1
dV
dt
, (4.89)
Similarly, current trough the Follower 2 is,
i2 =
V −E2
R2
+C2
dV
dt
, (4.90)
The voltage drop across the inductor is Ldidt . If we consider the total current ﬂow through
the circuit is,
i = i1+ i2, (4.91)
we can get the following differential equation:
E01+E02−Ldidt −V
R+ r1+ r2
= (C1+C2)
dV
dt
+
V −E1
R1
+
V −E2
R2
, (4.92)
or,
dV
dt
=
1
C1+C2
[
−
(
1
R1
+
1
R2
+
1
R+ r1+ r2
)
V
+
E01+E02
R+ r1+ r2
+
E1
R1
+
E2
R2
− L
di
dt
R+ r1+ r2,
]
. (4.93)
For this system, let us consider di(t)/dt = v(t) as an external disturbance and the volt-
age drop across the circuit, V := x, as a state with initial voltage x(0) = x0. It should be
noted that, in any electronic device, thermal noise is unavoidable at non-zero temperatures.
This means the system can be represented as a stochastic differential equation (SDE) with a
random noise term. If this noise is treated as a real-valued state-dependent Wiener process
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w(t) with coefﬁcient Ap, then the stochastic system can be written, in simpliﬁed notation,
as
dx(t) =
[
A¯x(t)+
2
∑
i=1
[B¯0iu0i(t)+ B¯iui(t)]+ D¯v(t)
]
dt+ A¯px(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0. (4.94)
where
A¯ :=− 1
CT
(
1
R1
+
1
R2
+
1
RS
)
,
B¯01 = B¯02 :=
1
CTRS
,
B¯1 :=
1
CTR1
,
B¯2 :=
1
CTR2
,
D¯ :=− L
CTRS
,
A¯p := 0.1A¯,
CT :=C1+C2,
RS := R+ r1+ r2.
It should be noted that the system noise has been added to the deterministic system by
describing it stochastically in the SDE (4.94). It is assumed that 1% of the magnitude of the
state coefﬁcient can be represented by a Wiener process based on stochastic perturbations.
Suppose that we wish to solve this SDE (4.94) for some time interval [0, T ]. By
the Euler-Maruyama approximation, the stochastic continuous-time system (4.94) can be
transformed into a stochastic discrete-time system with Tf equal sub-intervals of width
Δt = T/Tf , as follows:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
x(k+1) = A(k)x(k)+
2
∑
j=1
[
B0 j(k)u0 j(k)+Bj(k)u j(k)
]
+D(k)v(k)+Apx(k)N(0,1), x(0) = x0,
z(k) =
[
x(k) u01(k) u02(k) u1(k) u2(k)
]T
,
(4.95)
where
A := 1+ A¯Δt,
B01 := B¯01Δt,
B02 := B¯02Δt,
B1 := B¯1Δt,
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B2 := B¯2Δt,
D := D¯Δt,
Ap := A¯p
√
Δt,
and N(0,1) denotes a normally distributed random variable with zero mean and unit vari-
ance.
In this problem, it is assumed that the leader will control the voltage sources in such a
way that the team-optimal solution will be achieved, attenuating the external disturbance
under the H∞ constraint. On the contrary, the followers will simultaneously optimize their
own costs using Nash equilibrium strategies, with respect to the leader’s incentive Stackel-
berg strategy (4.46).
In order to solve this problem numerically, the simulation data are assigned to the pa-
rameters as follows:
R1 = 2 MΩ, R2 = 3 MΩ, R = 600 Ω, r1 = 2 Ω, r2 = 3 Ω,
C1 = 1 μF, C2 = 2μF, L = 0.01 H, x0 = 5 V, Δt = 1 ms.
The weight matrices of the cost functionals of the leader and followers can be deﬁned as in
R001 = 2, R002 = 4, R01 = 3, R02 = 2, R011 = 4, R022 = 4,
R11 = 3, R22 = 2, Q0 = 1, Q1 = 2, Q2 = 4.
Now, we choose as γ = 3 to design the incentive Stackelberg strategy-set.
Fig. 4.8: Percentage of voltage discharging.
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The H∞-constrained team-optimal state-dependent strategies of the voltage sources can
be determined to be
u01(k) =−1.1563e-1x(k),
u02(k) =−5.7815e-2x(k),
u1(k) =−2.3319e-5x(k),
u2(k) =−3.4978e-5x(k).
In addition, the incentive Stackelberg strategies announced by the leader can be found to
be
u01(k) =−1.1563e-1x(k)+1.1464e-2u1(k),
u02(k) =−5.7815e-2x(k)−3.0250e-4u2(k).
Finally, Fig. 5 shows the exponential decay of the capacitors’ voltage over time, calculated
using our current method.
Remark 4.4. As we know, LQ is a control scheme that provides optimal performance for
certain given quadratic objective functions. However, it cannot be used for hierarchical
decision making and optimal collaboration of multiple decision making problems. The
results of our proposed method show that by applying the incentive Stackelberg strategy,
the leader can impose his control over the followers.
In many real-world control problems, most physical systems and processes contain un-
detected uncertainties in the deterministic exogenous disturbances. In contrast to stochas-
tic perturbations due to the Wiener process, they introduce serious difﬁculties in the control
and design of the system. Moreover, engineering practices not only reduce the impact of
disturbances, but also minimize the desired objective in the presence of disturbance. Con-
sidering all of the above possible constraints, we propose such a solution to the problem
reﬂecting the real-life system in more general.
For example, [Luo et al. (2016)] investigates the problem of stimulating users to par-
ticipate in mobile crowdsourcing applications through personal devices such as smart-
phones/tablets/laptops. However, motivating enough users to provide their personal device
resources to achieve the good quality of service is a challenge. To solve this problem,
the authors propose an incentive framework based on Stackelberg game to simulate the
interaction between the server and users.
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4.7 Conclusion
This chapter investigates the incentive Stackelberg game for discrete-time stochastic sys-
tems. The motivation is to choose the incentive Stackelberg game is an engineering ap-
plication of a packet switch that works in the loop structure [Saksena and Cruz (1985)].
The above problem comes from a static game. However, this chapter only studies dynamic
games. This chapter involves one leader and multiple followers incentive Starkberg game.
For this game, incentive Stackelberg strategy is the idea in which leader can implement his
team-optimal solution in a Stackelberg game. In the followers’ group, players are supposed
to be non-cooperative, and Nash equilibrium is investigated. Unlike the previous chapter,
this chapter examines the stochastic system.
The deterministic disturbances and their attenuation to stochastic systems under the H∞
constraint is the main attraction of this chapter. Problems involving deterministic distur-
bance must be attenuated at a given target called disturbance attenuation level γ > 0. Sur-
prisingly, the concept of solving the disturbance reduction problem under the H∞ constraint
seems like a Nash equilibrium between the disturbance input and the control input. In this
game, an incentive structure is developed in such a way that leader achieve team-optimal so-
lution attenuating the disturbance under H∞ constraint. Simultaneously, followers achieve
their Nash equilibrium ensuring the incentive Stackelberg strategies of the leaders while
the worst-case disturbance is considered. Results based on both ﬁnite- and inﬁnite- time
domains are shown in this chapter. The structure of the incentive Stackelberg game is the
same in both ﬁnite- and inﬁnite-horizon problems. The main focus of the inﬁnite hori-
zon situation is stochastic Lyapunov stability theory. Using stochastic Lyapunov stability
theory, several lemmas have been proved. A computational algorithm based on Lyapunov
iterations is developed to obtain the incentive Stackelberg strategy-set.
This chapter studies the most common linear quadratic (LQ) optimal control in the
game problems. In order to solve the LQ problem, discrete-time stochastic dynamic pro-
gramming (SDP) is deeply studied. Several basic lemmas are completely proved and useful
for this chapter. The solution sets for incentive Stackelberg strategy are found by solving
a set of stochastic backward difference Riccati equations (SBDREs) in the ﬁnite-horizon
case. On the other hand, it is shown that the results of the inﬁnite-horizon case are found
by solving a set of stochastic algebraic Riccati equations (SAREs). In order to ensure the
stability of the system, the state trajectory ﬁgure is presented. To demonstrate the effective-
ness of the proposed method, an academic example and a practical example are presented.
However, this chapter only investigates one leader game problem, which leads many lead-
ers to further study.
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Chapter 5
Inﬁnite-Horizon Multi-Leader-Follower
Incentive Stackelberg Games for Linear
Stochastic Systems with H∞ Constraint
This chapter is based on a previously published article [Ahmed et al. (2017b)].
5.1 Introduction
Through the last four decades, incentive Stackelberg games are the grow-
ing interest in research (see, e.g., [Basar and Olsder (1980), Ho et al. (1982),
Ishida and Shimemura (1983), Zheng et al. (1984), Mizukami and Wu (1987),
Mizukami and Wu (1988)], and references therein). In a Stackelberg games, when
the leader’s strategy induces the follower’s decision such that the leader’s pre-
speciﬁed optimal solution or equilibrium (e.g., team-optimul, Nash equilibrium) can
be achieved - called the incentive Stackelberg strategy. In [Mizukami and Wu (1987)] and
[Mizukami and Wu (1988)], incentive Stackelberg strategies were derived for LQ differen-
tial games, where the two leaders and one follower to the ﬁrst paper and one leader and two
followers to the second paper were considered. Recently, in [Mukaidani and Xu (2018)],
one leader with multiple followers was considered for stochastic linear system with H∞
constraint. Moreover, the similar structure also applied for deterministic discrete-time case
in [Ahmed and Mukaidani (2016)]. On the other hand, multiple leaders and one follower
incentive Stackelberg games were investigated in [Mukaidani (2016)] for inﬁnite-horizon
stochastic linear system. However, in practical engineering or social systems, it is generally
assumed that there exists multiple leaders and a large number of followers, with the leaders
being multiple players. Thus, it is natural to consider possible decision patterns among the
multiple leaders and followers.
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Leader ܮଵ
Follower ܨଵ
ݑ௅ଵଵ
ݑிଵଵ
ݑ௅ଵே
ݑிேଵ
Follower ܨே
(a) One leader N followers
Leader ܮଵ
Follower ܨଵ
ݑ௅ଵଵ
ݑிଵଵ
ݑ௅ெଵ
ݑிଵெ
(b) M leaders one follower
Leader ܮெ
Fig. 5.1: Two-level multi-leader-follower hierarchy.
In this chapter, an inﬁnite-horizon continuous-time incentive Stackelberg game for
a class of linear stochastic systems governed by the Itoˆ’s differential equation involv-
ing multi-leader-follower is investigated. In this game, a deterministic exogenous dis-
turbance is also observed, which is attenuating under H∞ constraint. Recently, in
[Mukaidani et al. (2017b)], incentive Stackelberg strategy with multiple leaders and mul-
tiple followers are considered for the stochastic Markov jumping control problem. To the
best of our knowledge, there have been no studies on exogenous disturbance and its atten-
uation under H∞ constraint, which makes the game more complicated to deal with. Hence,
our current research is not simply a trivial extension of existing studies. Moreover, unlike
the deterministic system [Mizukami and Wu (1987)], [Mizukami and Wu (1988)], stochas-
tic incentive Stackelberg games involving state-dependent noise with deterministic external
disturbance are studied for the ﬁrst time. It should be noted that we only discuss two-level
hierarchical games with M leaders and N followers.
To illustrate such a multi-players hierarchical game, we consider that M leaders and
N followers are belonging to two groups. L1, L2, . . . ,LM are in the leader’s group and
F1, F2, . . . ,FN are in the follower’s group. Note that, when M = 1 the structure of the game
is the same as the structure used in [Mukaidani and Xu (2018)] depicted in Fig. 5.1(a). On
the other hand, if N = 1 the structure of the game will be same as [Mukaidani (2016)]
depicted in Fig. 5.1(b). Furthermore, tuning the value of M and N, we can form any
convenient hierarchical game. That’s why, we have termed it as a generalized structure.
We establish the following patterns for this game,
• Each leader achieves Nash equilibrium solution attenuating the exterior disturbance
under H∞ constraint.
• Each leader declares incentive Stackelberg strategies for each follower, individually.
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• Each follower will adopt the Nash equilibrium strategy regarding leader’s incentive
strategies declared in advance.
• Leaders and followers act non-cooperatively in their own group.
In our work, the conditions for the leader’s Nash equilibrium strategy under the H∞ con-
straint are derived based on the existing results for the inﬁnite-horizon stochastic H2/H∞
control problem in [Chen and Zhang (2004)]. It is shown that the strategy-set can be found
by solving some cross-coupled stochastic algebraic Riccati equations (CCSAREs) and ma-
trix algebraic equations (MAEs). The leader’s and the follower’s strategies are established
in such a way that simultaneously leaders achieve Nash equilibrium strategies attenuat-
ing the external disturbance under H∞ constraint ensuring the follower’s Nash equilibrium
strategy while worst-case disturbance is considered. However, the derivation of the CC-
SAREs seems not so easy; the solution can be found easily by Lyapunov based iterations.
A simple numerical example is provided to illustrate our ﬁndings.
Notation: The notations used in this chapter are fairly standard. In denotes the n×n iden-
tity matrix. col[·] denotes a column vector. diag[·] denotes a diagonal matrix. blockdiag[·]
denotes a block diagonal matrix. ‖ · ‖ denotes the Euclidean norm. E[·] denotes the expec-
tation operator. L 2F (R+, R
) denotes the space of nonanticipative stochastic processes.
Finally, for an N-tuple
γ = (γ1, . . . ,γN) ∈ Γ1× . . .×ΓN ,
and for given sets Γi, we write
γ∗−i(α) := (γ
∗
1 , . . . ,γ
∗
i−1,α,γ
∗
i+1, . . . ,γ
∗
N),
with α ∈ Γi.
5.2 Deﬁnitions and preliminaries
In this section, we will introduce stochastic H2/H∞ control problem and exact observability.
Consider the following stochastic linear system:
dx(t) = [Ax(t)+Bu(t)+Ev(t)]dt+Ap(t)x(t)dw, x(0) = x0 (5.1a)
z(t) = col
[
Cx(t) Du(t)
]
, DTD = I, (5.1b)
where, x(t) ∈ Rn is the state vector, u(t) ∈ L 2F (R+, Rnu) is the control input, v(t) ∈
L 2F (R+, R
nv) is the deterministic disturbance, w(t) ∈ R is a one-dimensional wiener pro-
cess and z(t) ∈ Rnz is the controlled output. The inﬁnite-horizon stochastic H2/H∞ control
problem can be stated as follows [Chen and Zhang (2004)],
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Deﬁnition 5.1. Given the disturbance attenuation level γ > 0, to ﬁnd u∗(t)∈L 2F (R+, Rnu)
and a worst-case disturbance v∗(t) ∈L 2F (R+, Rnv) such that
(i) when the optimal state feedback control u∗(t) = K∗x(t) is applied, then
‖L‖∞ := sup
v ∈L 2F (R+, Rnv)
v = 0, x0 = 0
‖z‖
‖v‖
= sup
v ∈L 2F (R+, Rnv)
v = 0, x0 = 0
√
E
[∫ ∞
0
{xTCTCx+uTu}dt
]
√
E
[∫ ∞
0
vT v dt
] < γ, (5.2)
where L(v) =
[
Cx(t,u∗,v,0)
Du∗
]
is called the perturbed operator of (5.1).
(ii) u∗(t) stabilizes the system (5.1) internally, i.e.
lim
t→∞E‖x(t,u
∗,0,x0)‖2 = 0. (5.3)
(iii) when the worst-case disturbance v∗(t) = K∗γ x(t) is applied, u∗(x) minimizes the output
cost
Ju(u,v∗) = ‖z‖22 = E
[∫ ∞
0
{
xTCTCx+uTu
}
dt
]
. (5.4)
Here, worst-case disturbance means
v∗(t) = argmin
v
Jv(u∗,v), (5.5)
with
Jv(u∗,v) = E
[∫ ∞
0
(γ2‖v‖2−‖z‖2)dt
]
. (5.6)
If the above mentioned (u∗(t), v∗(t)) exists, then we say that the inﬁnite-horizon H2/H∞
control admits a pair of solutions.
Remark 5.1. The inﬁnite-horizon stochastic H2/H∞ control strategy pair (u∗(t), v∗(t)) is
associated with the Nash equilibrium strategies.
Lemma 5.1. [Chen and Zhang (2004)] For the system (5.1), suppose the CCSAREs:
XAl +ATl X +A
T
pXAp+XSlX +C
TC = 0, (5.7a)
YAl +ATl Y +A
T
pYAp− γ−2YTY +XSlX +CTC = 0, (5.7b)
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with
Al := A−SlX + γ−2TY, Sl := BBT , T := EET ,
have solutions X > 0, Y > 0. If [A, Ap|C] and [A−γ−2DDTY, Ap|C] are exactly observable,
then the stochastic H2/H∞ control problem admits a solution set:
u∗(t) = K∗x(t) =−BTXx(t), (5.8)
v∗(t) = K∗γ x(t) = γ
−2ETYx(t). (5.9)
Proof. This lemma has been proved earlier as Theorem 2.8 in Chapter 2.
5.3 Problem formulation
Consider a linear stochastic system governed by the Itoˆ differential equation deﬁned by
dx(t) =
[
Ax(t)+
M
∑
i=1
[BLi1uLi1(t)+ . . . +BLiNuLiM(t)]
+
N
∑
j=1
[BF j1uF j1(t)+ . . . +BF jMuF jM(t)]+Dv(t)
]
dt+Apx(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0,
(5.10a)
z(t) = col
[
Cx(t) uc1(t) . . . ucM(t)
]
, (5.10b)
uci(t) = col
[
uLi1(t) . . . uLiN(t) uF1i(t) . . . uFNi(t)
]
, (5.10c)
where x(t) ∈ Rn represents the state vector; z(t) ∈ Rnz represents the controlled output;
uLi j(t)∈RmLi j represents the leader Li’s control input for the follower F j, i= 1, . . . ,M, j=
1, . . . ,N; uF ji(t) ∈ RmF ji represents the follower F j’s control input according to the leader
Li, i = 1, . . . ,M, j = 1, . . . ,N; v(t) ∈ Rmv represents the exogenous disturbance signal;
w(t)∈R represents a one-dimensional standard Wiener process deﬁned in the ﬁltered prob-
ability space (Ω, F , P, Ft) with Ft = σ{w(s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t} [Chen and Zhang (2004)].
Cost functionals of the leaders Li, i = 1, . . . ,M, are given by
JLi (uLi1, . . . ,uLiN , uF1i, . . . ,uFNi, v)
:=
1
2
E
[∫ ∞
0
{
xT (t)QLix(t)+
N
∑
j=1
[
uTLi j(t)RLi juLi j(t)+u
T
F ji(t)RLF jiuF ji(t)
]}
dt
]
,
(5.11)
where QLi = QTLi ≥ 0, RLi j = RTLi j > 0, RLF ji = RTLF ji ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . ,M, j = 1, . . . ,N.
Cost functionals of the followers Fi, i = 1, . . . ,N are given by
JFi (uL1i, . . . ,uLMi, uFi1, . . . ,uFiM, v)
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:=
1
2
E
[∫ ∞
0
{
xT (t)QFix(t)+
M
∑
j=1
[
uTL ji(t)RFL jiuL ji(t)+u
T
Fi j(t)RFi juFi j(t)
]}
dt
]
,
(5.12)
where QF j =QTF j ≥ 0, RFi j = RTFi j > 0 and RFL ji = RTFL ji ≥ 0, i= 1, . . . ,N, j= 1, . . . ,M.
For a two-level incentive Stackelberg game, leaders announce the following incentive strat-
egy to the followers in ahead of time:
uLi j(t) =Λ jix(t)+Ξ jiuF ji(t), i = 1, . . . ,M j = 1, . . . ,N, (5.13)
where the parameters Λ ji and Ξ ji are to be determined associated with the Nash equilib-
rium strategies uF ji(t) of the followers for i, . . . ,M j = 1, . . . ,N. In this game, leaders
will achieve a Nash equilibrium solution attenuating the external disturbance with H∞ con-
straint. The inﬁnite-horizon multi-leader-follower incentive Stackelberg games for linear
stochastic systems with H∞ constraint can be formulated as follows.
For any disturbance attenuation level γ > 0, to ﬁnd, if possible, the state feedback
strategy u∗Li j(t) = Kci jx(t) and u∗F ji(t) = KF jix(t) such that
(i) the trajectory of the closed-loop system (5.10) satisﬁes the Nash equilibrium condi-
tions (5.14a) of the leaders with H∞ constraint condition (5.14b):
JLi(u∗c1, . . . ,u
∗
cM, v
∗)≤ JLi(γ∗−i(uci)), v∗), (5.14a)
0≤ Jv(u∗c1, . . . ,u∗cM, v∗)≤ Jv(u∗c1, . . . ,u∗cM, v), (5.14b)
where i = 1, . . . ,M,
Jv(uc1, . . . ,ucM, v) = E
[∫ ∞
0
{
γ2‖v(t)‖2−‖z(t)‖2
}
dt
]
, (5.15)
‖z(t)‖2 = xT (t)CTCx(t)+
M
∑
i=1
uTci(t)uci(t), (5.16)
∀ v(t) = 0 ∈ Rmv ,
(ii) with a worst-case disturbance v∗(t) ∈ Rmv , follower’s decision u∗F ji(t)) ∈ RmF ji; i =
1, . . . ,M, j = 1, . . . ,N satisﬁes the following Nash equilibrium conditions:
JF j(u∗F1, . . . ,u
∗
FN , v
∗)≤ JF j(γ∗− j(uˆF j)), v∗), (5.17)
where
uˆF j(t) = col
[
uF j1(t) . . . uF jM(t)
]
, j = 1, . . . ,N.
It should be noted that uLi j(t) depend on uF ji(t) according to the incentive Stackelberg
structures assumed in (5.13).
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Remark 5.2. If the inequality (5.14b) holds, we say that it satisﬁes the condition for H∞
constraint,
‖L‖∞ = sup
v∈Rmv , v=0, x0=0
‖z‖2
‖v‖2 < γ. (5.18)
A set of decision (u∗c1(t), . . . ,u
∗
cM(t),v
∗) is said to constitute a Nash equilibrium solu-
tion for a two-level hierarchical game with H∞ constraint.
Without loss of generality, some assumptions for the following decision process are
made [Basar and Selbuz (1979), Mizukami and Wu (1987)].
Assumption 5.1. Leader Li announces his/her own strategy of the feedback pattern (5.13)
ahead of time to the followers F j as the incentive strategies.
Assumption 5.2. Followers F j decide their optimal strategies once they know the strategy
announced by Li.
Assumption 5.3. Li and Fj at the same level act non-cooperatively and they decide Nash
equilibrium.
5.4 Main results
Let us deﬁne the space of admissible strategies for the players Li j by ΓLi j and for the
players F ji by ΓF ji, i = 1, . . . ,M, j = 1, . . . ,N. For each pair (uLi j, uF ji) ∈ ΓLi j ×ΓF ji,
it is supposed that the linear stochastic systems (5.10) has a unique solution on 0 ≤ t < ∞
for all x0 ∈ Rn and the values of JLi and JF j are well deﬁned.
5.4.1 Leader’s Nash equilibrium strategy
First, the H∞ constraint Nash equilibrium solutions (u∗c1(t), . . . ,u
∗
cM(t),v
∗) for the leaders
are investigated. By composing the stochastic system (5.10a), the following centralized
systems can be obtained.
dx(t) =
[
Ax(t)+
M
∑
i=1
Bciuci(t)+Dv(t)
]
dt+Apx(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0, (5.19)
where
Bci =
[
BLi1 . . . BLiN BF1i . . . BFNi
]
, i = 1, . . . ,M.
Furthermore, the cost functional (5.11) can be modiﬁed as
JLi (uci(t)) =
1
2
E
[∫ ∞
0
{
xT (t)QLix(t)+uTci(t)Rciuci(t)
}
dt
]
, i = 1, . . . ,M, (5.20)
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where
Rci = block diag
[
RLi1 . . . RLiN RLF1i . . . RLFNi
]
.
Therefore, for the Nash equilibrium solution with H∞ constraint, the following result
can be obtained from Lemma 5.1.
For the system (5.19), suppose the CCSAREs:
PciAc+ATc Pci+A
T
pPciAp+PciSciPci+QLi = 0, (5.21a)
WAc+ATc W +A
T
pWAp− γ−2WTW +QL = 0, (5.21b)
with
Ac := A−
M
∑
i=1
SciPci+ γ−2TW, Sci := BciR−1ci B
T
ci, T := DD
T , QL =
M
∑
i=1
PciSciPci+CTC,
have solutions Pci > 0, W > 0. If [A, Ap|C] and [A− γ−2DDTW, Ap|C] are exactly observ-
able, then the stochastic H∞ constraint problem admits a solution set:[
u∗ci(t)
v∗(t)
]
=
[
K∗ci
K∗γ
]
x(t) =
[−R−1ci BTciPci
γ−2DTW
]
x(t), (5.22)
where
K∗ci =
[
K∗TLi1 . . . K
∗T
LiN K
∗T
F1i . . . K
∗T
FNi
]T
, i = 1, . . . ,M.
It should be noted that the relation between Λ ji and Ξ ji, i = 1, . . . ,M, j = 1, . . . ,N can
be derived from (5.13) as
Λ ji = K∗Li j−Ξ jiK∗F ji,
=−R−1Li jBTLi jPci+Ξ jiR−1LF jiBTF jiPci, i = 1, . . . ,M, j = 1, . . . ,N. (5.23)
So, the leader’s incentive Stackelberg strategy for the followers can be determined by
uLi j(t) =
[
K∗Li j−Ξ jiK∗F ji(t)
]
x(t)+Ξ jiuF ji(t),
=K∗Li jx(t)+Ξ ji
[
uF ji−K∗F ji(t)x(t)
]
i = 1, . . . ,M, j = 1, . . . ,N. (5.24)
To determine Ξ ji, i = 1, . . . ,M, j = 1, . . . ,N, which satisfy (5.13), let us consider
the following optimization problem.
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5.4.2 Follower’s Nash equilibrium strategy
To establish the Nash equilibrium for the followers according to the leader’s incentive
Stackelberg strategy (5.13) and worst-case disturbance v∗(t), we get the following system
from the system (5.10a),
dx(t) =
[
Ax(t)+
N
∑
i=1
[BFi1uFi1(t)+ . . . +BFiMuFiM(t)]
+
M
∑
j=1
[BL j1uL j1(t)+ . . . +BL jNuL jN(t)]+Dv(t)
]
dt+Apx(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0,
=
[
Ax(t)+
N
∑
i=1
[BFi1uFi1(t)+ . . . +BFiMuFiM(t)]
+
M
∑
j=1
[BL j1(Λ1 jx(t)+Ξ1 juF1 j(t))+ . . . +BL jN(ΛN jx(t)+ΞN juFN j(t))]
+ γ−2DDTWx(t)
]
dt+Apx(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0,
=
[
Aˆx(t)+
N
∑
i=1
BˆFiuˆFi(t)
]
dt+Apx(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0, (5.25)
where
Aˆ := A+
M
∑
j=1
[BL j1Λ1 j + . . . +BL jNΛN j]+ γ−2DDTW,
uˆFi := col
[
uFi1 . . . uFiM
]
,
BˆFi :=
[
B¯Fi1 . . . B¯FiM
]
,
B¯Fi j := BFi j +BL jiΞi j, i = 1, . . . ,N, j = 1, . . . ,M.
The cost functional of i-th follower can written as
JFi (uL1i, . . . ,uLMi, uFi1, . . . ,uFiM, v)
=
1
2
E
[∫ ∞
0
{
xT (t)QFix(t)+
M
∑
j=1
[
[Λi jx(t)+Ξi juFi j(t)]TRFL ji[Λi jx(t)+Ξi juFi j(t)]
+uTFi j(t)RFi juFi j(t)
]}
dt
]
, i = 1, . . . ,N, (5.26)
or, equivalently,
JFi(uˆFi) =
1
2
E
[∫ ∞
0
{
xT (t)QˆFix(t)+2xT (t)SˆFiuˆFi(t)+ uˆTFi(t)RˆFiuˆFi(t)
}
dt
]
, (5.27)
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where
QˆFi := QFi+
M
∑
j=1
ΛTi jRFL jiΛi j,
RˆFi := block diag
[
R¯Fi1 . . . R¯FiM
]
,
R¯Fi j := RFi j +ΞTi jRFL jiΞi j,
SˆFi :=
[
S¯Fi1 . . . S¯FiM
]
,
S¯Fi j := ΛTi jRFL jiΞi j, i = 1, . . . ,N, j = 1, . . . ,M.
It should be noted that there exists a cross-coupling term 2xT (t)SˆFiuˆFi(t) in the cost
functional (5.27). By using the technique similar to the one used in the stochastic optimal
control problem [Chen and Zhang (2004)], follower’s Nash strategy uFi(t) = uˆFi(t) can be
obtained.
uˆFi(t) =−Rˆ−1Fi (PFiBˆFi+ SˆFi)T x(t) = K†Fix(t) =
⎡
⎢⎣K
†
Fi1x(t)
...
K†FiMx(t)
⎤
⎥⎦ (5.28)
where
K†Fi =−Rˆ−1Fi (PFiBˆFi+ SˆFi)T , (5.29)
and PFi, i = 1, . . . N are the symmetric non-negative solution of the following CCSAREs:
PFiAFi+ATFiPFi+A
T
pPFiAp− (PFiBˆFi+ SˆFi)Rˆ−1Fi (PFiBˆFi+ SˆFi)T + QˆFi = 0, (5.30)
where
AFi = Aˆ+
N
∑
k=1, k =i
BˆFkK
†
Fk, i = 1, . . . ,N. (5.31)
Furthermore, from (5.22) we can ﬁnd
K∗cFi =
⎡
⎢⎣K
∗
Fi1
...
K∗FiM
⎤
⎥⎦=
⎡
⎢⎣ −R
−1
LFi1B
T
Fi1Pc1
...
−R−1LFiMBTFiMPcM
⎤
⎥⎦ i = 1, . . . ,N. (5.32)
Furthermore, Ξi j satisﬁes the equivalence relation K∗cFi ≡ K†Fi can establish from (5.29) and
(5.32) as follows: ⎡
⎢⎣ −R
−1
LFi1B
T
Fi1Pc1
...
−R−1LFiMBTFiMPcM
⎤
⎥⎦=−Rˆ−1Fi (PFiBˆFi+ SˆFi)T . (5.33)
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Equivalently,⎡
⎢⎣RFi1+Ξ
T
i1RFL1iΞi1
. . .
RFiM +ΞTiMRFLMiΞiM
⎤
⎥⎦
⎡
⎢⎣ R
−1
LFi1B
T
Fi1Pc1
...
R−1LFiMB
T
FiMPcM
⎤
⎥⎦
=
⎡
⎢⎣
(
BTFi1+Ξ
T
i1B
T
L1i
)
PFi
...(
BTFiM +ΞTiMBTLMi
)
PFi
⎤
⎥⎦+
⎡
⎢⎣ Ξ
T
i1RFL1iΛi1
...
ΞTiMRFLMiΛiM
⎤
⎥⎦ . (5.34)
Comparing each rows from both sides of (5.34), we get
[RFi j +ΞTi jRFL jiΞi j]R
−1
LFi jB
T
Fi jPc j = B
T
Fi jPFi+Ξ
T
i jB
T
L jiPFi+Ξ
T
i jRFL jiΛi j. (5.35)
By using relation (5.23) for Λi j, we get
RFi jR−1LFi jB
T
Fi jPc j +Ξ
T
i jRFL jiΞi jR
−1
LFi jB
T
Fi jPc j =
BTFi jPFi+Ξ
T
i jB
T
L jiPFi−ΞTi jRFL jiR−1L jiBTL jiPc j +ΞTi jRFL jiΞi jR−1LFi jBTFi jPc j. (5.36)
Canceling the term ΞTi jRFL jiΞi jR
−1
LFi jB
T
Fi jPc j from both sides of (5.36) we get
RFi jR−1LFi jB
T
Fi jPc j = B
T
Fi jPFi+Ξ
T
i jB
T
L jiPFi−ΞTi jRFL jiR−1L jiBTL jiPc j, (5.37)
and after simpliﬁcation, the following MAEs can be found:
ΞTi j(B
T
L jiPFi−RFL jiR−1L jiBTL jiPc j) = RFi jR−1LFi jBTFi jPci−BTFi jPFi, i = 1, . . . ,N, j = 1, . . . ,M.
(5.38)
Remark 5.3. It should be noted that the incentive parameter Ξi j can be uniquely deter-
mined if and only if (BTL jiPFi−RFL jiR−1L jiBTL jiPc j) is non-singular.
Theorem 5.1. Suppose that the CCSAREs in (5.21), CCSAREs (5.30) and the MAEs (5.38)
have solutions. Then the strategy-set (5.13) under (5.22) and (5.29) constitutes the two-
level incentive Stackelberg strategies with H∞ constraint.
5.5 Numerical example
In order to demonstrate the efﬁciency of our proposed strategies, a numerical example is
investigated. Let us consider the following system matrices:
A =
[
0.92 0
1.23 −2.9
]
, Ap = 0.1A,
BL11 =
[
0.13 0.20
−0.55 0.81
]
, BL12 =
[
0.31 1.20
−1.25 1.02
]
,
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BL21 =
[
0.28 0.12
5.32 0
]
, BL22 =
[
0.12 0.56
1.0 0.32
]
,
BF11 =
[
0.15 −0.11
0.55 1.32
]
, BF12 =
[
0.51 0.54
0.21 1.21
]
,
BF21 =
[
0.23 −0.45
0.28 2.96
]
, BF22 =
[
0.21 0.21
2.11 1.86
]
,
D =
[
0.054 0.043
0.023 0.013
]
, C =
[
1 2
]
,
QL1 = diag
[
1 2
]
, QL2 = diag
[
3.1 2.4
]
,
QF1 = diag
[
2.1 1.3
]
, QF2 = diag
[
1.3 4.2
]
,
RL11 = diag
[
1.5 2.5
]
, RL12 = diag
[
1.5 2.2
]
,
RL21 = diag
[
2.1 1.3
]
, RL22 = diag
[
2.1 2.2
]
,
RF11 = diag
[
2.3 1.1
]
, RF12 = diag
[
1.8 4.2
]
,
RF21 = diag
[
3.1 2.1
]
, RF22 = diag
[
3.1 1.2
]
,
RLF11 = diag
[
1.5 2.5
]
, RLF12 = diag
[
2.1 1.2
]
,
RLF21 = diag
[
2.1 1.3
]
, RLF22 = diag
[
1.5 2.4
]
,
RFL11 = diag
[
2.3 1.1
]
, RFL12 = diag
[
1.9 1.2
]
,
RFL21 = diag
[
3.1 2.1
]
, RFL22 = diag
[
1.4 6.2
]
,
We choose the disturbance attenuation level as γ = 5. First, the CCAREs (5.21) are solved.
These solutions attain the H∞-constrained Nash equilibrium solutions set (5.22) as given
below:
Pc1 =
[
7.0074e-1 −7.3498e-2
−7.3498e-2 1.3855e-1
]
,
Pc2 =
[
2.6369e+0 −8.4572e-3
−8.4572e-3 1.9503e-1
]
,
W =
[
1.7829e+0 1.6902e-1
1.6902e-1 3.0249e-1
]
,
Kc1 =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
−8.7680e-2 5.7171e-2
−3.2246e-2 −3.9010e-2
−2.0607e-1 1.3065e-1
−3.4815e-1 −2.4146e-2
−4.3125e-2 −4.3451e-2
6.9640e-2 −7.6388e-2
−6.6948e-2 −1.0423e-2
4.0991e-1 −3.4091e-1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
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Kc2 =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
−3.3016e-1 −4.9294e-1
−2.4341e-1 7.8066e-4
−1.4665e-1 −9.2387e-2
−6.6999e-1 −2.6215e-2
−6.3955e-1 −1.7449e-2
−1.1781e+0 −1.9285e-1
−3.5727e-1 −2.7315e-1
−2.2418e-1 −1.5041e-1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
Kγ =
[
4.0065e-3 6.4338e-4
3.1544e-3 4.4801e-4
]
,
Second, the CCAREs (5.30) and the MAEs (5.38) are solved as follows:
PF1 =
[
3.2114e+0 5.0554e-2
5.0554e-2 1.3704e-1
]
,
PF2 =
[
2.0458e+0 −1.0578e-1
−1.0578e-1 2.9737e-1
]
,
Ξ11 =
[
1.6632e+0 −2.9164e+0
−1.1162e+0 1.1706e+0
]
,
Ξ12 =
[
6.9087e-2 −1.0437e+0
4.0327e+0 −2.6264e+1
]
,
Ξ21 =
[
4.7540e-2 1.3001e+0
−1.3020e-1 −5.9341e-2
]
,
Ξ22 =
[
1.2908e+0 −2.2264e+0
−3.2405e-1 3.6127e-2
]
.
Finally, the remaining parameter matrix (5.23) can be determined as,
Λ11=
[
1.8714e-1 −9.3337e-2
−1.6190e-1 1.9065e-3
]
,
Λ12 =
[−7.3580e-1 5.7434e-1
−3.3254e-1 −4.5733e-2
]
,
Λ21 =
[−1.5156e+0 −6.9301e-1
−2.8605e+1 −4.9937e+0
]
,
Λ22 =
[−1.8459e-1 −7.4664e-2
−7.7766e-1 −1.0930e-1
]
.
The MATLAB code is developed on the basis of Lyapunov iterations which converges to
the required solutions of CCSAREs (5.30) with an accuracy of 1.0e− 12 order after 76
iterations. It should be noted that the incentive strategy (5.13) that will be announced by
the leader can calculated at this time.
Through this incentive, the follower will select the same strategy-set by applying the
standard LQ theory,
uFi j(t) =−R¯−1Fi j(PFiB¯Fi j + S¯i j)T x(t). (5.39)
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Fig. 5.2: Trajectory of the state x(t).
Namely, it can be conﬁrmed that the followers take the Nash equilibrium solution with H∞
constraint eventually. Finally, the response is depicted in Fig. 5.2. As a result, it can be
observed that the state attains the mean-square stable.
5.6 Conclusion
This chapter investigates the incentive Stackelberg game for continuous-time stochastic
systems. The multiple leaders and multiple followers in an incentive Starkberg game are
the main features of this chapter. For this game, leaders implement Nash equilibrium in
their own group. In the followers’ group, players are supposed to be non-cooperative;
subsequently, Nash equilibrium is investigated.
A deterministic disturbance input, multiple non-cooperative leaders, and multiple non-
cooperative followers have also been considered in this chapter which is different from the
previous chapters. An incentive structure is developed in such a way that leaders achieve
Nash solution attenuating the disturbance under H∞ constraint. Simultaneously, followers
achieve their Nash equilibrium ensuring the incentive Stackelberg strategies of the leaders
while the worst-case disturbance is considered. As far as we know, this is the ﬁrst time
study for a linear stochastic system with H∞ constraint involving such multi-leader-follower
complicated structure.
This chapter studies the most common linear quadratic (LQ) optimal control in the
game problems. Results based on only inﬁnite time domains are shown in this chapter. A
computational algorithm based on Lyapunov iterations is used to solve some matrix-valued
algebraic equations. In this study, some CCAREs and MAEs in the inﬁnite-horizon case
were established, so that the incentive Stackelberg strategy can be achieved with an easy
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numerical simulation. Several theorems and lemmas are designed to study the incentive
Stackelberg game problems. In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed
method, a numerical example is demonstrated with the state trajectory ﬁgure.
However, the structure of the game is complex, this chapter only investigates the incen-
tive Stackelberg game with state feedback. This complex structure with output feedback
will make the game more interesting in further research. In addition, Markov jump param-
eters in this study have not been fully investigated and this will be converged in the future
study. Finally, a lot of matrix variables are needed to solve the multi-player game problem
that takes up a lot of computer memory. Therefore, the number of players can be increased
in such a limit so that the computer memory does not fail.
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Chapter 6
H∞-Constrained Pareto Optimal
Strategy for Stochastic LPV Systems
with Multiple Decision Makers
This chapter is based on a previously published article [Ahmed et al. (2018)].
6.1 Introduction
The dynamic games and the many related applications in practical control problems have
been widely investigated by several researchers (see, e.g., [Bas¸ar and Bernhard (2008),
Bas¸ar and Olsder (1999), Engwerda (2005)], and references therein). Starting from the de-
terministic cases for the continuous and discrete-time, systems have been extended to the
stochastic case. Moreover, recent advances in the game theory for a class of stochastic
systems revisit the robust and multi-objective control problems [Chen and Zhang (2004),
Zhang et al. (2008), Huang et al. (2008)]. The stochastic dynamic games can be solved
even if the systems dynamics include a noisy process known as the Wiener process. Addi-
tionally, the inﬂuence of the deterministic disturbance in the systems model can be reduced
by applying the H∞ control method. Although these results comprise an elegant theory
and despite the possibility of obtaining an equilibrium strategy-set, the treatment of uncer-
tainties in the systems state equations continue to remain an issue to be considered in the
dynamic games. In other words, the essential core implementation of this strategy-set will
determine the notations of the system’s unmodeled dynamics.
In robust control design and synthesis, there exists a wide class of dynamic systems
that are subject to arbitrary smooth or discontinuous variations in the systems uncertain-
ties. In order to capture these variations in the parameters, linear parameter varying (LPV)
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systems are reliable to model a large number of parameter variations and these systems of-
fer adequate mathematical models for numerous and phenomena [Apkarian et al. (1995)].
The gain-scheduled design technique is among the most popular methods for designing a
robust control by adjusting the scheduling parameters, which describe the changes in plant
dynamics. With the maturity of gain-scheduling (GS) control, several results have been
reported across various control ﬁelds [Sato (2011), Mahmoud (2002), Ku and Wu (2015),
Rotondo (2015)]. Stability and H∞-ﬁltering problems for a class of LPV discrete-time
systems in which the state-space matrices depend afﬁnely on time-varying parameters
have been investigated in [Mahmoud (2002)]. A new design method for Gain-Scheduled
Output Feedback (GSOF) controllers for continuous-time LPV systems via parameter-
dependent Lyapunov functions has been tackled in [Sato (2011)]. A GS controller design
method has been proposed for LPV stochastic systems subject to H∞ performance con-
straint [Ku and Wu (2015)]. Linear quadratic control (LQC) using linear matrix inequali-
ties (LMls) to LPV systems has been extended [Rotondo (2015)]. Although fruitful results
on LPV control design can be found in recent publications, most of them are focused on
one control input as a unique decision maker. Considering the fact that the game theory in
robust control has become a priority research topic, investigation of the stochastic dynamic
games for LPV systems with multiple decision makers is extremely attractive.
Chapter 6 discusses the Pareto optimal strategy for stochastic LPV system with multi-
ple decision makers. In the dynamic game of uncertain stochastic systems, multiple par-
ticipants can be used for more realistic plants. The system includes disturbances that
are attenuated under the H∞ constraint. This chapter can be seen as an extension of
[Mukaidani (2017a)]. This is because the ﬁxed gain controller is also considered here to
understand the practical implementation. In this chapter, we design a method for Pareto op-
timal solution that satisﬁes the H∞ norm condition. We redesigned the stochastic bounded
real lemma [Ku and Wu (2015)] and the linear quadratic control [Rotondo (2015)] to ﬁnd
the solution. Solvability conditions are established using LMIs. For multiple decision mak-
ers, a Pareto optimal strategy-set is designed. The Pareto optimal strategy-set can be found
by solving a set of cross-coupling matrix inequalities (CCMI). Academic and practical nu-
merical examples are provided to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed model of
the LPV system. In the practical point of view, the advantages of the method proposed in
this chapter are:
• to alleviate of propagation of uncertainty in stochastic plants;
• to operte linear time-invariant (LTI) plants subject to time-varying parametric uncer-
tainty θ(t);
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• they can be modeled with linear time-varying plants or linearized by nonlinear plants
along the trajectory of parameter θ ;
• to explain the time-varying nature of the plant through gain-scheduling techniques;
• to process the whole parameter range of the plant with one shot without performing
extensive simulation;
• to develop worst-case controller design of linear plants with additive disturbances
and plant uncertainties, including problems of disturbance attenuation;
• to minimize multi-objective optimization plant-size and maximize target coverage
with Pareto approach.
Notation: The notations used in this Chapter are fairly standard. E[·] denotes the expecta-
tion operator. In denotes the n× n identity matrix. ‖ · ‖ denotes the Euclidean norm of a
matrix. L2F([0, ∞], Rk) denotes the space of nonanticipative stochastic process φ(t) ∈ Rk
with respect to an increasing σ -algebras Ft , t ≥ 0 satisfying E[
∫ ∞
0 ‖φ(t)‖2dt]< ∞.
6.2 Preliminaries
Consider the following stochastic LPV system.
dx(t) = [A(θ(t))x(t)+Bu(t)+Dv(t)]dt+Ap(θ(t))x(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0, (6.1a)
z(t) = E(θ(t))x(t), (6.1b)
where x(t) ∈ Rn denotes the state vector. u(t) ∈ Rm denotes the control input.
v(t) ∈ Rnv denotes the external disturbance. z(t) ∈ Rnz denotes the controlled out-
put. w(t) ∈ R denotes a one-dimensional standard Wiener process deﬁned in the ﬁl-
tered probability space [Chen and Zhang (2004), Zhang et al. (2008), Huang et al. (2008),
Rami and Zhou (2000)]. θ(t)∈Rr denotes the time-varying parameters. r is the number of
time-varying parameters. It is assumed that the stochastic system (6.1) has a unique strong
solution x(t) = x˜(t,x(0)) [Arapostathis et al. (2010)]. The coefﬁcient matrices A(θ(t)) and
Ap(θ(t)) are parameter dependent matrices and these matrices can be expressed as
[
A(θ(t)) Ap(θ(t))
]
=
M
∑
k=1
αk(t)
[
Ak Apk
]
, (6.2a)
E(θ(t)) =
M
∑
k=1
αk(t)Ek, (6.2b)
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where αk(t)≥ 0, ∑Mk=1 αk(t) = 1, M = 2r.
It should be noted that for simplifying the context of this Chapter, the above-mentioned
descriptions are used. Furthermore, many problems involving the synthesis of controllers
in the case of a constant B can be reformulated as a varying B(θ) involving augmented
plants [Rotondo (2015)]. The following deﬁnition on stochastic stability will be needed.
Deﬁnition 6.1. [Ku and Wu (2015)] A stochastic LPV autonomous system governed by the
Itoˆ differential equotion (6.1) without u(t) is called mean square stable if the trajectories
satisfy
lim
t→∞E[‖x(t)‖
2] = 0,
for any initial condition.
The H∞ norm, which is an essential assumption, is introduced in [Ku and Wu (2015)].
Deﬁnition 6.2. The H∞ norm of stochastic LPV autonomous system (6.1) with mean square
stable is given by
‖L‖2∞ = sup
v ∈ L2F ([0, ∞), Rnv ),
v = 0, x0 = 0
Jz
Jv
, (6.3)
where
Jz := E
[∫ ∞
0
‖z(t)‖2dt
]
,
Jv := E
[∫ ∞
0
‖v(t)‖2dt
]
.
Lemma 6.1. Let us consider an autonomous system such that u(t)≡ 0. For a given atten-
uation performance level γ > 0, if there exists matrix Z > 0 satisfying the following linear
matrix inequalities (LMIs) (6.4), the stochastic LPV system (6.1) is mean square stable with
‖L‖∞ < γ under x0 = 0.
Γk :=
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
ZAk+ATk Z ZD A
T
pkZ E
T
k
DTZ −γ2Inv 0 0
ZApk 0 −Z 0
Ek 0 0 −Inz
⎤
⎥⎥⎦< 0, k = 1, · · · ,M. (6.4)
Moreover, the worst-case disturbance is given by
v∗(t) = γ−2DTZx(t). (6.5)
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Proof. The following parameter independent Lyapunov function is chosen:
Vv(x(t)) =Vv(x) = xT (t)Zx(t), (6.6)
where Z = ZT > O.
The following derivation can be obtained along the trajectories of the stochastic LPV
system (6.1) by using Itoˆ’s formula.
dVv(x) = LVv(x)dt+2xTATp (θ)Zxdw(t), (6.7)
where
LVv(x) := xT
(
ZA(θ)+AT (θ)Z+ATp (θ)ZAp(θ)x
)
+2xTZDv.
In this case, we have the following.
LVv(x)− γ2‖v‖2+‖z‖2
= xTΦ(θ)x− γ2 (v− γ−2DTZx)T (v− γ−2DTZx) , (6.8)
where
Φ(θ) := ZA(θ)+AT (θ)Z+ATp (θ)ZAp(θ)+E
T (θ)E(θ)+ γ−2ZDDTZ.
Hence, if
v(t) = v∗(t) =−γ−2DTZx(t)
holds, we have
LVv(x)− γ2‖v‖2+‖z‖2 ≤ xTΦ(θ)x. (6.9)
Thus, the worst-case disturbance (6.5) can be obtained. Moreover, Φ(θ)< 0 is equivalent
to the following LMI by using the Schur complement.
Λ(θ(t)) :=
[
Ψ(θ) ZD
DTZ −γ2Inv
]
, (6.10)
where
Ψ(θ) := ZA(θ)+AT (θ)Z+ATp (θ)ZAp(θ)+E
T (θ)E(θ).
By integrating and taking the expectation both sides of the equality (6.7) from 0 to t f , the
following equation holds under the assumption that LVv(x)−γ2‖v‖2+‖z‖2 < xTΦ(θ)x< 0
from (6.8):
E
[∫ t f
0
dVv(x)
]
=Vv(x(t f ))−Vv(x(0)) =Vv(x(t f ))
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< E
[∫ t f
0
γ2‖v(t)‖2+‖z(t)‖2
]
. (6.11)
From (6.11), it is easy to see that if Λ(θ) < 0 then ‖L‖∞ < γ because Jz < γ2Jv and
Vv(x(t f )) > 0 as t f → 0. Therefore, Λ(θ) < 0 is considered. By applying the Schur com-
plement, inequality (6.10) is seen to be equivalent to the LMI as
Λ(θ(t)) :=
[
Ψ(θ) ZD
DTZ −γ2Inv
]
< 0,
which implies[
ZA(θ)+AT (θ)Z+ATp (θ)ZAp(θ)+ET (θ)E(θ) ZD
DTZ −γ2Inv
]
< 0,[
ZA(θ)+AT (θ)Z ZD
DTZ −γ2Inv
]
+
[
ATp (θ)ZAp(θ)+ET (θ)E(θ) 0
0 0
]
< 0,[
ZA(θ)+AT (θ)Z ZD
DTZ −γ2Inv
]
−
[
ATp (θ)Z ET (θ)
0 0
][ −Z 0
0 −Inz
]−1[ ZAp(θ) 0
E(θ) 0
]
< 0,⎡
⎢⎢⎣
ZA(θ)+AT (θ)Z ZD ATp (θ)Z ET (θ)
DTZ −γ2Inv 0 0
ZAp(θ) 0 −Z 0
E(θ) 0 0 −Inz
⎤
⎥⎥⎦< 0,
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
ZA(θ)+AT (θ)Z ZD ATp (θ)Z ET (θ)
DTZ −γ2Inv 0 0
ZAp(θ) 0 −Z 0
E(θ) 0 0 −Inz
⎤
⎥⎥⎦< 0. (6.12)
If the parameter dependent coefﬁcient matrices are changed by applying (6.2), the inequal-
ity (6.12) can be written as follows:
Γk :=
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
ZAk+ATk Z ZD A
T
pkZ E
T
k
DTZ −γ2Inv 0 0
ZApk 0 −Z 0
Ek 0 0 −Inz
⎤
⎥⎥⎦< 0, k = 1, · · · ,M.
Thus, the proof of Lemma 6.1 is completed.
On the other hand, the standard linear quadratic control (LQC) problem for the stochas-
tic LPV system with v(t)≡ 0 or D(θ(t))≡ 0 is given [Rotondo (2015)].
Deﬁnition 6.3. Let us consider the stochastic LPV system with v(t) ≡ 0 in (6.1). The
following cost performance is deﬁned by
J(u, x0) = E
[∫ ∞
0
[xT (t)Qx(t)+uT (t)Ru(t)]dt
]
, (6.13)
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where Q = QT > 0 and R = RT > 0.
In this situation, the LQC problem is to ﬁnd a state feedback control
u(t) = K(θ(t))x(t) =
M
∑
k=1
αk(t)Kkx(t) (6.14)
such that the quadratic cost functional (6.13) is minimized.
Lemma 6.2. If there exists the matrix X > 0 and Yk, k = 1, · · · , M satisfying the LMI
(6.15): ⎡
⎢⎢⎣
Ξk X YTk XA
T
pk
X −Q−1 0 0
Yk 0 −R−1 0
ApkX 0 0 −X
⎤
⎥⎥⎦< 0, (6.15a)
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
Ξkl X YTkl XA
T
pkl
X −12Q−1 0 0
Ykl 0 −12R−1 0
ApklX 0 0 −12X
⎤
⎥⎥⎦< 0, (6.15b)
where
k < l, k = 1, · · · ,M,
Ξk = AkX +XATk +BYk+Y
T
k B
T ,
Ξkl = (Ak+Al)X +X(Ak+Al)T +BYk+YTk B
T +BYl +YTl B
T ,
Kk = YkX−1, Kl = YlX−1,
Apkl :=
1
2
(Apk+Apl),
Ykl :=
1
2
(Yk+ yl),
then
u(t) =
M
∑
k=1
αk(t)Kkx(t) =
M
∑
k=1
αk(t)YkX−1x(t), (6.16a)
J(u, x0)< E
[
xT (0)X−1x(0)
]
. (6.16b)
Proof. First, the following parameter independent Lyapunov function is introduced:
Vu(x(t)) =Vu(x) = xT (t)Px(t), (6.17)
where P = PT > 0 with P = X−1.
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Let us consider the closed-loop stochastic LPV system With the control (6.14). By
using a similar technique to that in [Mukaidani (2009)], if there exists P > 0 such that
P(A(θ)+BK(θ))+(A(θ)+BK(θ))TP
+ATp (θ)PAp(θ)+Q+K
T (θ)RK(θ)< 0, (6.18)
then, the following equation holds.
J(u, x0)< E
[
xT (0)Px(0)
]
(6.19)
In this case, by rearranging equation (6.18), we have the following.
M
∑
k=1
α2k
(
P(Ak+BKk)+(Ak+BKk)TP+ATpkPApk+Q+K
T
k RKk
)
+
M−1
∑
k=1
M
∑
l=k+1
αkαl
(
PGkl +GTklP+Hkl +2Q+Tkl
)
< 0, (6.20)
where
Gkl := Ak+BKk+Al +BKl,
Hkl := ATpkPApl +A
T
plPApk,
Tkl := KTk RKl +K
T
l RKk.
On the other hand, applying Schur complement on the inequality (6.15a) and (6.15b), the
following matrix inequalities hold.
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
AkX +XATk +BYk+Y
T
k B
T X YTk XA
T
pk
X −Q−1 0 0
Yk 0 −R−1 0
ApkX 0 0 −X
⎤
⎥⎥⎦< 0, (6.21a)
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
(Ak+Al)X +X(Ak+Al)T +BYk
+YTk B
T +BYl +YTl B
T X YTkl XA
T
pkl
X −12Q−1 0 0
Ykl 0 −12R−1 0
ApklX 0 0 −12X
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦< 0, (6.21b)
where
Kk := YkX−1,
Kl := YlX−1,
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Apkl :=
1
2
(Apk+Apl),
Ykl :=
1
2
(Yk+ yl).
Or, ⎡
⎣ AkX +XATk+BYk+YTk BT X
X −Q−1
⎤
⎦−[YTk XATpk
0 0
][−R−1 0
0 −X
]−1[ Yk 0
ApkX 0
]
< 0, (6.22a)
[
(Ak+Al)X +X(Ak+Al)T +BYk+YTk B
T +BYl +YTl B
T X
X −12Q−1
]
−
[
YTkl XA
T
pkl
0 0
][−12R−1 0
0 −12X
]−1[
Ykl 0
ApklX 0
]
< 0, (6.22b)
where
Kk = YkX−1, Kl = YlX−1, Apkl :=
1
2
(Apk+Apl), Ykl :=
1
2
(Yk+ yl).
Or,
AkX +XATk +BYk+Y
T
k B
T +XQ−1X +YTk RYk+A
T
pkXApk < 0, (6.23a)
(Ak+Al)X +X(Ak+Al)T +BYk+YTk B
T +BYl +YTl B
T
+X
1
2
Q−1X +
1
2
YTkl RYkl +
1
2
ATpklXApkl < 0, (6.23b)
where
Kk = YkX−1, Kl = YlX−1, Apkl :=
1
2
(Apk+Apl), Ykl :=
1
2
(Yk+ yl).
Pre- and post- multiplying both sides on inequality (6.23) by P yields,
P(Ak+BKk)+(Ak+BKk)TP+ATpkPApk+Q+K
T
k RKk < 0, (6.24a)
PGkl +GTklP+2A
T
pklPApkl +2Q+2
(
Kk+Kl
2
)T
·R · Kk+Kl
2
< 0, (6.24b)
where Kk = YkX−l = YkP.
Furthermore, it is well known that the following inequalities hold.
2ATpklPApkl ≥ Hkl, (6.25a)
2
(
Kk+Kl
2
)T
·R · Kk+Kl
2
≥ Tkl. (6.25b)
Hence, inequality (21b) can be changed as follows.
PGkl +GTklP+Hkl +2Q+Tkl < 0. (6.26)
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Thus, if inequalities (6.24a) and (6.26) are satisﬁed, then inequality (6.20) holds. In other
words, if inequalities (6.15a) and (6.15b) are satisﬁed, then (6.18) holds and this inequality
implies the cost bound (6.16b).
It should be noted that the obtained result corresponding to Lemma 6.1 is
not a necessary and sufﬁcient condition as compared with the existing result of
[Apkarian et al. (1995)] but the conditions of (6.15) are the sufﬁcient conditions.
6.3 Problem Formulation
Consider a stochastic LPV system governed by Itoˆ differential equation with multiple de-
cision makers deﬁned by
dx(t) =
[
A(θ(t))x(t)+
N
∑
j=1
Bju j(t)+Dv(t)
]
dt+Ap(θ(t))x(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0, (6.27a)
z(t) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
E(θ(t))x(t)
G1u1(t))
...
GNuN(t)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ , (6.27b)
where ui(t) ∈ Rmi , i = 1, · · · ,N denote the i-th control inputs. Other variables are deﬁned
by stochastic equation (6.1). It should be noted that Gi does not depend on the time-varying
parameter because the controlled output can be chosen by the controller designer. Hence,
without loss of generality, it may be assumed that Gi is a constant matrix.
Assumption 6.1. GTi Gi = Im, i = 1, · · · ,N, Gi ∈ Rgi×mi.
The cost performances are deﬁned by
Jv(u1, · · · , uN , v, x0) = E
[∫ ∞
0
[
γ2‖v(t)‖2−‖z(t)‖2]dt] , (6.28a)
Ji(u1, · · · , uN , v, x0) = E
[∫ ∞
0
[
xT (t)Qix(t)+uTi (t)Riui(t)
]
dt
]
, (6.28b)
where Qi = QTi > 0 and Ri = R
T
i > 0.
The inﬁnite horizon gain-scheduled H∞ constraint Pareto optimal control strategy
[Engwerda (2005)] for the stochastic LPV system (6.27) is described as follows.
Deﬁnition 6.4. For given γ > 0, v(t) ∈ L2F([0, ∞), Rmv), ﬁnd a state feedback strategy-set
ui(t) = u∗i (t) ∈ L2F([0, ∞)), i = 1, · · · ,N such that
(i) The trajectory of the closed-loop system of stochastic system (6.27) satisﬁes
0≤ Jv(u∗1, · · · ,u∗N , v∗, x0)≤ Jv(u∗1, · · · ,u∗N , v, x0), (6.29)
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where v∗(t) is the worst-case disturbance.
(ii) When the worst-case disturbance v∗(t) is implemented in (6.27), ui(t), i = 1, · · · ,N
minimizes a sum of the cost of function of all decision makers denoted by
J(u1, · · · ,uN , v∗, x0) =
N
∑
j=1
r jJ j(u1, · · · ,uN , v∗, x0), (6.30)
where 0< ri < 1, ∑Nj=1 r j = 1 for some ri.
It should be noted that Pareto optimality is not necessarily equivalent to the weighted
sum minimization [Engwerda (2005)].
For the next we will establish the solution of the above-mentioned problem which is
called the H∞ constraint Pareto optimal strategy.
6.4 Gain-Scheduled H∞ Constrained Pareto Optimal So-
lution
6.4.1 Main Result
We now in give the main contribution of this Chapter.
Theorem 6.1. Let us consider the stochastic LPV system (6.27) with multiple decision
makers ui(t) and the disturbance v(t). For a given attenuation performance level γ > 0,
assume that there exists a solution set for the real symmetric matrices X > 0, Yk, Yl and
Z > 0 such that the following CCMIs are satisﬁed:⎡
⎢⎢⎣
Ξk X YTk XA
T
pk
X −Q−1 0 0
Yk 0 −R−1 0
ApkX 0 0 −X
⎤
⎥⎥⎦< 0, (6.31a)
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
Ξkl X YTkl XA
T
pkl
X −12Q−1 0 0
Ykl 0 −12R−1 0
ApklX 0 0 −12X
⎤
⎥⎥⎦< 0, (6.31b)
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
ZA−Fk+AT−FkZ ZD ATpkZ E
T
k
DTZ −γ2Inv 0 0
ZApk 0 −Z 0
Ek 0 0 −Inzg
⎤
⎥⎥⎦< 0, (6.31c)
where
k < l, k = 1, · · · ,M,
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Ξk := AkX +XATk +BYk+Y
T
k B
T ,
Ξkl := (Ak+Al)X +X(Ak+Al)T +BYk+YTk B
T +BYl +YTl B
T ,
A−Fk := Ak+
N
∑
j=1
BjKjk,
Ak := Ak+DF,
Ek :=
[
ETk (G1K1k)
T · · · (GNKNk)T
]T
,
nzg := nz+
N
∑
j=1
gi,
Kk := YkX−1,
Kl := YlX−1,
Ykl :=
1
2
(Yk+Yl),
F := γ−2DTZ,
Q :=
N
∑
j=1
r jQ j,
R := block diag(r1R1 · · · rNRN).
Then, the following controllers comprise the Pareto optimal strategy-set.
u(t) = Ki(θ)x(t) =
M
∑
k=1
αk(t)Kikx(t) =
M
∑
k=1
αk(t)YkiX−1x(t), (6.32)
where Kk :=
[
KT1k · · · KTNk
]T . Furthermore, the optimal cost bound is given by
J(u∗1, · · · ,u∗N , v∗, x0)≤ E
[
xT (0)X−1x(0)
]
, (6.33)
where v∗(t) = Fx(t).
Proof. First, the H∞ constraint condition is investigated. The Pareto optimal strategy-set
(6.32) is applied to original stochastic LPV system (6.27) and we have the following closed
loop stochastic system.
dx(t) =
[(
A(θ(t))+
N
∑
j=1
BjKj(θ(t))
)
x(t)+Dv(t)
]
dt+Ap(θ(t))x(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0,
(6.34a)
z(t) = E (θ(t))x(t). (6.34b)
Hence, by the term-wise comparison between (6.1) and (6.34), we have
A(θ)← A(θ)+
N
∑
j=1
BjKj(θ) =
M
∑
k=1
αkA−Fk, (6.35a)
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E(θ)← E (θ) =
M
∑
k=1
αkEk. (6.35b)
Thus, by applying Lemma 6.1 to this problem, LMI (6.31c) can be obtained. Moreover, the
condition of the existence of the Pareto optimal strategy-set is derived. The following LQC
problem is considered.
min J(u, v, x0) =min
u
E
[∫ ∞
0
[
xT (t)Qx(t)+uT (t)Ru(t)
]
dt
]
, (6.36)
where u(t) =
[
uT1 · · · uTN
]T such that
dx(t) = [(A(θ(t))+DF)x(t)+Bu(t)]dt+Ap(θ(t))x(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0, (6.37)
where B =
[
B1 · · · BN
]
.
Hence, as the similar step of the H∞ constraint problem, by the term-wise comparison
between (6.1) and (6.36) with (6.52), we have
A(θ)← A(θ(t))+DF +BK(θ(t)) =
M
∑
k=1
αkAk, (6.38a)
Q← Q, R← R. (6.38b)
Therefore, by applying Lemma 6.2 to this problem, CCMIs (6.31a) and (6.31b) can be
obtained.
It should be noted that the Existence of the solutions in inequality (6.31) is not guar-
anteed and these conditions are conservative in general. It may also be pointed out that a
weakly sufﬁcient condition (dense in the set of all Pareto equilibria) that usually asserts the
statement based on the Arrow-Barankin-Blackwell theorem [Arrow et al. (1953)].
6.4.2 Numerical Algorithm for Solving CCMIs
In order to construct the Pareto optimal strategy-set of (6.32), we must solve the CCMIs
(6.31). It should be noted that since these matrix inequalities are coupled, it is very com-
plicated if an ordinary scheme such as Newton’s method is applied. In this section, a
numerical algorithm via the semideﬁnite programming problem (SDP) is considered.
Step 1. As the ﬁrst step, any weight ri for the cost function (6.30) and solve the following
SDP.
minimize Tr
[
α(0)
]
, (6.39)
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subject to ⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
Ξ(0)k X
(0) Y (0)Tk X
(0)ATpk
X (0) −Q−1 0 0
Y (0)k 0 −R−1 0
ApkX (0) 0 0 −X (0)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦< 0, (6.40a)
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
Ξ(0)kl X
(0) Y (0)Tkl X
(0)ATpkl
X (0) −12Q−1 0 0
Y (0)kl 0 −12R−1 0
ApklX (0) 0 0 −12X (0)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦< 0, (6.40b)
[−α(0) xT (0)
x(0) −X (0)
]
< 0, (6.40c)
where
k < l, k = 1, · · · ,M,
Ξ(0)k := AkX
(0) +X (0)ATk +BY
(0)
k +Y
(0)T
k B
T ,
Ξ(0)kl := (Ak+Al)X
(0) +X (0)(Ak+Al)T +BY
(0)
k +Y
(0)T
k B
T +BY (0)l +Y
(0)T
l B
T ,
Y (0)kl :=
1
2
(Y (0)k +Y
(0)
l ),
K(0)k := Y
(0)
k [X
(0)]−1,
K(0)l := Y
(0)
l [X
(0)]−1.
Choose any γ and solve Z(0), where
F(0) := γ−2DTZ(0),
Z(0)A¯+ A¯TZ(0) + A¯TpZ
(0)A¯p+ γ−2Z(0)DDTZ(0) + E¯T E¯ = 0,
A¯ :=
1
N
M
∑
k=1
Ak,
A¯p :=
1
N
M
∑
k=1
Apk,
E¯ :=
1
N
M
∑
k=1
Ek.
Step 2. Solve the following SDP.
minimize Tr
[
α(p)
]
, (6.41)
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subject to ⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
Ξ(p)k X
(p) Y (p)Tk X
(p)ATpk
X (p) −Q−1 0 0
Y (p)k 0 −R−1 0
ApkX (p) 0 0 −X (p)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦< 0, (6.42a)
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
Ξ(p)kl X
(p) Y (p)Tkl X
(p)ATpkl
X (p) −12Q−1 0 0
Y (p)kl 0 −12R−1 0
ApklX (p) 0 0 −12X (p)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦< 0, (6.42b)
[−α(p) xT (0
x(0) −X (p)
]
< 0, (6.42c)
where
p = 1, 2, · · · ; k < l, k = 1, · · · ,M,
Ξ(p)k := AkX
(p) +X (p)ATk +BY
(p)
k +Y
(p)T
k B
T ,
Ξ(p)kl := (Ak+Al)X
(p) +X (p)(Ak+Al)T +BY
(p)
k +Y
(p)T
k B
T +BY (p)l +Y
(p)T
l B
T ,
A(p)k := Ak+DF
(p−1) +BK(p−1)k ,
Y (p)kl :=
1
2
(Y (p)k +Y
(p)
l ),
K(p−1)k := Y
(p−1)
k [X
(p−1)]−1,
K(p−1)l := Y
(p−1)
l [X
(p−1)]−1.
Step 3. Solve the following SDP.
minimize Tr
[
xT (0)Z(p)x(0)
]
, (6.43)
subject to ⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
Γ(p) Z(p)D ATpkZ
(p) E(p)Tk
DTZ(p) −γ2Inv 0 0
Z(p)Apk 0 −Z(p) 0
E (p)k 0 0 −Inzg
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦< 0, (6.44)
where
p = 1, 2, · · · ; k = 1, · · · ,M,
Γ(p) := Z(p)A(p)−Fk+A
(p)
−FkZ
(p),
A(p)−Fk := Ak+BK
(p−1)
k ,
E (p)k :=
[
ETk (G1K
(p−1)
1k )
T · · · (GNK(p−1)Nk )T
]T
,
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F(p) := γ−2DTZ(p).
Step 4. If the algorithm converges, then X (p) → X , Y (p)k → Yk and Z(p) → Z as p → ∞.
They are the solution of CCMIs (6.31), STOP. That is, stop if any norm of the error of
difference between the iterative solutions of (6.42), (6.44) and the exact solutions of (6.31)
is less than a precision. Otherwise, increment p→ p+1 and go to Step 2. If the algorithm
does not converge, declare the algorithm failed.
It should be noted that convergence of the above algorithm cannot be guaranteed. How-
ever, we found that the proposed algorithm works well in practice.
6.5 Fixed Gain Pareto Strategy
In this section, we discuss the ﬁxed gain Pareto optimal strategy-set to enable easy con-
troller design. Consider a stochastic LPV system by Itoˆ differential equation with multiple
decision makers deﬁned by
dx(t) =
[
A(θ(t))x(t)+
N
∑
j=1
Bj(θ(t))u j(t)+Dv(t)
]
dt+Ap(θ(t))x(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0,
(6.45a)
ui(t) = K¯ix(t). (6.45b)
where
Bi(θ(t)) =
M
∑
k=1
αk(t)Bik.
Other variables are deﬁned by stochastic equation (6.27). It should be noted that ui(t) does
not depend on θ(t) in this section.
Theorem 6.2. Let us consider stochastic LPV system (6.45). For a given attenuation per-
formance level −γ > 0, assume that there exists a solution set for the real symmetric ma-
trices X¯ > 0, Y¯ and Z¯ > 0 such that the following CCMIs (6.46) are satisﬁed:⎡
⎢⎢⎣
X¯ ik X¯ Y¯ T X¯ATpk
X¯ −Q−1 0 0
Y¯ 0 −R−1 0
ApkX¯ 0 0 −X¯
⎤
⎥⎥⎦< 0, (6.46a)
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
X¯ ikl X¯ Y¯ T X¯ATpkl
X¯ −12Q−1 0 0
Y¯ 0 −12R−1 0
ApklX¯ 0 0 −12 X¯
⎤
⎥⎥⎦< 0, (6.46b)
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⎡
⎢⎢⎣
Z¯A−Fk+AT−FkZ¯ Z¯D ATpkZ¯ E¯
T
k
DTZ −γ2Inv 0 0
Z¯Apk 0 −Z¯ 0
E¯ k 0 0 −Inzg
⎤
⎥⎥⎦< 0, (6.46c)
where
k < l, k = 1, · · · ,M,
X¯ ik := A¯kX¯ + X¯ A¯
T
k +BkY¯ + Y¯
TBTk ,
X¯ ikl := (A¯k+ A¯l)X +X(A¯k+ A¯l)T +BkY¯ + Y¯ TBTk +BlY¯ + Y¯
TBTl ,
A¯−F¯k := Ak+
N
∑
j=1
BjkK¯ jk,
A¯k := Ak+DF¯ ,
Bk :=
[
B1k · · · BNk,
]
E¯ k :=
[
ETk (G1K1k)
T · · · (GNKNk)T
]T
,
F¯ := γ−2DT Z¯.
Then, the following controllers comprise the Pareto optimal strategy-set.
u∗(t) = K¯x(t) = Y¯ X¯−1x(t) =
⎡
⎢⎣K¯
∗
1
...
K¯∗N
⎤
⎥⎦x(t) =
⎡
⎢⎣u
∗
1(t)
...
u∗N(t)
⎤
⎥⎦ , (6.47)
where u∗i (t) = K¯∗i x(t).
Furthermore, the optimal cost bound is given by
J(u∗1, · · · ,u∗N , v∗, x0)≤ E
[
xT (0)X¯−1x(0)
]
, (6.48)
where v∗(t) = F¯x(t).
Proof. By using the similar technique in the previous section, the proof can be completed.
Applying (6.45b) to the stochastic LPV system, we have
dx(t) =
[
A¯−F¯(θ(t))x(t)+Dv(t)
]
dt+Ap(θ(t))x(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0, (6.49a)
z(t) = E¯ (θ(t))x(t). (6.49b)
where
A¯−F¯(θ(t)) := A(θ(t))+
N
∑
j=1
Bj(θ(t))K¯ j =
M
∑
k=1
αk(t)A¯−F¯k,
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E¯ (θ(t)) :=
M
∑
k=1
αk(t)E¯ k.
Hence, by the term-wise comparison between (6.1) and (6.49), we have
A(θ)← A¯−F¯(θ) =
M
∑
k=1
αkA¯−F¯k, (6.50a)
E(θ)← E¯ (θ) =
M
∑
k=1
αkE¯ k, (6.50b)
Thus, LMI (6.46c) can be obtained. Second, the following LQC problem is considered.
min
u
J(u, v¯∗, x0) :=min
u
E
[∫ ∞
0
[
xT (t)Qx(t)+uT (t)Ru(t)
]
dt
]
, (6.51)
such that
dx(t) =
[
A¯(θ(t))x(t)+B(θ(t))u(t)
]
dt+Ap(θ(t))x(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0, (6.52)
where
v¯∗(t) := F¯x(t) = γ−2DT Z¯x(t),
A¯(θ(t)) :=
M
∑
k=1
αkA¯k,
B(θ(t)) :=
[
B1(θ(t)) · · · BN(θ(t))
]
.
As the similar argument of the LQC problem in Lemma 6.1, if the following inequality
holds, the closed-loop stochastic LPV system is mean square stable and it has a cost bound.
P¯
(
A¯(θ)+B(θ)K¯
)
+
(
A¯(θ)+B(θ)K¯
)T P¯
+ATp (θ)P¯Ap(θ)+Q+ K¯
TRK¯ < 0, (6.53)
where u(t) = u∗(t) = K¯x(t), K¯ =
[
K¯1 · · · K¯N
]
.
That is, the following equation holds.
J(x, x0)< E
[
xT (0)P¯x(0)
]
. (6.54)
On the other hand, we have the following inequality by rearranging (6.53).
M
∑
k=1
α2k
(
P¯(A¯k+BkK¯)+(A¯k+BkK¯)T P¯+ATpkP¯Apk+Q+ K¯
TRK¯
)
M−1
∑
k=1
M
∑
l=k+1
αkαl
(
P¯G¯kl + G¯TklP¯+Hkl +2Q+2K¯
TRK¯
)
< 0, (6.55)
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where
G¯kl := A¯k+BkK¯+ A¯l +BlK¯.
Therefore, as the sufﬁcient conditions, if the following inequalities hold, inequality (6.55)
is satisﬁed.
P¯
(
A¯k+BkK¯
)
+
(
A¯k+BkK¯
)T P¯+ATpkP¯Apk+Q+ K¯TRK¯ < 0, (6.56a)
P¯G¯kl + G¯TklP¯+Hkl +2Q+2K¯
TRK¯
≤ P¯G¯kl + G¯TklP¯+2ATpklPApkl +2Q+2K¯TRK¯ < 0. (6.56b)
Thus, if inequalities (6.56) are satisﬁed, then inequality (6.55) holds. In other words, if
inequalities (6.46a) and (6.46b) are satisﬁed, then (6.53) holds and this inequality implies
the cost bound (6.54).
6.6 Numerical Examples
In order to demonstrate the efﬁciency of our proposed strategies, an academic numerical
example and a practical example based on air-path system of diesel engines are investi-
gated.
6.6.1 Academic example
The system matrices are given as follows:
A1 =
[−1.5 1
−1 −1.6
]
, Ap1 = 0.1A1,
A2 =
[−1.5 1
−1 −1.8
]
, Ap2 = 0.1A2,
α1(t) = sin t, α2(t) = 1− sin t,
B1 =
[
0
2
]
, B2 =
[
0
1
]
,
D =
[
0.22
0.2
]
, E1 =
[
0.4 0
0 0.3
]
, E2 =
[
0.6 0
0 0.3
]
,
Q1 =
[
1 0
0 6
]
, Q2 =
[
3 0
0 3
]
, R1 = 5, R2 = 4.
The disturbance attenuation is chosen as γ = 5. The CCMIs (6.31) are by using algorithm
of the previous subsection. The strategy-set (6.32) which attains the Pareto optimal solution
with H∞ constraint is given below.
K1 =
[
K11
K21
]
=
[
2.9247e-2 −7.0586e-1
1.8279e-2 −4.4116e-1
]
,
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Fig. 6.1: Simulation results for the closed-loop system under the time-varying gain.
K2 =
[
K12
K22
]
=
[
2.9247e-2 −7.0586e-1
1.8279e-2 −4.4116e-1
]
,
Fγ =
[
1.0680e-3 8.9609e-4
]
.
The proposed algorithm converges to the required solution with an accuracy of 1.0e-8
order only after 5 iterations. In order to verify the performance constraint condition by the
value of the following ratio function is computed.
‖L‖2[0, t f ] =
E
[∫
t f
0
‖z(t)‖2dt
]
E
[∫
t f
0
‖v(t)‖2dt
] = 2.8131e-2< γ2 = 25.
It can be observed that the value of the above ratio function (6.45) is small when γ = 5.
Hence, the constraint condition is satisﬁed. Second, the time histories with x(0) =
[
1 0.5
]
are depicted from Fig. 6.1.
It should be noted that the disturbance is chosen as v(t) = [1 1]sin2 t. From Fig. 6.1,
one can ﬁnd that the asymptotic stability can be achieved. In other words, one can succeed
in reducing the inﬂuence of the deterministic disturbance v(t) by means of the designed
Pareto optimal strategy-set.
6.6.2 Practical example (air-path system of diesel engines)
In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method, we show results for the
control problem on the air-path system of the diesel engine [Ku and Wu (2015)] with some
trivial modiﬁcations. In [Ku and Wu (2015)], the gain-scheduled H∞ control for stochastic
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LPV system was set so that the disturbance does not affect the performance output more
than performance index γ > 0. Although in [Ku and Wu (2015)] used state feedback con-
trol to stabilize the system (6.27), include the Pareto optimal control assuming a quadratic
cost functional for each control input. The idea is based on [Zeng et al. (2017)], where a
linear quadratic (LQ) controller design used to minimize the tracking errors of both exhaust
gas re-circulation (EGR) mass ﬂow rate and boost pressure through variable geometry tur-
bocharger (VGT).
According to [Ku and Wu (2015)], x =
[
x1(t) x2(t) x3(t)
]T and u(t) =[
u1(t) u2(t)
]T denote the state vector and control input, respectively. Furthermore,
x1(t) denotes intake manifold pressure; x2(t) denotes exhaust manifold pressure; x3(t)
denotes compressor air mass ﬂow; u1(t) denotes EGR valve position; u2(t) denotes VGT
vane position; and v(t) is chosen as zero-mean white noise with variance one. Thus, the
disturbed air-path of diesel engines can be described as stochastic system (6.27a), where
A(θ) =
⎡
⎣ −12.6 8.2 01.01+4θ1 −2.08 0
0.12+4.04θ1 −0.37−0.44θ2 −1.33
⎤
⎦ ,
B1 =
⎡
⎣ 0−25.65
−18.27
⎤
⎦ , B2 =
⎡
⎣ 040.32
0
⎤
⎦ , D =
⎡
⎣00
1
⎤
⎦ ,
Ap(θ) = 0.01A(θ), θ = θ(θ1, θ2),
It should be noted that exact function of parameter θ(t) is generally unknown in this ex-
ample and several cases should be simulated. According to the air-path system of diesel
engines, the two scheduling parameters θ1(t) and θ2(t) vary within the following ranges
[Liu et al. (2007)]:
θ1(t) ∈ [−0.15, 0.15],
θ2(t) ∈ [−0.84, 0.16].
In this example, the following parameters are applied as a special case.
θ1(t) = 0.15sin(ωt),
θ2(t) =−0.34−0.5sin(ωt),
where, ω is the frequency determined by the frequency response. After several trials,
[Liu et al. (2007)] shows air mass ﬂow step response and boost pressure step response for
θ1(t) = 0.15sin(10t), (6.57)
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Fig. 6.2: Simulation results for LPV system under practical plant.
θ2(t) =−0.34−0.5sin(10t), (6.58)
LPV controller achieves much better performance. It can be seen that they change very
quickly and cover the entire range of two scheduling variables, while rapid changes in
scheduling variables have only a slight effect on the system response.
Since the number of time-varying parameters is 2, the number M = 2r = 4. So, the
parameter dependent coefﬁcient matrices (6.2) can be decomposed as follows:
A1 =
⎡
⎣ −12.6 8.2 00.41 −2.08 0
−0.486 −0.0004 −1.33
⎤
⎦ , A2 =
⎡
⎣ −12.6 8.2 00.41 −2.08 0
−0.486 −0.4404 −1.33
⎤
⎦ ,
A3 =
⎡
⎣−12.6 8.2 01.61 −2.08 0
0.726 −0.0004 −1.33
⎤
⎦ , A4 =
⎡
⎣−12.6 8.2 01.61 −2.08 0
0.726 −0.4404 −1.33
⎤
⎦ ,
Apk = 0.01Ak, for k = 1, 2, 3, 4.
Without loss of generality, we can assume E1 =E2 =E3 =E4 = I3. The weight matrices for
the cost functionals are assumed as Q1 = diag( 7 5 10 ), Q2= diag( 6 21 5 ), R1 =
9, R2 = 9. It should be noted that, the performance of the resulting closed-loop system
can be adjusted by appropriately selecting the LQ weighting matrices [Zeng et al. (2017)].
The values for α1 = a(1− b), α2 = ab, α3 = (1− a)(1− b) and α4 = (1− a)b, where
a = (0.15−θ1)/0.3 and b = θ2+0.84. The disturbance attenuation is chosen as γ = 2.
The CCMIs (6.31) are by using algorithm of the previous subsection. The strategy-set
(6.32) which attains the Pareto optimal solution with H∞ constraint is given below.
K1 =
[
K11
K21
]
=
[
1.2070e-1 7.4273e-1 1.1100e+0
−2.5075e-1 −1.5599e+0 5.5093e-1
]
,
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K2 =
[
K12
K22
]
=
[
1.2070e-1 7.4273e-1 1.1100e+0
−2.5075e-1 −1.5599e+0 5.5093e-1
]
,
K3 =
[
K13
K23
]
=
[
1.2070e-1 7.4273e-1 1.1100e+0
−2.5075e-1 −1.5599e+0 5.5093e-1
]
,
K4 =
[
K14
K24
]
=
[
1.2070e-1 7.4273e-1 1.1100e+0
−2.5075e-1 −1.5599e+0 5.5093e-1
]
,
Fγ =
[−3.1441e-4 −2.5139e-3 1.5667e-2] .
The proposed algorithm converges to the required solution with an accuracy of 1.0e-6
order after 6 iterations. In order to verify the performance constraint condition by the value
of the following ratio function is computed.
‖L‖2[0, t f ] =
E
[∫
t f
0
‖z(t)‖2dt
]
E
[∫
t f
0
‖v(t)‖2dt
] = 9.1315e-2< γ2 = 4.
It can be observed that the value of the above ratio function is small when γ = 2. Hence,
the constraint condition is satisﬁed. Second, the time histories with x(0) =
[
1 0 1
]
are
depicted from Fig. 6.2. From Fig.6.2, it can be observed that the asymptotic stability can
be achieved. In other words, one can succeed in reducing the inﬂuence of the deterministic
disturbance v(t) by means of the designed Pareto optimal strategy-set.
Remark 6.1. Diesel engines generate Nitrogen Oxides (NOx) emissions that are toxic and
cause health problems. To reduce NOx emissions, an effective means is to regulate transient
exhaust gas re-circulation (EGR) using control strategies. On the other hand, by control-
ling the variable geometry turbine (VGT) vane position, the boost pressure is adjusted to
save fuel efﬁciently. The VGT absorbs the waste-heat energy and recycling gas from the
EGR to drive the compressor. On the other hand, when VGT vane is closed, the exhaust
gas ﬂowing into the EGR increases. So, there is a correlation between these two controls.
However, [Zeng et al. (2017)] used LQ controllers to minimize the tracking errors of the
EGR mass ﬂow and boost pressure through VGT. Our idea is to associate these two con-
trols to a cooperative game with a common objective and to adapt to Pareto optimality.
The advantage of this an idea is that it not only minimizes the individual tracking errors,
but also optimizes the overall performance of the diesel engine with disturbance attenu-
ation under H∞-constraint. Therefore, by applying the proposed scheme, it is possible to
generate a more sophisticated, environmentally friendly fuel-efﬁcient diesel engine.
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6.7 Conclusions
This chapter discusses the Pareto optimal strategy for stochastic LPV system with multiple
decision makers. In the dynamic game of uncertain stochastic systems, multiple partici-
pants can be used for more realistic plants. The deterministic disturbances and their at-
tenuation to stochastic LPV systems under the H∞ constraint is the main attraction of this
chapter. Problems involving deterministic disturbance must be attenuated at a given target
called disturbance attenuation level γ > 0. This chapter can be seen as an extension of
[Mukaidani (2017a)] in the sence that the ﬁxed gain controller is also considered here. In
this chapter, we design a method for Pareto optimal solution for multiple decision makers
that satisﬁes the H∞ norm condition.
Unlike the existing Pareto optimal strategy-set, the gain-scheduled controllers have
been adopted for the ﬁrst time. As a result, even though the deterministic time-varying
parameters in the stochastic systems exist, a strategy-set can be designed. We redesigned
the stochastic bounded real lemma [Ku and Wu (2015)] and the linear quadratic control
[Rotondo (2015)] to ﬁnd the solution. The Pareto optimal strategy-set can be found by solv-
ing a set of cross-coupling matrix inequalities (CCMIs). The modiﬁed stochastic bounded
real lemma and linear quadratic control (LQC) for the stochastic LPV systems are refor-
mulated by means of linear matrix inequalities (LMIs). The solvability conditions of the
problem are established from cross-coupled matrix inequalities (CCMIs). Since these ma-
trix inequalities are coupled, it is very complicated if an ordinary scheme such as New-
ton’s method is applied. A numerical algorithm via the semideﬁnite programming problem
(SDP) is developed to solve this problem.
The proof of convergence for the method based on the SDP (6.39) is not discussed.
Moreover, the uniqueness of the solution was not proved. These problems will be ad-
dressed in future investigations. Academic and practical numerical examples show the
feasibility of the proposed method. In order to demonstrate the real life application of the
proposed method, we show results for the control problem on the air-path system of the
diesel engine. Although we have not implemented the H∞ constraint incentive Stackelberg
game for stochastic LPV systems, this will be our future research. However, in our current
research, the information structure is used as state feedback; the output feedback pattern
will be investigated in our future studies.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
This thesis investigates the incentive Stackelberg game for discrete-time systems and
continuous-time systems. Prior to this, the basic terminologies of the dynamic game are in-
troduced. The motivation is to choose the incentive Stackelberg game to be an engineering
application of a packet switch that works in a loop structure [Saksena and Cruz (1985)].
The above problem comes from a static game. However, this thesis studies only dynamic
games.
For discrete time case, both deterministic and stochastic systems are investigated. Re-
sults based on ﬁnite and inﬁnite time domains are shown in discrete time. However,
stochastic systems are only considered in the case of continuous time. It should be noted
that the generalized results given by stochastic investigation can also be applied to deter-
ministic cases. To simplify the calculation, only the inﬁnite time domain in the case of
continuous time is emphasized. In most cases, the linear differential equation governed by
Ito’s differential equation is used in the theory of this research. This is a very common
phenomenon in the ﬁeld of control theory research and is simple to operate.
This thesis studies the most common linear quadratic (LQ) optimal control in game
problems. To solve the LQ problem, stochastic dynamic programming (SDP) and stochas-
tic maximum principle are deeply studied. Cooperative and non-cooperative game prob-
lems are solved based on the concepts of Pareto optimality and Nash equilibrium solutions,
respectively. Several basic problems are completely solved and useful for the current re-
search. The main task to solve the LQ problem is to ﬁnd a matrix solution of algebraic
Riccati equations. However, the Newton’s method is very effective for fast convergence,
the Lyapunov’s iterative method is most popular for a simple built-in function ‘lyap(·)’.
Among the various styles for presenting results, ﬁgures for the trajectories of the states are
the most attractive and reliable to ensure that the system is stable.
The deterministic disturbances and their attenuation to stochastic systems under the H∞
constraint is the main attraction of this thesis. Problems involving deterministic disturbance
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must be attenuated at a given target called disturbance attenuation level γ > 0. Surprisingly,
the concept of solving the disturbance reduction problem under the H∞ constraint seems
like a Nash equilibrium between the disturbance input and the control input.
In the incentive Stackelberg game, players are divided into two categories; the leader
group and the follower group. For a single leader game, incentive Stackelberg strategy is
an extensive idea in which the leader can achieve his/her team-optimal solution in a Stack-
elberg game. Multiple leaders and multiple followers have made the game more complex
and challenging. In the leaders’ and the followers’ groups, the players are supposed to
be non-cooperative; subsequently, the Nash equilibrium is investigated. Several novel the-
orems and lemmas are designed to study the incentive Stackelberg game problems. In
this game, an incentive structure is developed in such a way that leaders achieve Nash
equilibrium by attenuating the disturbance under H∞ constraint. Simultaneously, followers
achieve their Nash equilibrium ensuring the incentive Stackelberg strategies of the lead-
ers while the worst-case disturbance is considered. Interestingly, for all cases, some sets
of cross-coupled matrix algebraic and Riccati equations can be derived to ﬁnd the set of
strategies. To solve those matrix equations, algorithms based on Lyapunov iterations are
developed. In addition, several academic and real-life numerical examples have also been
resolved to demonstrate the usefulness of our proposed scheme.
This thesis discusses the incentive mechanism of the Stackelberg game in detail, but it
also gives a small description of the ordinary Stackelberg game. A detailed survey shows
that over the past four decades, several studies have been conducted on the incentive Stack-
elberg game. However, the main objective of this research is to investigate the incentives
Stackelberg strategy, preliminary research and synthesis of LPV systems for multiple deci-
sion makers. We aim to better understand to implement our current idea for LPV systems
in the future. H∞ constraint Pareto optimal strategy for stochastic linear parameter vary-
ing (LPV) systems with multiple decision makers is investigated. The modiﬁed stochastic
bounded real lemma and LQ control for the stochastic LPV systems are reformulated by
means of linear matrix inequalities (LMIs). To decide the strategy set of multiple decision
makers, the Pareto optimal strategy is considered for each player and the H∞ constraint
is imposed. The solvability conditions of the problem are established from cross-coupled
matrix inequalities (CCMIs).
The basics of LMIs are discussed as an appendix. However, the results and discussion
on LMIs already exist. It gives an important idea in the formulation and solution of the
control problems. The appendix discusses how to solve convex optimization problems us-
ing LMIs and special cases to solve systems and control theory problems. We consider the
original problem from solution system and control theory. Although the appendix mainly
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covers system and control theory, there is a possibility to pose problems for convex op-
timization as well. The method described in that appendix has great practical value for
control engineering. MATLAB LMI toolbox is an essential feature of the control theory
research to solve LMI system.
In fact, through this thesis, stochastic games of multiple decision makers with distur-
bances open a new dimension of optimal control research. Several academic and practical
numerical examples show the feasibility of the proposed method. Although we have not
implemented the H∞ constraint incentive Stackelberg game for stochastic LPV systems,
this will be our future research. In our current research, the information structure is used as
state feedback; the output feedback pattern will be investigated in our future studies.
Some preliminary results on static output feedback optimal control are given in Ap-
pendix B. The linear quadratic optimal cost control problem for static output feedback
optimal control for stochastic Itoˆ differential equations is considered. Several deﬁnitions,
theorems, and lemmas are studied for future research. To solve the output feedback con-
trol problem, the Newton’s algorithm and corresponding codes are already developed. A
numerical example of fundamental problems has been solved. The problem is already for-
mulated for future investigation.
In that problem, an inﬁnite-horizon incentive Stackelberg game with multiple leaders
and multiple followers will be investigated for a class of linear stochastic systems with H∞
constraint. An incentive structure will be developed in such a way that leaders will achieve
the Nash equilibrium by attenuating the disturbance under H∞ constraint. Simultaneously,
followers will achieve their Nash equilibrium ensuring the incentive Stackelberg strate-
gies of the leaders while the worst-case disturbance will be considered. In that research,
some cross-coupled stochastic algebraic Riccati equations (CCSAREs) and matrix alge-
braic equations (MAEs) will be derived for static output feedback case so that the incentive
Stackelberg strategy-set can be found. Unlike current research, static output feedback con-
trol will be considered. However, [Mukaidani et al. (2018)] studied discrete-time linear
stochastic systems with inﬁnite time-domain incentives by means of Markov jump param-
eters and external disturbances through static output feedback. Multiple leader-follower
problems with output feedback in continuous-time linear stochastic systems will be our
future study. Moreover, in the future, we have plans to extend the proposed results to the
output feedback by means of the state observer. Also, the information that the leader can
utilize may be different from that the followers can utilize.
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Appendix A
Linear Matrix Inequalities (LMIs)
The basic topic in this appendix is how to solve convex optimization problems using linear
matrix inequalities (LMIs) and special cases to solve systems and control theory problems.
Although this appendix mainly covers system and control theory, there is a possibility to
pose problems for convex optimization as well. The method described in this appendix
has great practical value for control engineering. LMI is a matrix inequality that is linear
or afﬁne within a set of matrix variables. Since they are convex constraints themselves,
many existing software can efﬁciently and easily solve many convex objective functions
and optimization problems of LMI constraints. This method has become very popular
among control engineers in recent years. This is because various control issues can be
formulated as LMI issues.
The LMI format is as follows:
G(x) = G0+ x1G1+ · · · + xmGm > 0. (A.1)
Where x ∈ Rm is the vector of decision variables, G0, G1, . . . , Gn are constant Symmetric
matrices, that is
Gi = GTi , i = 0, 1, . . . , m. (A.2)
The inequality used in equation (A.1) means the positive deﬁniteness of G(x), i.e.,
uTG(x)u > 0, for all u ∈ Rn.
Deﬁnition A.1. [Rami and Zhou (2000)] Let G0, G1, . . . , Gm ∈S n be constant symmetric
matrices. Inequalities consisting of any combination of the following relations:
G(x) := G0+
m
∑
i=1
xiGi > 0 (A.3a)
G(x) := G0+
m
∑
i=1
xiGi ≥ 0 (A.3b)
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are called LMI’s for variable x = (x1, . . . , xm)T ∈ Rm. If there is at least one x ∈ Rm that
satisﬁes them, LMI is called feasible, and point x is called a feasible point.
LMIs is basically used in dynamical system of Lyapunov theory.
Theorem A.1. The following differential equation,
x˙(t) = Ax(t) (A.4)
is asymptotically stable iff there exists a matrix P> 0 such that the following the Lyapunov
inequality holds:
ATP+PA < 0. (A.5)
Proof. Let us consider the Lyapunov candidate
V (t) = xT (t)P(t)x(t), (A.6)
where P is a symmetric positive deﬁnite matrix. Therefore,
V˙ (t) = x˙T (t)Px(t)+ xT (t)Px˙(t)
= xT (t)ATPx(t)+ xT (t)PAx(t)
= xT (t)[ATP+PA]x(t). (A.7)
According to Lyapunov stability theorem, for a Lyapunov function V (t), the system (A.4)
is asymptotically stable if and only if V (t) < 0. Comparing equations (A.6) and (A.7) we
can obtain
ATP+PA < 0. (A.8)
Hence Theorem A.1 is proved.
If we consider a matrix Q = QT > 0 such that
ATP+PA =−Q,
the LMI turns to be a matrix algebraic equation.
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A.1 Formation of LMIs
Many control problems can be expressed as LMI problems, but some of them cause non-
linear matrix inequalities. Speciﬁc techniques can be used to convert these nonlinear in-
equalities to the appropriate LMI format. Here, we will use appropriate examples to de-
scribe some of the techniques that are often used for control.
Let us consider a state feedback optimal control problem in which we have to ﬁnd a
state feedback gain matrix K ∈ Rm×n and a symmetric positive deﬁnite matrix P ∈ Rn×n
such that the following inequality holds:
(A+BK)TP+P(A+BK)< 0, (A.9)
equivalently,
ATP+PA+KTBTP+PBK < 0. (A.10)
It should be noted that the matrices K and P are contained in the same product terms make
the inequality nonlinear or bilinear. To make it linear, suppose that X = P−1, which gives
XAT +AX +XKTBT +BKX < 0. (A.11)
This is also a matrix inequality containing a new variable X . However, the inequality is still
nonlinear. Let us consider another new variable L = KX , which gives
XAT +AX +LTBT +BL < 0. (A.12)
This is a LMI feasibility problem with respect the variable X > 0 and L ∈ Rm×n. Solving
this LMI problem, the feedback gain matrix K can be found from the relation K = LX−1 and
P = X−1. This shows that by changing variable of a nonlinear matrix inequality problem
into an LMI problem.
The Schur Complement can be used to transform nonlinear inequalities of convex type
LMI problem.
Lemma A.1. (Schur’s lemma)[Rami and Zhou (2000)] Let matrices Q = QT , S, and
R = RT > 0 be given with appropriate dimensions. Then the following conditions are
equivalent:
1) Q−SR−1ST > 0;
2)
[
Q S
ST R
]
> 0;
3)
[
R ST
S Q
]
> 0.
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For example, let us consider the following quadratic matrix inequality
[Boyd et al. (1994)]:
ATP+PA+PBR−1BTP+Q < 0, (A.13)
where A, B, Q = QT , R = RT > 0 are given matrices of appropriate sizes, and P = PT is
the variable. It should be noted that this is a quadratic matrix inequality in the variable P.
It can be expressed as the linear matrix inequality as follows:[−ATP−PA−Q PB
BTP R
]
> 0, (A.14)
or, [
R BTP
PB −ATP−PA−Q
]
> 0. (A.15)
The MATLAB LMI toolbox provides some convenient functions for solving LMI prob-
lems. Now we present an example for solving a control problem by using MATLAB LMI
toolbox.
Consider the following continuous-time stochastic linear quadratic optimal control
problem:
dx(t) = [Ax(t)+Bu(t)]dt+Apx(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0, (A.16a)
J(x0, u) :=
1
2
E
[∫ ∞
0
(
xT (t)Qx(t)+uT (t)Ru(t)
)
dt
]
, (A.16b)
where x(t) ∈L 2F (R+, Rn) is the state vector; u(t) ∈L 2F (R+, Rnu) is the control input;
w(t) ∈ R is a one-dimensional wiener process; A, B, Ap, Q = QT ≥ 0, R = RT > 0 are
the coefﬁcient matrices of suitable dimensions. For the stochastic optimal control problem
(A.16), suppose that the following stochastic ARE has the solution PT = P > 0:
PA+ATP+Q−PBR−1BTP+ATpPAp = 0. (A.17)
then the optimal control problem admits a state feedback solution,
u∗(t) = Kx(t) =−R−1BTPx(t). (A.18)
LMI associated to (A.17) can be written as:[
ATP+PA+Q+ATpPAp PB
BTP R
]
≥ 0, (A.19)
with respect to the symmetric matrix variable P. It should be noted that Deﬁnition A.1 can
be applied to LMI (A.19) by a simple transformation. Consider P1, . . . , Pn(n+1)/2 be any
basis of Sn. The variable matrix P can be written as
P :=
n(n+1)/2
∑
i=1
xiPi.
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Considering (x1, . . . ,xn(n+1)/2) as a new variable, we can see that (A.19) is followed by
Deﬁnition A.1.
A.2 Some standard LMI problems
Given an LMI F(x)> 0, the corresponding LMI problem is to ﬁnd x f eas so that F(x f eas)> 0
or determine that the LMI is infeasible. For example, let us consider the following the
simultaneous Lyapunov stability problem:
P > 0, ATi P+PAi < 0, i = 1, . . . ,L, (A.20)
where Ai ∈ Rn×n, i = 1, . . . ,L. It is needed to ﬁnd P that satisﬁes the LMI (A.20) or to
determine such P does not exist.
For the linear stochastic system
dx(t) = [Ax(t)+Bu(t)]dt+Apx(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0, (A.21)
the following theorem will verify the stability with some equivalence conditions.
Theorem A.2. [Rami and Zhou (2000)]
1. System (A.21) is mean-square stable.
2. There is a matrix K and X = XT > 0 such that
(A+BK)TX +X(A+BK)+ATpXAp < 0. (A.22)
The state feedback u(t) = Kx(t) is stable, in this case.
3. There is a matrix K and X = XT > 0 such that
(A+BK)X +X(A+BK)T +ApXATp < 0. (A.23)
The state feedback u(t) = Kx(t) is stable, in this case.
4. There exists a matrix K such that for any matrix Y there is a unique solution X to the
following equation
(A+BK)TX +X(A+BK)+ATpXAp+Y = 0. (A.24)
Furhtermore, if Y > 0 (respectively, Y ≥ 0), then X > 0 (respectively, X ≥ 0). More-
over, the state feedback u(t) = Kx(t) is stable, in this case.
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5. There exists a matrix K such that for any matrix Y there is a unique solution X to the
following equation
(A+BK)X +X(A+BK)T +ApXATp +Y = 0. (A.25)
Furhtermore, if Y > 0 (respectively, Y ≥ 0), then X > 0 (respectively, X ≥ 0). More-
over, the state feedback u(t) = Kx(t) is stable, in this case.
6. There is a matrix Y and a symmetric matrix X such that[
AX +XAT +BY +YTBT ApX
XATp −X
]
< 0. (A.26)
In this case, the state feedback u(t) = YX−1x(t) is stable.
Proof. For any matris K ∈ Rnu×n, deﬁne the following operator
φ : Sn →Sn, (A.27)
by
φ(X) = (A+BK)X +X(A+BK)T +ApXATp . (A.28)
If x(·) satisﬁes the following state feedback equation
dx(t) = [A+BK]x(t)dt+Apx(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0, (A.29)
where, K is a feedback gain, then applying Itoˆ’s formula, the matrix X(t) = E[xT (t)x(t)]
satisﬁes the differential matrix system X˙(t) = φ(X(t)). Applying the results given in
[Ghaoui and Rami (1996)], we have the equivalence between the mean-square stabiliz-
ability and each of the assertions 2–5. Furthermore, with Y = KX and X > 0, (A.23) is
equivalent to
AX +XAT +BY +YTBT +ApXATp < 0. (A.30)
All other equivalence relations can be established by applying the Schur’s lemma, as shown
in Lemma A.1 here.
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Appendix B
Future Research
B.1 Static output feedback optimal control
In this section, we consider the problem of linear quadratic optimal cost control via static
output feedback optimal control. The technique can be described by the stochastic differ-
ential equation of state as follows:
dx(t) = [Ax(t)+Bu(t)]dt+Apx(t)dw, x(0) = x0, (B.1a)
y(t) =Cx(t). (B.1b)
where, x(t) ∈ Rn is the state vector, u(t) ∈ Rm is the control input, w(t) ∈ R is a one-
dimensional wiener process, y(t) ∈ R is the output, A, Ap ∈ Rn×n, B ∈ Rn×m, C ∈ R×n
are given coefﬁcient matrices.
Deﬁnition B.1. [Dragan et al. (2006)] The system (B.1) or (A, B, Ap) is called stochastic
stabilizable (in mean-square sense), if there exists a output feedback control u(t) =Ky(t) =
KCx(t) with K being a constant matrix, such that the closed-loop system
dx(t) = [A+BKC]x(t)dt+Apx(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0, (B.2)
is asymptotically mean-square stable, i.e.
lim
t→∞E[‖x(t)‖
2] = 0. (B.3)
Remark B.1. Under the condition B≡ 0, (A, Ap) is called stable, if equation (B.3) holds.
Deﬁnition B.2. [Chen and Zhang (2004)] The state-measurement system (B.1) or
(A, Ap | C) is called stochastically detectable, if there exists a constant matrix X such
that (A+XC, Ap) is asymptotically mean-square stable.
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Lemma B.1. [Chen and Zhang (2004)] If (A, C | √Q) is stochastic detectable, then the
autonomous system (A, Ap) is stable if and only if the following stochastic algebraic Lya-
punov equation (SALE) (B.4) has a unique solution P≥ 0:
ATP+PA+ATpPAp+Q = 0, (B.4)
with cost functional
J(x0) = E
[∫ ∞
0
xT (t)Qx(t)dt
]
= xT0 Px0, (B.5)
where Q = QT ≥ 0.
Proof. To prove the ﬁrst part of Lemma B.1, the same procedure as Lemma 2.2 can be
applied. To prove the second part
E
[∫ t
0
xT (s)Qx(s)ds
]
=−E
[∫ t
0
xT (s)[ATP+PA+ATpPAp]x(s)ds
]
=−E
[∫ t
0
xT (s)P˙x(s)ds
]
[Itoˆ’s formula for ﬁnite-horizon.]
= xT0 Px0−E[xT (t)Px(t)]→ xT0 Px0, when t → ∞.
Now, consider the stochastic optimal control problem (B.1) with the following cost
functional:
J(u, x0) = E
[∫ ∞
0
[xT (t)Qx(t)+uT (t)Ru(t)]dt
]
, (B.6)
where Q = QT ≥ 0 and R = RT > 0. Suppose that there exists an optimal state feedback
control
u∗(t) = KCx(t), (B.7)
where K is the feedback gain matrix of the static output feedback control problem (B.1)
with (A, Ap |C) is stochastically detectable.
Applying Lemma B.1, there exists a positive semi-deﬁnite matrix P, which is the solu-
tion of the following algebraic Riccati equation:
G1(P, K) := (A+BKC)TP+P(A+BKC)+ATpPAp+C
TKTRKC+Q = 0. (B.8)
To ﬁnd the feedback gain K, consider the following Lagrangian:
L (P, V, K) =Tr[x0xT0 P]+Tr
[
G1(P, K)V
]
, (B.9)
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where V = VT ; V ∈ Rn×n is the Lagrange multiplier. On the other hand, P ∈ Rn×n and
K ∈Rm× are the optimization variables. Taking partial derivatives of (B.9) with respect to
V, P and K we can ﬁnd the following results:
∂L (P, V, K)
∂V
:= [(A+BKC)TP+P(A+BKC)+ATpPAp+C
TKTRKC+Q]T , (B.10a)
∂L (P, V, K)
∂P
:= (A+BKC)V +V (A+BKC)T +ApVATp +(x
T
0 x0)I, (B.10b)
∂L (P, V, K)
∂K
:= 2BTPVCT +2RKCVCT . (B.10c)
By setting ∂L /∂V , ∂L /∂P, and ∂L /∂K equal to zero, we can ﬁnd
(A+BKC)TP+P(A+BKC)+ATpPAp+C
TKTRKC+Q = 0, (B.11a)
(A+BKC)V +V (A+BKC)T +ApVATp +(x
T
0 x0)I = 0, (B.11b)
K =−R−1BTPVCT (CVCT )−1. (B.11c)
By solving the resulting equations of (B.11) at the same time, the optimal solution for K
can be found. Newton’s algorithm is proposed to solve the system (B.11).
B.1.1 Newton’s algorithm
Inputs:
Let P = P(0), V = V (0) and K = K(0) be the given initial matrices; ITER is the maximum
number of iterations; TOL is the tolerance of convergence.
Outputs:
Solution matrices P, V and K.
Step 1 Let us consider the following nonlinear matrix functions.
G1(P,V,K) =(A+BKC)TP+P(A+BKC)+ATpPAp+C
TKTRKC+Q, (B.12a)
G2(P,V,K) =(A+BKC)V +V (A+BKC)T +ApVATp +(x
T
0 x0)I, (B.12b)
G3(P,V,K) =RKCVCT +BTPVCT , (B.12c)
Step 2 For k = 1, 2, · · · , ITER do Step 3 to Step 4.
Step 3 Calculate the following newtons formula:
vecX (k+1) = vecX (k)−
[
∂vecG (X)
∂ (vecX)T
∣∣∣∣
X=X (k)
]−1
vecG (X (k)), (B.13)
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where
vecG (X) =
⎡
⎣vecG1(P,V,K)vecG2(P,V,K)
vecG3(P,V,K)
⎤
⎦ and X =
⎡
⎣vecPvecV
vecK
⎤
⎦ .
Step 4 If ‖X (k+1)−X (k)‖< TOL, stop.
Step 5: Output
Step 6: End
It should be noted that to compute (B.13), Jacobian ∂vecG (X)∂ (vecX)T can be deﬁned as follows:
∂vecG (X)
∂ (vecX)T
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
∂vecG1(X)
∂ (vecP)T
∂vecG1(X)
∂ (vecV )T
∂vecG1(X)
∂ (vecK)T
∂vecG2(X)
∂ (vecP)T
∂vecG2(X)
∂ (vecV )T
∂vecG2(X)
∂ (vecK)T
∂vecG3(X)
∂ (vecP)T
∂vecG3(X)
∂ (vecV )T
∂vecG3(X)
∂ (vecK)T
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ ,
where
∂vecG1(X)
∂ (vecP)T
= (A+BKC)T ⊗ In+ In⊗ (A+BKC)T +ATp ⊗ATp ,
∂vecG1(X)
∂ (vecV )T
= 0,
∂vecG1(X)
∂ (vecK)T
=CT ⊗PB+(PB⊗CT )Um+CT ⊗CTKTR+(CTKTR⊗CT )Um,
∂vecG2(X)
∂ (vecP)T
= 0,
∂vecG2(X)
∂ (vecV )T
= In⊗ (A+BKC)+(A+BKC)⊗ In+Ap⊗Ap,
∂vecG2(X)
∂ (vecK)T
=VCT ⊗B+(B⊗VCT )Um,
∂vecG3(X)
∂ (vecP)T
=CV ⊗BT , ∂vecG3(X)
∂ (vecV )T
=C⊗ (RKC+BTP), ∂vecG3(X)
∂ (vecK)T
=CVCT ⊗R,
Um denotes a permutation matrix in Kronecker matrix sense
[Henderson and Searle (1981)] such that UmvecK = vecKT , K ∈ Rm×.
B.1.2 Numerical example
Let us consider the following system matrices:
A =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
−2.98 0.93 0 −0.034
−0.99 −0.21 0.035 −0.0011
0 0 0 1
0.39 −5.555 0 −1.89
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ , B =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
−0.032
0
0
−1.6
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ ,
C =
[
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
]
, Ap = 0.1A, R = 1, Q = I4, x0 =
[
1 0.5 −0.5 −1]T .
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Applying Newton’s Algorithm B.1.1 through MATLAB simulations that meet the appro-
priate initial conditions of Newton-Kantorovich’s theorem, the Algorithm B.1.1 provides
the following results:
P =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
1.0310 −2.7190 −1.9989 −0.3816
−2.7190 11.4489 2.7210 −0.7817
−1.9989 2.7210 −8.6677 −1.4500
−0.3816 −0.7817 −1.4500 0.4378
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ ,
V =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
0.5193 0.7023 −2.0968 −7.6932
0.7023 2.8654 1.1328 −1.9652
−2.0968 1.1328 1.3150 −1.2389
−7.6932 −1.9652 −1.2389 −2.2189
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ ,
K =
[−4.5034 −1.3158] , Tr[x0xT0 P] = 0.1786.
k ‖G (X (k))‖
0 3.7675
1 3.2866×10−2
2 5.0958×10−4
3 2.9617×10−10
4 8.052×10−15
Table B.1: Error in each iteration.
It should be noted that algorithm B.1.1 converges to the exact solution with an accuracy
of ‖G (X (k))‖ < 10−14 only after four iterations. From Table B.1, it can be observed that
Newton’s method attains quadratic convergence under the appropriate initial conditions.
B.1.3 Future investigation
In this section, I would like to formulate a problem of H∞-constrained multiple leaders,
multiple followers incentive Stackelberg game with static output feedback. However, the
results and discussions on this issue will be future investigations. Consider a linear stochas-
tic system governed by the Itoˆ differential equation deﬁned by
dx(t) =
[
Ax(t)+
M
∑
i=1
[BLi1uLi1(t)+ . . . +BLiNuLiM(t)]
+
N
∑
j=1
[BF j1uF j1(t)+ . . . +BF jMuF jM(t)]+Dv(t)
]
dt+Apx(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0,
(B.14a)
z(t) = col
[
Cx(t) uc1(t) . . . ucM(t)
]
, (B.14b)
166
y(t) = Ex(t), (B.14c)
uci(t) = col
[
uLi1(t) . . . uLiN(t) uF1i(t) . . . uFNi(t)
]
, (B.14d)
where x(t) ∈ Rn represents the state vector; z(t) ∈ Rnz represents the controlled output;
y(t) ∈Rny represents the measured output; uLi j(t) ∈RmLi j represents the leader Li’s control
input for the follower F j, i = 1, . . . ,M, j = 1, . . . ,N; uF ji(t) ∈ RmF ji represents the
follower F j’s control input according to the leader Li, i = 1, . . . ,M, j = 1, . . . ,N; v(t) ∈
R
mv represents the exogenous disturbance signal; w(t) ∈ R represents a one-dimensional
standard Wiener process deﬁned in the ﬁltered probability space (Ω, F , P, Ft) with
Ft = σ{w(s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t} [Chen and Zhang (2004)]. Cost functionals of the leaders
Li, i = 1, . . . ,M, are given by
JLi (uLi1, . . . ,uLiN , uF1i, . . . ,uFNi, v)
:=
1
2
E
[∫ ∞
0
{
xT (t)QLix(t)+
N
∑
j=1
[
uTLi j(t)RLi juLi j(t)+u
T
F ji(t)RLF jiuF ji(t)
]}
dt
]
,
(B.15)
where QLi = QTLi ≥ 0, RLi j = RTLi j > 0, RLF ji = RTLF ji ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . ,M, j = 1, . . . ,N.
Cost functionals of the followers Fi, i = 1, . . . ,N are given by
JFi (uL1i, . . . ,uLMi, uFi1, . . . ,uFiM, v)
:=
1
2
E
[∫ ∞
0
{
xT (t)QFix(t)+
M
∑
j=1
[
uTL ji(t)RFL jiuL ji(t)+u
T
Fi j(t)RFi juFi j(t)
]}
dt
]
,
(B.16)
where QF j =QTF j ≥ 0, RFi j = RTFi j > 0 and RFL ji = RTFL ji ≥ 0, i= 1, . . . ,N, j= 1, . . . ,M.
For a two-level incentive Stackelberg game, leaders announce the following incentive strat-
egy to the followers in ahead of time:
uLi j(t) =Λ jix(t)+Ξ jiuF ji(t), i = 1, . . . ,M j = 1, . . . ,N, (B.17)
where the parameters Λ ji and Ξ ji are to be determined associated with the Nash equilib-
rium strategies uF ji(t) of the followers for i, . . . ,M j = 1, . . . ,N. In this game, leaders
will achieve a Nash equilibrium solution attenuating the external disturbance with H∞ con-
straint. The inﬁnite-horizon multi-leader-follower incentive Stackelberg games for linear
stochastic systems with H∞ constraint can be formulated as follows.
For any disturbance attenuation level γ > 0, to ﬁnd, if possible, the static output feed-
back strategy u∗Li j(t) = Kci jy(t) and u∗F ji(t) = KF jiy(t) such that
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(i) the trajectory of the closed-loop system (B.14) satisﬁes the Nash equilibrium condi-
tions (B.18a) of the leaders with H∞ constraint condition (B.18b):
JLi(u∗c1, . . . ,u
∗
cM, v
∗)≤ JLi(γ∗−i(uci)), v∗), (B.18a)
0≤ Jv(u∗c1, . . . ,u∗cM, v∗)≤ Jv(u∗c1, . . . ,u∗cM, v), (B.18b)
where i = 1, . . . ,M,
Jv(uc1, . . . ,ucM, v) = E
[∫ ∞
0
{
γ2‖v(t)‖2−‖z(t)‖2
}
dt
]
, (B.19)
‖z(t)‖2 = xT (t)CTCx(t)+
M
∑
i=1
uTci(t)uci(t), (B.20)
∀ v(t) = 0 ∈ Rmv ,
(ii) with a worst-case disturbance v∗(t) ∈ Rmv , follower’s decision u∗F ji(t)) ∈ RmF ji; i =
1, . . . ,M, j = 1, . . . ,N satisﬁes the following Nash equilibrium conditions:
JF j(u∗F1, . . . ,u
∗
FN , v
∗)≤ JF j(γ∗− j(uˆF j)), v∗), (B.21)
where
uˆF j(t) = col
[
uF j1(t) . . . uF jM(t)
]
, j = 1, . . . ,N.
It should be noted that uLi j(t) depend on uF ji(t) according to the incentive Stackelberg
structures assumed in (B.17).
Remark B.2. Our research plan is to extend the above results of the static output feedback
incentive Stackelberg game for Markov jump linear stochastic system with disturbance.
However, [Mukaidani et al. (2018)] investigated discrete-time linear stochastic systems
with inﬁnite time-domain incentives by means of Markov jump parameters and external
disturbances through static output feedback. To the best of our knowledge, multiple leader-
follower problems with output feedback in continuous-time Markov jump linear stochastic
systems have not been studied yet.
B.2 Observer-based output feedback control
To extend the proposed results to the output feedback by means of the state observer, some
preliminary results have been studied.
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Deﬁnition B.3. [Chen and Zhang (2004)] Consider the following autonomous stochastic
system with measurement equation.
dx(t) = Ax(t)dt+Apx(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0, (B.22a)
y(t) =Cx(t), (B.22b)
where x(t) ∈ Rn is the state vector; y(t) ∈ R is the measurement output; w(t) ∈ R is a
one-dimensional wiener process; A, Ap ∈ Rn×n and C ∈ R×n are the coefﬁcient matrices.
If y(t)≡ 0, ∀ t ≥ 0 implies x0 = 0, (A, Ap |C) is called exactly observable.
To check the exact observability for the system (B.22) we can ﬁnd the following obsev-
ability matrix [Zhang and Chen (2004)]:
Os =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
C
CA
CAp
CApA
CAAp
CA2
CA2p
...
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
Then, (A, Ap|C) is exactly observable iff rank(Os) = n.
B.2.1 Basic problem
Here we consider the problem of linear quadratic optimal cost control via observer-based
control design. The technique can be described by the stochastic differential equation of
state as follows:
dx(t) = [Ax(t)+Bu(t)]dt+Apx(t)dw, x(0) = x0, (B.23a)
y(t) =Cx(t). (B.23b)
where x(t) ∈ Rn is the state vector; u(t) ∈ Rm is the control input; w(t) ∈ R is a one-
dimensional wiener process; y(t)∈R is the measurement output; A, Ap ∈Rn×n, B∈Rn×m
and C ∈ R×n are coefﬁcient matrices.
Consider stochastic LQ control with the following cost functional:
J = E
[∫ ∞
0
[xT (t)Qx(t)+uT (t)Ru(t)]dt
]
, (B.24)
where Q = QT ≥ 0 and R = RT > 0.
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B.2.2 Preliminary results
If the system state of (B.23) is not fully accessible, the state feedback controller may be
disabled. This is the motivation to propose an output feedback controller; the controller
will be an observer-based controller in the following form [Gao and Shi (2013)]:
dxˆ(t) = [Axˆ(t)+Bu(t)]dt+G[yˆ(t)− y(t)]dt, xˆ(0) = x0, (B.25a)
yˆ(t) =Cxˆ(t), (B.25b)
u(t) = Kxˆ(t), (B.25c)
where xˆ(t) ∈ Rn is the estimation of x(t); yˆ(t) ∈ R is the estimation of y(t); G ∈ Rn× and
K ∈ Rm×n the observer gain and control gain, respectively.
So, by using (B.23) and (B.25), the following closed loop systems can be obtained:
dx(t) = [Ax(t)+BKxˆ(t)]dt+Apx(t)dw, x(0) = x0, (B.26a)
dxˆ(t) = [Axˆ(t)+BKxˆ(t)]dt+GC[xˆ(t)− x(t)]dt, xˆ(0) = x0. (B.26b)
The cost functional of the state dynamics and the estimated state dynamics can be written
as:
J = E
[∫ ∞
0
[xT (t)Qx(t)+ xˆT (t)KTRKxˆ(t)]dt
]
, (B.27)
where Q = QT ≥ 0 and R = RT > 0. Let e(t) = x(t)− xˆ(t) be the error. Then from (B.26),
we can ﬁnd the error dynamics as
dx(t) = [Ax(t)+BKxˆ(t)]dt+Apx(t)dw, x(0) = x0, (B.28a)
de(t) = [Ae(t)+GCe(t)]dt+Apx(t)dw, e(0) = 0 ∈ Rn. (B.28b)
The cost functional of the state and the error dynamics can be written as:
J = E
[∫ ∞
0
[xT (t)(Q+KTRK)x(t)−2xT (t)KTRKe(t)+ eT (t)KTRKe(t)]dt
]
, (B.29)
where Q = QT ≥ 0 and R = RT > 0.
Let x¯(t)= col[x(t) e(t)]. Therefore, form (B.26), a closed loop system can be obtained
as follow:
dx¯(t) = A¯x¯(t)dt+ A¯px¯(t)dw(t), x¯(0) = x¯0, (B.30)
where
A¯ =
[
A+BK −BK
0 A+GC
]
, A¯p =
[
Ap 0
Ap 0
]
, x¯0 =
[
x0
0
]
.
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The cost functional in this case is
J = E
[∫ ∞
0
x¯T (t)Q¯x¯(t)dt
]
, (B.31)
where
Q¯ :=
[
Q+KTRK −KTRK
−KTRK KTRK
]
. (B.32)
Deﬁnition B.4. [Dragan et al. (2006)] The closed-loop system (B.30) or (A¯, A¯p) is called
asymptotically mean-square stable if
lim
t→∞E[‖x¯(t)‖
2] = 0. (B.33)
Lemma B.2. [Gao and Shi (2013)] If there exists a symmetric positive deﬁnite matrix Z¯
such that
A¯T Z¯+ Z¯A¯+ A¯Tp Z¯A¯p+ Q¯ < 0, (B.34)
then the stochastic system (B.30) is mean-square stable.
Theorem B.1. [Gao and Shi (2013)] The closed-loop system (B.30) is mean-square stable
if there are matrices K, G, X = XT > 0 and Y = YT > 0, and a positive scalar α such that
the following inequalities hold:[
Λ1+αATpYAp −X(BK)−KTRK
−(BK)TX −KTRK αΛ2+KTRK
]
< 0, (B.35)
where
Λ1 = (A+BK)TX +X(A+BK)+ATpXAp+Q+K
TRK, (B.36)
Λ2 = (A+GC)TY +Y (A+GC). (B.37)
Proof. Let Z¯ =
[
X 0
0 αY
]
. Then Z¯ = Z¯T > 0 as X > 0 and Y > 0. Using Lemma B.2, we
can derive
A¯T Z¯+ Z¯A¯+ A¯Tp Z¯A¯p+ Q¯ < 0, (B.38)
which implies[
A+BK −BK
0 A+GC
]T [X 0
0 αY
]
+
[
X 0
0 αY
][
A+BK −BK
0 A+GC
]
(B.39)
+
[
Ap 0
Ap 0
]T [X 0
0 αY
][
Ap 0
Ap 0
]
+
[
Q+KTRK −KTRK
−KTRK KTRK
]
< 0. (B.40)
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Equivalently, [
Λ1+αATpYAp −X(BK)−KTRK
−(BK)TX −KTRK αΛ2+KTRK
]
< 0, (B.41)
where
Λ1 = (A+BK)TX +X(A+BK)+ATpXAp+Q+K
TRK, (B.42)
Λ2 = (A+GC)TY +Y (A+GC). (B.43)
Hence, the theorem is proved.
Theorem B.2. [Gao and Shi (2013)] For the closed-loop system (B.30), if there exist ma-
trices
(i) U =UT > 0, Z and a positive scalars ρ such that:⎡
⎢⎢⎣
ΓUV UATp U ZT
ApU −U 0 0
U 0 −Q−1 0
Z 0 0 −R−1
⎤
⎥⎥⎦< 0, (B.44)
where
ΓUV :=UAT +AU +ZTBT +BZ+ρIn,
(ii) Y = YT > 0, W and a positive scalar β such that:[
ΓXY −βX(BK)−βKTRK
−β (BK)TX −βKTRK ATY +YA+WC+CTWT +βKTRK
]
< 0, (B.45)
where
ΓXY :=−βρXTX +ATpYAp,
then control gain K and observer gain G can be obtained as follows:
K = ZU−1, (B.46)
G = Y−1W. (B.47)
Proof. Proof (i): Compared to the Theorem 3 of [Gao and Shi (2013)],
Λ1 <−ρXTX , (B.48)
where
Λ1 = (A+BK)TX +X(A+BK)+ATpXAp+Q+K
TRK. (B.49)
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Multiplying X−1 on the left-hand side and on the right-hand side of (B.48), and letting
U = X−1, we can get
U(A+BK)T +(A+BK)U +UATpU
−1+ApU +ρIn+U(Q+KTRK)U < 0. (B.50)
Now letting Z = KU and using Schur complement inequality, (B.50) is implied by⎡
⎢⎢⎣
ΓUV UATp U ZT
ApU −U 0 0
U 0 −Q−1 0
Z 0 0 −R−1
⎤
⎥⎥⎦< 0, (B.51)
where
ΓUV :=UAT +AU +ZTBT +BZ+ρIn.
Hence inequality (i) is proved.
Proof (ii): Applying Λ1 <−ρXTX from (B.48) into (B.35), we can write[−ρXTX +αATpYAp −X(BK)−KTRK
−(BK)TX −KTRK αΛ2+KTRK
]
< 0, (B.52)
where
Λ2 = (A+GC)TY +Y (A+GC).
Let W = Y−1G, and α = 1/β , we can obtain[
ΓXY −βX(BK)−βKTRK
−β (BK)TX −βKTRK ATY +YA+WC+CTWT +βKTRK
]
< 0, (B.53)
where
ΓXY :=−βρXTX +ATpYAp.
This competes the proof.
Furthermore, the corresponding value of the cost function (B.24) satisﬁes the following
inequality:
J < E[xT0U
−1x0]. (B.54)
Consequently, solving the following optimization problem allows us to determine the opti-
mal cost bound.
J∗ =minψ, (B.55)
subject to [−ψ xT0
x0 −U
]
< 0. (B.56)
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B.2.3 Future works
In this section, I would like to formulate a problem of stochastic incentive Stackelberg game
through observer-based control design. However, the results and discussions on this issue
will be future investigations. Consider a stochastic system governed by the Itoˆ differential
equation deﬁned by
dx(t) =
[
Ax(t)+B0u0(t)+B1u1(t)
]
dt+Apx(t)dw(t), x(0) = x0, (B.57a)
y(t) =Cx(t) (B.57b)
where u0(t) ∈ Rm0 denotes the leader’s control input. u1(t) ∈ Rm1 denotes the follower’s
control input. The deﬁnitions of the other variables are the same as those in stochastic
system (B.23). The coefﬁcient matrices A, B0, B1, Ap and C are of suitable dimensions. In
the following, we use P0 to represent the leader and P1 to represent the follower.
On the other hand, the cost functions of P0 and P1 are correspondingly given by
J0(u0, u1) =
1
2
E
[∫ ∞
0
{
xT (t)Q0x(t)+uT0 (t)R00u0(t)+u
T
1 (t)R01u1(t)
}
dt
]
, (B.58a)
J1(u0, u1) =
1
2
E
[∫ ∞
0
{
xT (t)Q1x(t)+uT0 (t)R10u0(t)+u
T
1 (t)R11u1(t)
}
dt
]
, (B.58b)
where Q1 = QT1 ≥ 0, R00 = RT00 > 0, R01 = RT01 ≥ 0, R10 = RT10 ≥ 0 and R11 = RT11 > 0, are
of suitable dimensions. The game process to determine the incentive Stackelberg strategy
set is as follows.
(i) In the stochastic system (B.57), the leader P0 achieves an observer-based output feed-
back strategy of team-optimal condition (B.59),
J0(u∗0, u
∗
1) = minu0, u1
J0(u0, u1). (B.59)
(ii) The leader announces the strategy to the follower in advance through the following
estimated state observer pattern:
u0(t) = u0(t, xˆ(t),u1) = Λxˆ(t)+Ξu1(t), (B.60)
where Λ ∈ Rm0×n and Ξ ∈ Rm0×m1 are strategy parameter matrices and
dxˆ(t) = [Axˆ(t)+Bcuc(t)]dt+G[yˆ(t)− y(t)]dt, xˆ(0) = x0, (B.61a)
yˆ(t) =Cxˆ(t), (B.61b)
uc(t) =
[
Kc0
Kc1
]
xˆ(t) = Kcxˆ(t), (B.61c)
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with
Bc :=
[
B0 B1
]
, uc := col
[
u0 u1
]
.
Furthermore, the cost functional in this case is
J0 (uc(t)) :=
1
2
E
[∫ ∞
0
{
xˆT (t)Q0xˆ(t)+uTc (t)Rcuc(t)
}
dt
]
, (B.62)
where
Rc := block diag
[
R00 R01
]
.
(iii) The follower determines the optimal strategy u∗1(t) through the output feedback by
means of the state observer responding to the announced strategy of the leader. i.e., to ﬁnd
u∗1(t) with
dxˆ(t) = [Axˆ(t)+B0[Λxˆ(t)+Ξu1(t)]+B1u1(t)]dt+G[yˆ(t)− y(t)]dt, xˆ(0) = x0,
(B.63a)
yˆ(t) =Cxˆ(t), (B.63b)
u1(t) = K1xˆ(t). (B.63c)
The cost functional in this case is
J1(u1) =
1
2
E
[∫ ∞
0
{
xˆT (t)Q1xˆ(t)+ [Λxˆ(t)+Ξu1(t)]TR10[Λxˆ(t)+Ξu1(t)]
+uT1 (t)R11u1(t)
}
dt
]
. (B.64)
(iv) Using the equivalence relation Kc1 = K1, the leader determines unknown parameters
and the incentive Stackelberg strategy
u∗0(t) = u
∗
0(t, xˆ(t),u1) = Λxˆ(t)+Ξu
∗
1(t), (B.65)
to achieve the team optimal solution (u∗0, u
∗
1).
Remark B.3. As we saw the state feedback control, when we consider incentive Stackel-
berg games, the coefﬁcients B0 and B1 associated with the control inputs should be square
matrices. The incentive parameter Ξ was determined by the following matrix algebraic
equation:
ΞT (BT0 P1−R10R−101 BT0 Pc) = R11R−101 BT1 Pc−BT1 P1, (B.66)
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where P1,Pc ∈Rn×n are symmetric positive semi-deﬁnite matrices. The incentive parameter
Ξ can be uniquely determined if and only if (BT0 P1−R10R−101 BT0 Pc) is non-singular. If B0
is not a square matrix, the statement does not hold. We can also observe that R01 should
have the same size as B0. On the right side, the same dimension of R01 and Pc means
that the dimensions of B1 must be the same and square. However, with the observer-based
output feedback strategy, it can be seen from the preliminary results that no relationship
like (B.66) will occur. Therefore, to avoid this serious drawback, an observer-based output
feedback design can be considered.
B.3 H∞ constrained nonlinear stochastic LQ control
B.3.1 Preliminaries
Consider a nonlinear stochastic system governed by the Itoˆ differential equation deﬁned by
dx(t) =
[
f (x)+
N
∑
j=1
g j(x)u j(t)+h(x)v(t)
]
dt+ r(x)dw, x(0) = x0, (B.67a)
z(t) = col
[
Cx(t) u1(t) · · · uN(t)
]
, (B.67b)
where f (0) = 0 and h(0) = 0. Here, x(t) ∈Rn represents the state vector. z(t) ∈Rnz repre-
sents the controlled output. ui(t)∈L 2F ([0,Tf ], Rmi), i= 1, ... ,N represent the i-th control
inputs. v(t) ∈L 2F ([0,Tf ], Rmv) represent the exogenous disturbance signal. w(t) ∈ R rep-
resents a one-dimensional standard Wiener process deﬁned in the ﬁltered probability space
(Ω, F , P, Ft)withFt = σ{w(s) : 0≤ s≤ t} [Zhang et al. (2006), Zhang et al. (2008)].
Now, the ﬁnite horizon nonlinear stochastic H∞ control with multiple decision makers
that is based on a stochastic Nash game is given below.
Deﬁnition B.5. For any given γ > 0, 0< Tf <∞, v(t)∈L 2F ([0,Tf ], Rmv), ﬁnd, if possible,
a state feedback strategy set ui(t) = u∗i (t) ∈L 2F ([0,Tf ], Rmi), i = 1, ... ,N, such that
(i) The trajectory of the closed-loop system (B.67) satisﬁes
0≤ Jv(u∗1, ... ,u∗N , v∗, x0)≤ Jv(u∗1, ... ,u∗N , v, x0), (B.68)
where
Jv(u1, ... ,uN , v, x0) = E
[∫ Tf
0
[γ2‖v(t)‖2−‖z(t)‖2]dt
]
, (B.69)
‖z(t)‖2 = xT (t)CTCx(t)+
N
∑
j=1
uTj (t)u j(t) (B.70)
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for ∀v(t) = 0 ∈L 2F ([0,Tf ], Rmv).
(ii) When the worst case disturbance v∗(t) ∈L 2F ([0,Tf ], Rmv), if existing, is implemented
in (1), ui(t) ∈ L 2F ([0,Tf ], Rmi), i = 1, ... ,N satisfy the following the Nash equilibria
deﬁned by
Ji(u∗1, ... ,u
∗
N , v
∗, x0)≤ Ji(u∗1, ... , u∗i−1, ui, u∗i+1, ... ,u∗N , v∗, x0), (B.71)
where
Ji(u1, ... ,uN , v, x0) = E
[∫ Tf
0
[xT (t)Qix(t)+uTi (t)Riui(t)]dt
]
(B.72)
with Qi = QTi ≥ 0 and Ri = RTi > 0.
That is, the considered H∞ control problem for stochastic nonlinear systems with mul-
tiple decision makers is to ﬁnd the v∗ and u∗i such that the inequalities (B.68) and (B.71)
hold, respectively.
TheoremB.3. [Mukaidani et al. (2015b)] Consider the following cross-coupled Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations:
∂VTv
∂ t
+
∂VTv
∂x
fˆK(x)− γ
−2
4
· ∂V
T
v
∂x
h(x)hT (x)
∂Vv
∂x
−mˆT (t,x)mˆ(t,x)+ 1
2
rT (x)
∂ 2Vv
∂x2
r(x) = 0,
(B.73a)
∂VTi
∂ t
+
∂VTi
∂x
fˆ−i(x)+ xT (t)Qix(t)−14 ·
∂VTi
∂x
gi(x)R−1i g
T
i (x)
∂Vi
∂x
+
1
2
rT (x)
∂ 2Vi
∂x2
r(x) = 0,
(B.73b)
where i = 1, ... ,N, Vv =Vv(t,x), Vi =Vi(t,x), Vv(Tf ,x(Tf )) = 0, Vi(Tf ,x(Tf )) = 0,
fˆK(x(t)) := f (x(t))+
N
∑
j=1
g j(x)Kj(t,x),
fˆ−i(x(t)) := f (x(t))+
N
∑
j=1, i=i
g j(x)Kj(t,x)+h(x(t))Kv(t,x),
mˆT mˆ := xT (t)CTCx(t)+
N
∑
j=1
KTj (t,x)Kj(t,x).
Suppose there exist a set of solutions (Vv, V1, ... ,VN) then the ﬁnite horizon Nash based
H∞ control has a strategy set
v∗(t,x) = K∗v (t,x) =−
γ−2
2
hT
∂V ∗v (t,x)
∂x
, (B.74a)
u∗i (t,x) = K
∗
i (t,x) =−
1
2
R−1i g
T
i
∂V ∗i (t,x)
∂x
. (B.74b)
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Proof. Let us consider the following H∞ control problem for the closed-loop stochastic
system with arbitrary strategies ui(t,x) = Ki(t,x), i = 1, ... ,N.
dx(t) =
[
fˆK(x(t))+h(x(t))v(t)
]
dt+ r(x(t))dw(t), (B.75a)
z(t) = mˆ :=
[
xT (t)CT KT1 (t,x) · · · KTN (t,x)
]T
. (B.75b)
Applying Lemma 2.1 of [Zhang et al. (2006)] to the stochastic system (B.75) yields the
HJB equation (B.73a) and a worst case disturbance is (B.74a). Furthermore, in order to
apply LQ problem that is deﬁned by [Zhang et al. (2006)], the following regulator problem
is considered.
minimize J−i(ui), (B.76)
s.t. dx(t) = [ fˆ−i(x(t))+gi(x(t))ui(t)]dt+ r(x(t))dw(t),
where
J−i(ui) := Ji(K∗1 ... , K
∗
i−1, ui, K
∗
i+1, ... ,K
∗
N , v
∗, x0)
= E
[∫ Tf
0
[
xT (t)Qix(t)+uTi (t,x)Riui(t,x)
]
dt
]
.
If there exists a nonnegative Lyapunov function Vi(t,x) solving the HJB equation (B.73b).
Thus, we have
J−i(K∗i )≥ E[Vi(0,x0)] (B.77)
with the optimal strategy (B.74b) can be derived, respectively.
B.3.2 Future works
In this section, I would like to formulate a problem of H∞-constrained incentive Stackelberg
game with stochastic nonlinear system dynamics. However, the results and discussions on
this issue will be future investigations. Consider a nonlinear stochastic system governed by
the Itoˆ differential equation deﬁned by
dx(t) =
[
f (x)+
N
∑
j=1
[
g0 j(x)u0 j(t)+g j(x)u j(t)
]
+h(x)v(t)
]
dt+ r(x)dw, x(0) = x0,
(B.78a)
z(t) = col
[
Cx(t) u0(t) u1(t) · · · uN(t)
]
, (B.78b)
u0(t) = col
[
u01(t) · · · u0N(t)
]
, (B.78c)
where f (0)= 0 and h(0)= 0. Here, u0(t)∈L 2F ([0,Tf ], Rm0), m0 =∑Nj=1m0 j with u0 j(t)∈
L 2F ([0,Tf ], R
m0 j) denotes the leader’s control input. ui(t)∈L 2F ([0,Tf ], Rmi), i= 1 , ... ,N
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denotes the ith follower’s control input. In the following, we use P0 to represent the leader
and Pi, i = 1 , ... ,N to represent the ith follower. The deﬁnitions of the other variables are
the same as those in stochastic system (B.67).
On the other hand, the cost functions of P0 and Pi, i = 1, 2, ..., N are given by
J0(u01, ... ,u0N , u1, ... ,uN , v)
=
1
2
E
[∫ Tf
0
{
xT (t)Q0x(t)+
N
∑
i=1
[
uT0i(t)R00iu0i(t)+u
T
i (t)R0iui(t)
]}
dt
]
, (B.79a)
Ji(u01, ... ,u0N , u1, ... ,uN , v)
=
1
2
E
[∫ Tf
0
{
xT (t)Qix(t)+uT0i(t)R0iiu0i(t)+u
T
i (t)Riiui(t)
}
dt
]
, i = 1, ... ,N,
(B.79b)
where Q0 :=CTC, Qi = QTi ≥ 0, R00i = RT00i > 0, R0i = RT0i ≥ 0, R0ii = RT0ii ≥ 0 and Rii =
RTii > 0, i = 1, ... ,N are of suitable dimensions, and the entries are piece-wise continuous
functions of time on the ﬁxed interval [0, Tf ].
The game process to determine the incentive Stackelberg strategy set is as follows:
(i) The leader announces a strategy ahead of time to the followers with the following feed-
back pattern.
u0i(t) = u0i(t,x(t),ui) = Γix(t)+Ξiui(t), (B.80)
for i = 1, ... ,N, where Γi ∈ Rm0i×n and Ξi ∈ Rm0i×mi are strategy parameter matrices of
suitable dimensions. Moreover, their components are piece-wise continuous functions of
time on the interval [0, Tf ].
(ii) The followers determine their strategies to achieve a Nash equilibrium by responding
to the announced strategy of the leader.
(iii) The leader determines the incentive Stackelberg strategy
u∗0i(t) = Γix(t)+Ξiu
∗
i (t), (B.81)
for i = 1, ... ,N to achieve the team optimal solution (u∗0,u
∗
1, ...,u
∗
N), which is associated
with the Nash equilibrium strategy u∗i (t) for i = 1, ... ,N of the followers.
The ﬁnite-horizon H∞-constrained incentive Stackelberg game with multiple non-
cooperative followers can be formulated as follows.
For any disturbance attenuation level γ > 0, 0 < Tf < ∞, we need to ﬁnd an incentive
strategy of P0 by (B.81) and a closed-loop Nash strategy of Pi by
u∗i (t) := Ki(t), i = 1, ... ,N,
considering the worst-case disturbance v∗(t) := Fγ(t) such that
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(i) The trajectory of the closed-loop system (B.78) satisﬁes the following team-optimal
condition (B.82a) along with H∞ constraint condition (B.82b),
J0(x0,u∗0,u
∗
1, ... ,u
∗
N ,v
∗)≤ J0(x0,u0,u1, ... ,uN ,v∗), (B.82a)
0≤ Jv(x0,u∗0,u∗1, ... ,u∗N ,v∗)≤ Jv(x0,u∗0,u∗1, ... ,u∗N ,v). (B.82b)
(ii) A set of decision (u∗0i, u
∗
i ) ∈ Rm0i+mi , i = 1, ... ,N satisfying the following Nash
equilibrium inequality:
Ji(x0,u∗0,u
∗
1, ... ,u
∗
N ,v
∗)≤ Ji(x0,λ ∗−i(u0i),λ ∗−i(ui),v∗) (B.83)
with λ ∗−i(α) := (λ ∗1 , ... ,λ
∗
i−1, α, λ
∗
i+1, ... ,λ
∗
N).
Then, the strategy-set (u∗0i, u
∗
i ) ∈ Rm0i+mi , i = 1, ... ,N constitutes both a team-
optimal incentive Stackelberg strategy with the H∞ constraint of the leader and Nash
equilibrium strategies of the followers for a two-level hierarchical game.
Remark B.4. It should be noted that to implement the proposed method for the nonlinear
stochastic systems, HJB equations like (B.73) will appear, and it is more difﬁcult to ﬁnd
appropriate solutions numerically than that of the linear systems.
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Appendix C
Stochastic H∞-Control for Small γ
If the disturbance attenuation level is too small, the H∞-control design described in our
thesis will be invalid. To solve such problems [Pan and Bas¸ar (1993)] characterizes a class
of stabilizing controllers. Furthermore, the minimum value of γ = γmin can be found until
the system is stable. Consider the following stochastic linear system:
dx(t) = [Ax(t)+Bu(t)+Ev(t)]dt+Apx(t)dw, x(0) = x0 (C.1a)
z(t) = col
[
Cx(t) Du(t)
]
, DTD = I, (C.1b)
where, x(t) ∈ Rn is the state vector, u(t) ∈ L 2F (R+, Rnu) is the control input, v(t) ∈
L 2F (R+, R
nv) is the deterministic disturbance, w(t) ∈ R is a one-dimensional wiener pro-
cess and z(t) ∈ Rnz is the controlled output.
With this system, we associate the standard quadratic performance index:
Ju(u, v) = ‖z‖22 = E
[∫ ∞
0
{
xTCTCx+uTu
}
dt
]
. (C.2)
The H∞-optimal control problem is the minimization of the quantity
‖L ‖∞ = sup
v ∈L 2F (R+, Rnv)
v = 0, x0 = 0
‖z‖2
‖v‖2 . (C.3)
The derivation of a feedback controller u = Kx will ensure a performance within a given
neighborhood of the inﬁmum of (C.3). Let this minimum value be represented by γmin, i.e.
γmin = inf
u∈L 2F (R+, Rnu)
sup
v ∈L 2F (R+, Rnv)
v = 0, x0 = 0
‖z‖2
‖v‖2 . (C.4)
We can associate this to the linear-quadratic differential game [Bas¸ar and Bernhard (2008)]
with worst-case disturbance problem, which has the cost functional
J(u, v) = E
[∫ ∞
0
(‖z‖2− γ2‖v‖2)dt
]
. (C.5)
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Deﬁnition C.1. [Bas¸ar and Bernhard (2008)] A strategy pair (u∗, v∗) ∈ Γu × Γv is in
saddle-point equilibrium if
J(u∗, v)≤ J(u∗, v∗)≤ J(u, v∗)
for all (u∗,v)∈ Γu×Γv and (u, v∗)∈ Γu×Γv, where Γu×Γv means a product vector space.
For each γ > γmin, the differential game allows the saddle-point controller design
[Bas¸ar and Bernhard (2008)] with state feedback law. The design can also be transferred as
a state feedback Nash equilibrium strategy [Zhang and Chen (2004)] by changing the sign
of the disturbance performance (C.5) as
Jv(u,v) = E
[∫ ∞
0
(γ2‖v‖2−‖z‖2)dt
]
. (C.6)
Due to the numerical stiffness, the computation of γmin and the corresponding H∞-optimal
controller for small values of γ > 0 have serious difﬁculties.
The following theorem can be used to design the controller whether such problems of
small disturbance attenuation levels occur.
Theorem C.1. For the system (C.1), suppose the generalized algebraic Riccati equation
(GARE):
ATZ+ZA+ATpZAp−ZSZ+CTC = 0, (C.7)
with
S := BBT − γ−2EET ,
has the solution Z > 0 > 0. If [A, Ap|C] is exactly observable, then the stochastic H2/H∞
control problem admits a solution set:
u∗(t) = K∗x(t) =−BTZx(t), (C.8)
v∗(t) = K∗γ x(t) = γ
−2ETZx(t). (C.9)
Proof. Let u(t) = u∗(t) =−BTZx(t), then by Lemma 5 of [Zhang and Chen (2004)], there
exist a solution Z > 0 to the following ARE:
Z(A−BBTZ)+(A−BBTZ)TZ+ATpZAp+ZBBTZ+ γ−2ZEETZ+CTC = 0, (C.10)
which is the same as GARE (C.7).
Now we have to show
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(i) ‖L ‖∞ < γ .
Substituting u(t) = u∗(t) =−BTZx(t) into (C.1) gives⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
dx(t) =
{
(A−BBTZ)x(t)+Ev(t)}dt+Apx(t)dw(t),
z(t) =
[
Cx(t)
−DBTZx(t)
]
,
(C.11)
where x(0) = x0. Applying Ito’s formula to (C.11) and considering GARE (C.10), we have
E
[∫ ∞
0
d(xTZx)
]
= E
[∫ ∞
0
{(
(A−BBTZ)x+Ev)(Zx+ xTZ)+ xTATpZApx}dt
]
or, − xT0 Zx0 = E
[∫ ∞
0
{
xT (Z(A−BBTZ)+(A−BBTZ)TZ+ATpZAp)x
+ vTETZx+ xTZEv
}
dt
]
= E
[∫ ∞
0
{
xT A˜T2 A˜2x+ v
TETZx+ xTZEv
}
dt
]
= E
[∫ ∞
0
{
xT (CTC+ γ−2ZEETZ+ZBBTZ)x+ vTETZx+ xTZEv
}
dt
]
= E
[∫ ∞
0
{
zT z+ γ2v∗
T
v∗+ vTETZx+ xTZEv
}
dt
]
[suppose, v∗(t) = γ−2ETZx(t)]
or, E
[∫ ∞
0
{
γ2vT v− zT z}dt]= xT0 Zx0+E
[∫ ∞
0
{
γ2vT v+ γ2v∗
T
v∗ − γ2vT v∗ − γ2v∗T v
}
dt
]
= xT0 Zx0+ γ
2
E
[∫ ∞
0
(v− v∗)T (v− v∗)dt
]
(C.12)
So
Jv(u∗, v) = E
[∫ ∞
0
{
γ2vT v− zT z}dt]
= xT0 Zx0+ γ
2
E
[∫ ∞
0
(v− v∗)T (v− v∗)dt
]
≥ Jv(u∗, v∗) = xT0 Zx0. (C.13)
Now, if we deﬁne an operatorL1v= v−v∗, then form (C.13) we have (for x(0) = x0 = 0):
Jv(u∗, v) = γ‖v‖2−‖z‖2 = γ2‖L1v‖2 ≥ ε‖v‖2 > 0
, for some ε > 0, which yields ‖L ‖∞ < γ .
(ii) u∗ minimizes the output energy ‖z‖22 when v∗ applied in (C.1), i.e.,
u∗ = argmin
u
Ju(u, v∗), ∀u ∈L 2F (R+, Rnu).
When worst-case disturbance v = v∗(t) = γ−2ETZx(t) is applied to (C.1), we have⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
dx(t) =
{
(A+ γ−2EETZ)x(t)+Bu(t)
}
dt+Apx(t)dw(t)
z(t) =
[
Cx(t)
Du(t)
]
,
(C.14)
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where x(0) = x0. Now the H2 optimization problem becomes a standard stochastic LQ
optimal control problem, so we can write [Rami and Zhou (2000)]
On the other hand, let v(t) = v∗(t) = K∗γ x(t) = γ−2ETZx(t), then by Lemma 6 of
[Zhang and Chen (2004)], there exist a solution Z > 0 to the following ARE:
Z(A+ γ−2ZEETZ)+(A+ γ−2ZEETZ)TZ+ATpZAp+ZBB
TZ− γ−2ZEETZ+CTC = 0,
(C.15)
which is the same as GARE (C.7). Applying Ito’s formula in (C.14) considering (C.15) we
get,
E
[∫ ∞
0
d(xTZx)
]
= E
[∫ ∞
0
{(
(A+ γ−2EETZ)x+Bu
)
(Zx+ xTZ)+ xTATpZApx
}
dt
]
or, − xT0 Zx0 = E
[∫ ∞
0
{
xTZBBTZx− xTCTCx+uTBTZx+ xTZBu}dt] [by (C.15)]
or, E
[∫ ∞
0
{
xTCTCx+uTu
}
dt
]
= xT0 Zx0+E
[∫ ∞
0
{
uTu+u∗
T
u∗+uTu∗ −uTu∗ −u∗T u
}
dt
]
or, Ju(u, v∗) = xT0 Zx0+E
[∫ ∞
0
(u−u∗)T (u−u∗)dt
]
. (C.16)
If we put u = u∗, then form (C.16) we get
Ju(u, v∗)≥ Ju(u∗, v∗) = xT0 Zx0. (C.17)
It can be observed from both (C.10) and (C.15) that these equations can be simpliﬁed as
the GARE (C.7). So, the solution of GARE (C.7) can be written as Z > 0.
Using above results we can ﬁnd from (C.4)
γmin = inf
u∈L 2F (R+, Rnu)
sup
v ∈L 2F (R+, Rnv)
v = 0, x0 = 0
√
E
[∫ ∞
0
{xTCTCx+uTu}dt
]
√
E
[∫ ∞
0
vT v dt
]
= inf
u∈L 2F (R+, Rnu)
sup
v ∈L 2F (R+, Rnv)
v = 0, x0 = 0
√
E
[∫ ∞
0
{xT [CTC+K∗TK∗]x}dt
]
√
E
[∫ ∞
0
xTKTγ Kγx dt
] .
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Numerical example
In order to demonstrate the efﬁciency of our proposed strategies, a numerical example is
investigated. Let us consider the following system matrices of the system (C.1):
A =
⎡
⎣ −0.52 1.12 00 −0.24 1
0.23 0.85 −0.16
⎤
⎦ , Ap = 0.1A, x(0) =
⎡
⎣ 10.5
−0.6
⎤
⎦ ,
B =
⎡
⎣0.150.12
3.55
⎤
⎦ , E =
⎡
⎣ 0.23−0.52
0.28
⎤
⎦ , C = [1 1 1], γ = 3.
If we apply our proposed method to the system (C.1), we get the following numerical
results.
Z =
⎡
⎣2.3417e−01 2.8373e−01 2.4301e−012.8373e−01 4.3796e−01 3.7839e−01
2.4301e−01 3.7839e−01 3.3864e−01
⎤
⎦ ,
K =
[−9.3184e−01 −1.4384e+00 −1.2840e+00] ,
Kγ =
[−2.8487e−03 −6.2811e−03 −5.1173e−03] .
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Fig. C.1: Trajectory of the state.
The MATLAB code is developed on the basis of Lyapunov iterations which converges
to the required solutions of GARE (C.7) with an accuracy of 1.0e− 14 order only after 7
iterations. It can be observed form the response depicted in Fig. C.1 that the state attains
the mean-square stable.
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γ 3 1.5 · · · 0.09375 0.140625 · · · 0.1532178
Solution exists exist · · · does not exist does not exist · · · exists (γmin)
Table C.1: Bisection method for ﬁnding γmin.
By applying the bisection method, it can be found that the minimum value of γ = γmin =
0.1532178 with an accuracy of 1.0e− 11, which is depicted in Table C.1. Therefore, we
can choose any small value of the disturbance level γ > 0.1532178. It should be noted that
for any value of γ < γmin, the solution of GARE (C.7) does not exist and the H∞-control
cannot be designed.
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